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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate alternative, more reliable and cost effective ways 
of improving the reliability performance of medium voltage networks. Customers are mainly 
affected by faults on the distribution MV network, to which, consequently, we have to pay 
particular attention. A major requirement on electricity supply systems is high supply 
reliability for the customer which is mainly determined by the distribution networks. Power 
system reliability is an essential factor in the quality of supply and is directly related to the 
number and duration of outages. By analysing the power system properly, the weaknesses 
will then be identified and improvements can be introduced to minimise the occurrence of 
outages. A decrease in the outage rate will result in an improvement in reliability and quality 
of supply of the distribution MV network. 
The dissertation focuses on improving the network management by increasing the level of 
network automation and control which improves the operating efficiency of medium voltage 
distribution networks. Steps are shown how to equip the network according to progressive 
investment capability, from Fault Path Indicators (FPIs) and remote control Pulseclosing 
technologies to automatic FuseSavers and Tripsavers used in a feeder automation scheme 
to minimise the number of disturbances and the outage durations experienced when they 
occur. 
The results of a study analysing the impact of different intelligent automation solutions on the 
reliability performance of Medium Voltage distribution networks are presented in the 
dissertation. The respective system topologies are modelled and the resulting system 
reliability performance is determined by reliability calculations such as the SAIDI and SAIFI 
values. The results show that the distribution automation technologies can have a very 
significant impact on both the SAIDI and SAIFI performance of the systems. Further, 
selected details related to the implementation of such intelligent automation schemes are 
presented in this dissertation. 
The dissertation begins with a brief introduction about power systems, followed by a review 
of the literature pertaining to the topic. The dissertation then describes how to carry out 
reliability evaluation of a real distribution network using DIgSILENT PowerFactory and 
compare the results with the analytical method, the historical data method and results 
obtained from the field after the installation of the new innovative technologies. Thereafter a 
cost analysis for the distribution system reliability enhancement solution implementation was 
performed. 
It was concluded based on the results that the use of different distribution automation 
technologies improved reliability performance by reducing the duration of interruptions but 
not the frequency of interruption i.e. it improves the SAIDI but not SAIFI. It appears clear that 
implementation of automatic technologies, remote control and fault detection are the key 
solutions to improving network reliability.  
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LISTS OF DEFINITIONS 
 
AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER - Any transformer that has been installed and supplied 
from a supply transformer with the purposes of 
supplying auxiliary equipment or supply points. 
 
ARC- AUTO-RECLOSE - Operation when the network breaker opens its contacts 
for a set period of time allowing the fault current on the 
line to be removed and then closes the contacts, 
restoring voltage supply to the  line [3].  
 
BULK LOADS / POINTS - It refers to a customer’s supply point (metering points), 
where the customer’s supply voltage is >1 kV i.e. the 
transformer supplying the customer is not an Eskom 
asset, but the customer’s. 
CAUSE (ROOT) - The source factor or root cause resulting in a network 
event or loss of supply to a customer. 
 
CUSTOMER - A person or legal entity who has an electricity supply 
agreement with the relevant distribution licensee (Eskom 
Group) [3]. 
 
CUSTOMER (NEPS) - This is the outage classification for faults caused directly 
by the customer or network outages requested by the 
customer for the maintenance of their own plant, up-
rating of equipment or the refurbishment of the 
networks. 
 
DIgSILENT  PowerFactory - he calcul tion progr   The calculation program PowerFactory, as written by 
DIgSILENT, is a computer aided engineering tool for the 
analysis of transmission, distribution, and industrial 
electrical power systems. It has been designed as an 
advanced integrated and interactive software package 
dedicated to an electrical power system and control 
analysis in order to achieve the main objectives of 




Process by which the protection equipment philosophies 
and positioning are optimised so as to improve the 
overall network performance. 
 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM - That portion of an electric system that delivers electric 
energy from transformation points on the transmission 









DURATION INTERRUPTION - The period (measured in seconds, or minutes, or hours, 
or days) from the initiation of an interruption to a 
customer or other facility until service has been restored 
to that customer or facility. An interruption may require 
step-restoration tracking to provide reliable index 
calculation. It may be desirable to record the duration of 
each interruption.  
 
EMERGENCY-  A condition that poses an immediate and direct threat to 
life or could possibly cause severe damage to the plant 
of the distribution licensee or the customer [3].  
 
EVENT - An incident on the network that may or may not have 
caused losses or an event affecting the customer.  
 
FAULT - Those outages due to network fault (transient or 
permanent) conditions or an unplanned interruption of 
supply due to protection mal-operation or switching 
errors.  
 
FMS - Fault Management System. An application used in the 
Network Management Centre to record network faults. 
 
FREQUENCY - The frequency of alternating voltage generated by power 
system generators (50Hz in South Africa) [3]. 
 
INTERRUPTION - The event that occurs when one or more phases of a 
supply to a single customer or group of customers are 
disconnected for a period exceeding three seconds [4].  
 
INTERRUPTING RATING - The interrupting rating of a circuit breaker is a critical 
factor concerning protection and safety. The interrupting 
rating of a circuit breaker is the maximum fault current 
the breaker has been tested to interrupt in accordance 
with the testing laboratory standards. 
 
I²t (AMPERES SQUARED   
     SECONDS) - 
An expression related to the circuit energy as a result of 
current flow. With respect to circuit breakers, the I²t [A²s] 
is expressed for the current flow between the initiation of 
the fault current and the clearing of the circuit [20].  
LATERAL LINES - Spur lines or T-offs. 
LIVE WORK - Live work conducted on a network or plant using 
standard accepted techniques where the supply to the 
customer was not lost [3].  
LOSSES - Supply losses energy not supplied as a result of the 
network interruption of supply. Losses are measured in 




MAJOR EVENT - A disastrous event that exceeds design limits of the 
electric power system and is characterized by the 
following (as defined by the utility):  
 
a) Extensive damage to the electric power system;  
b) More than a specified percentage of customers  
     simultaneously out of service;  
c) Service restoration times longer than specified.  
 
MOMENTARY INTERRUPTION - Interruption of supply with a duration < 2 minutes. 
NETWORK BACKBONE - The section of a network from the source to the principal 
load or normal open point considered to be the main 
line. 
 
NMC - Network Management Centre is where the network is 
safely and efficiently managed and operated. 
 
PARETO NETWORK - The network that has a major contribution (80%) to 
network performance KPIs. 
PERMANENT FAULT - Assumes that the line has experienced permanent 
damage and the fault cannot be cleared by a momentary 
interruption to supply. A line crew must physically repair 
the damage before re-energising the line [19]. 
 
PLANNED INTERRUPTION - An interruption that occurs when a component is 
deliberately taken out of service by the utility at a 
selected time, usually for the purposes of construction, 
preventative maintenance or repair [4].  
QA - An application (Quality Assurance), used to audit, edit 
and verify network event related data (FMS data). 
 
ROGUE FEEDER Worst performing feeder. 
 
RSLI  (MV Supply Loss Index) - RSLI is the measure of the MV supply unavailability 
(MV/LV transformers and bulk loads) caused by 
sustained interruptions. RSLI is expressed as hours per 
month. 
 
SCADA - Supervisory control and data acquisition - This provides 









SINGLE - PHASE SUPPLIES  
                  (≤ 16 kVA) -   
 
 Dual-phase SPU supplies (≤ 128 kVA)   
 Three-phase SPU supplies (≤ 100 kVA)   
 Three-phase LPU supplies (≥ 100 kVA and ≤ 500   
 kVA)   
 Three-phase LPU supplies (> 500 kVA)  
 
SMALLWORLD - Is the brand name of a portfolio of GIS software 
provided by GE Energy, a division of General Electric. 
Smallworld technology supports application products for 
telecommunications, utilities, and public systems 
organizations. A database technology called Version 
Managed Data Store (VMDS) that has been designed 
and optimized for storing and analysing complex spatial 
and topological data. The native Smallworld data store 
can be stored in an Oracle Database. This allows the 
use of Oracle facilities for backups and recovery. 
 
SUSTAINED INTERRUPTION - Interruption of supply with a duration ≥ 2 minutes 
TRANSIENT FAULT - Means that the electricity supply is turned off 
momentarily and that the fault will be gone when the line 
is re-energized [19].  
 
TRANSIENT INSENSITIVE - An ability to withstand temporary over-current conditions  
without being damaged or destroyed [6].  
 
UNPLANNED INTERRUPTION - Interruption of supply due to network transient or 
permanent conditions, protection, mal-operation, or 























Chapter 1: Introduction 
The performance and reliability study in power systems is very important to the utilities as well 
as to the country as it could be used for many decisions making in the development of the 
system and increasing the end user satisfaction. Improving quality of supply in a demanding 
and competitive business environment is one of the most challenging tasks for power utilities 
today. Reducing the number and duration of power outages and limiting the number of 
affected customers are important steps toward this goal. 
 
The dissertation is about the improvement of reliability performance of medium voltage 
networks using new techniques, technologies, applications and simulations. 
 
1.1. Background to the Problem 
The reliability of electric distribution systems is critically important for both utilities and 
customers. Electric reliability affects public health and safety, economic growth and 
development, and societal well‐being. Many utilities estimate the value of electric services to 
consumers to assess the benefits of investments to improve reliability. 
Most power outages are caused by weather related damage to overhead power lines. High 
winds, ice, and snow can cause trees to touch power lines and sometimes can cause lines 
and poles to break. Animal contact, vehicle accidents, equipment failure, and human error 
also contribute to power outages.  
Power outages in electric distribution systems are documented and classified by the number 
of customers affected and the length of time that power is out. The Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) specifies three types of outages [1], [2]:  
 
 Major Events are those that exceed the reasonable design and/or operational limits of 
the electric power system and affect a large percentage of the customers served by 
the utility. 
 
 Sustained Interruptions include outages not classified as momentary events and 
that last for more than two minutes. 
 
 Momentary Interruptions involve the brief loss of power to one or more customers 
caused by opening and closing of interruption devices.  
The reliability of the electricity supply depends on the number of disturbances in the network 
and the time it takes to restore supply to the customers. Challenges regarding reliability 
concern the reduction of the number of outages, the minimisation of the number of affected 
customers and the reduction of the outage duration. 
The reliability evaluation study of the electricity networks in South Africa is seldom carried out. 
Moreover in areas where this is carried out, it is limited to the calculation of System Average 
Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI); System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) by 
means of using the failure data. This is not enough to evaluate and improve the reliability 
levels of the network. The failures of Medium Voltage (MV) lines and equipment result in 
revenue losses to the utilities as well as to consumers. In South Africa, the utilities are 
concerned about the collection of revenue but not much about reliability issues. 
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Medium Voltage networks have the highest impact on reliability in electricity distribution 
because more than 90 % of the customer experienced outages occur on MV networks. A 
challenge with the MV network is that it is usually very large, and the line length of a single 
feeder may be even more than 100 km. Thus, improving the distribution reliability in these 
areas poses a considerable challenge, because it is too expensive to install a lot of cables 
underground. Network automation provides a good opportunity to reduce the effects of 
outages [1], [2]. 
 
The reliability indices SAIFI, SAIDI and Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index 
(MAIFI) [1] have been traditionally used to provide statistical information to evaluate the state 
of the distribution network and the demand for new investments. These are the standard 
indices used by the electric power industry and provide a uniform methodology for data 
collection and analysis. The indices have also played a key role in the valuation of investment 
options, which may not be feasible in the present operational environment because the 
valuation of interruptions is not taken into account in the economic regulation [2]. Therefore, 
interruptions have a real effect on the allowed profit, and the level of outage costs is an 
important indicator of reliability and a significant driver in investment decisions. The traditional 
reliability indices SAIFI and SAIDI include information about the number and duration of faults, 
which form the basis for outage costs [2]. 
 
MV distribution networks constitute the backbone of power distribution systems and for this 
reason utilities justifiably strive to improve their performance. Distribution Automation provides 
a means of enhancing feeder performance in the event of a fault by automatically restoring 
supply, after the fault has been cleared by a circuit breaker, to as many customers as possible, 
whilst isolating the faulted section of the line or cable.  
 
1.1.1 Why Distribution Automation? [5] 
 
Distribution businesses and utilities are improving their business performance both technically 
and financially by implementing distribution automation (DA). DA has improved their 
businesses in the areas of reliability and quality of supply to customers by minimising 
downtime, improving efficiencies of restoration times technically including the inherent benefit 
of improving the safety to operating personnel [5].  
The distribution industry in the distant past did not readily accept DA because it was expensive 
and at it did not make good investment sense at the time however recently with the rise of new 
cost efficient control systems and deregulation within the industry it has been increasingly 
adopted by distribution businesses globally. 
Automation is usually implemented upstream in the network. Since a loss of supply affects 
more customers upstream and downstream closer to the customers site it is only implemented 
if it makes economic sense or if there are stiff financial penalties. For example, if a utility like 
Eskom should be unable to supply a large power user like a mine or aluminium smelter for a 
long period of time or rather greater than the period of time stipulated in the large power user 
contract. The benefits demonstrated through automating substations are now being extended 
outside the substation to devices along the feeders and even down to the meter. The key 
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Planning 
       
1. Utility √   √  √ 
2. Network √ √ √  √ √ 
3. Substation √ √ √  √ √ 
4. Distribution √ √ √  √ √ 
5. Customer √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
 
a) Reduced Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Costs 
 
Automation reduces operational costs in various ways. At high voltage level rapid response 
times are needed to restore the service after faults however high voltage lines are usually very 
long and if a fault is located on a line it will  take a long time to locate and the height of high 
voltage overhead lines makes the task of finding a fault like insulator breakdown very hard. 
Night time visibility is also a factor which operators struggle with when trying to restore the 
service after faults. At the substation and distribution layers, fast fault location substantially 
reduces crew travel times, because crews can be dispatched directly to the faulted area of the 
network. Time consuming traditional fault location practices using line patrols in combination 
with field operation of manual switches and the feeder circuit breaker in the primary substation 
are eliminated. The same issues are of course true for long MV lines and requires a large 
number of operating staff to do manual switching sectionalising to identify fault location. 
In contrast, the benefits of DA to a distribution business is obvious that by automatically 
isolating fault locations on the network and implementing the predefined contingency switching 
plan would completely or significantly reduce the number of customers affected by faults or 
power outages. 
Issues of quality of supply can also be monitored to protect equipment from overvoltage or 
overcurrent including monitoring frequency which affects network security. Condition 
monitoring systems can also be implemented. A hypothetical example would be to have an 
instrument which monitors a transmission transformer temperature and oil properties to 
measure trending of transformer condition and automatically flag when the data indicates 
there may be a problem and requires human inspection [5].  
 
b) Capacity Project Deferrals 
 
Optimum substation transformer loadings can be achieved by monitoring transformer loading 
in real-time and transfer excessive short-term loading from one transformer to another 
transformer located at another substation by switching open points automatically. 
This will extend the lifetime of the substation transformers by always optimally loading them 
and keeping their thermal limits well below the transformers manufactures maximum thermal 
limits [5].  
 
c) Improved Reliability 
 
Reliability in distribution business is usually improved by introducing equipment like reclosers, 
load break switches and communicating fault path indicators which are linked remotely to the 
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control room management system so that control room personnel can direct field operators to 
the location of the fault. Automation provides the fastest way to reduce outage duration. 
Installation of this reliability improving equipment can reduce average outage durations by as 
much as 20-30% annually for a reasonably well maintained overhead feeder. It can even 
reduce the number of outages if an outage is recorded as an outage only if it is sustained 
beyond a certain interval. This improvement is made on the basis that momentary 
interruptions due to autorecloser operation are acceptable. 
Autoreclosers are mainly responsible for these types of reliability improvements since they 
automatically reclose for nuisance tripping events which prevents unnecessary disruption to 
the supply of customers [5].  
 
d) Power Quality 
 
With the proliferation of electronic consumer goods/loads, the power quality received by these 
sensitive devices needs to be of high quality to prevent these electronic devices from being 
damaged for example high voltages, sags, swells and harmful harmonics. Although many 
albeit usually the more expensive electronic equipment such as laptops and expensive 
medical instrumentation usually have embedded protection circuits or passive elements like 
fuses which protect these devices from a low quality power supply. Therefore, this is another 
area where DA can improve utility performance with respect to quality of supply by complying 
with regulations such as NRS 048-2:2007 with respect to power quality. Automation also 
enables the dynamic control of voltage regulation through remote control of capacitor banks 
and voltage regulators [5]. 
 
e) Improved Information for Engineering and Planning 
 
The increase in real-time data availability resulting from DA provides more visibility to planners 
and operators of the network. The optimisation of the communications infrastructure is an 
important aspect of the automation implementation that will deliver the required data to the 
appropriate application. This data is fundamental to better planning and asset management 
under business objectives, forcing lower operating and capital investments [5].  
 
1.2. Motivation for the Dissertation Topic 
With dependence on electricity increasing, driven by load growth, unpredictable weather 
conditions, aging distribution equipment, and other factors, the need for reducing the 
frequency, duration and severity of interruptions is vital. Hence, a research in this field of study 
was chosen. 
 
1.3. Research Objectives and Questions  
1.3.1 Research Objective 
 
The main objective of this research is to improve the reliability performance of a medium 
voltage system using new technologies which will provide the fastest way to reduce outage 
durations. 
 




1. Improve the level of reliability and performance of a distribution network using distribution    
    automation. 
 
2.  Improve the level of quality of supply to the customers. 
 
3. Carry out reliability evaluation of distribution networks using DIgSILENT PowerFactory  
    software 
 
4. Model an existing real network using DIgSILENT PowerFactory software (version 15.0)  
    and compare the results obtained to that of the analytical method FMEA, historical data  
    analysis method and the pilot project field work data. 
 
5. Perform cost benefit analysis for the tested distribution system 
 
6. Draw conclusions based on the results obtained from the field, DIgSILENT PowerFactory  
    software evaluation, FMEA and the Historical data method. 
 
1.3.2 Research Questions 
  
The main research question associated with this research project is: 
 
“To what extent will the installation of IntelliRupter PulseCloser, Tripsaver and the FuseSaver   
 Breakers improve the reliability performance of Medium Voltage Rogue Feeders?” 
 
This question will be addressed through detailed consideration of each of the following 
secondary research questions: 
 
 How often does the average customer experience an interruption? When a service 
interruption occurs, how long does it take to restore power on average? 
 What techniques best improve the reliability performance of MV networks? 
 How will the MV overhead feeder automation technology such as the IntelliRupter 
PulseCloser, Tripsaver and the FuseSaver Breakers improve the SAIDI and SAIFI of a 
rogue feeder?  
 How will Eskom benefit with regards to the implementation of the IntelliRupter 
PulseCloser, Tripsaver and FuseSaver Breakers? 
 
 How will the collection and analysis of different data be used to monitor/ improve the 
reliability performance of MV networks? 
 
 What is the expected network performance and how does it vary from the actual  
      performance? 
 
 What is the cost saving benefits and the percentage performance improvement? 
 
 The ultimate goal of applying reliability analysis is to help answer questions such as:  
 
 Is the system reliable enough? 




 Where can the next rand be best spent in order to improve the particular 
network? 
 
1.4. Limitations and Scope of the Study 
The scope of the dissertation is to accurately locate the Distribution Automation (DA) devices 
in an electric power distribution network that can help engineers quickly identify and repair 
faulted components, reduce outage time, speed up system restoration, and, thus, greatly 
improve the reliability performance of the medium voltage system.   
Although there are a number of methods that are used in improving the reliability of the 
distribution feeders, this dissertation report focuses mainly on the use of DA on one of the 
worst performing feeders in the Western Cape in South Africa. 
The Neutral Earth Compensator (NEC) minimum earth fault current value was limited to either 
360 A or 960 A on the Eskom network, which in turn limited the installation of Intellirupter [IR] 
Pulsecloser. The Intellirupter pulseclosing fault-detection threshold minimum is 400 A, and 
applies to both phase-earth and phase-phase faults. The IR will trip in response to fault 
currents less than 400 A (if configured to do so), but upon testing for the continued presence 
of the fault that caused the initial trip, its pulseclosing technology will not be able to determine 
if the fault is still present unless the resulting pulseclosing data indicates a current of 400 A or 
greater. The consequence of not determining if a fault (with a projected current of < 400 A) is 
still present, simply results in an automated reclosing operation, albeit pole-by-pole, and at or 
near a voltage peak.The Waterkloof substation was installed with a 960 A NEC which was 
ideal for the correct operation of Intellirupter Pulsecloser. 
 
1.5. Plan of Development 
The dissertation contains twelve chapters that explain the perceptions, developments and the 
results of the research. 
 
The layout of this dissertation is as described below 
Chapter 1: provides a general introduction to the topic of the dissertation. The chapter 
gives a brief outline and overview of the whole dissertation and its scope. 
Chapter 2: 
 
briefly presents the dissertation literature review including power system            
overview, the importance of reliability in distribution systems, causes of 
interruptions and the introduction to the analytical method using load point 
reliability indices such as failure mode effect analysis (FMEA). 
 
Chapter 3: describes the electricity quality regulation, utility cost and promoting continuity 
of supply. It also introduces the reward and penalty plot for incentive scheme. 
Chapter 4: 
 
is a continuation of the literature review, it focuses mainly on the MV 
Overhead Feeder Automation. The chapter includes the following: Benefits of 
Distribution Automation System Implementation and Distribution Automation 
Technologies - An enabling technology for the smart grid. 
Chapter 5: describes the reliability evaluation of the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
distribution network before installation of equipment using Historical Data, 





















is devoted to protection coordination and grading. It focuses on the method of 
selective coordination to avoid blackouts on the tested feeder. It includes the 
TCC curves for Intellirupter Pulsecloser, Modelling and Simulation of 
Protection Time/Current Characteristics of Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
using DIgSilent PowerFactory Software, protection settings and protection 
functionality for the innovative new technologies. 
Chapter 7: 
 
Laboratory work and field work is presented. It focuses on the methodology of 
the dissertation. It describes field trial of the innovative new technologies 
which includes the practical and field installation methods used for each 
technology. 
Chapter 8:  describes the load point and system indices calculations of Waterkloof 





is the continuation of the results describing the cost assessment of the 
reliability improvement in distribution networks by means of distribution 
automation systems using DIgSILENT PowerFactory software. It also 
describes the different configurations tested i.e. cost benefits analysis before 
and after the installation of the equipment. 
 
Chapter 10:  focuses on the results and analysis of field data. 
Chapter 11:  draws conclusions based on the findings of this research. 
 
Chapter 12:  Some recommendations are made as to how the system should be 
implemented and future development works that should be carried out. 
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Chapter 2: Power System Reliability 
2.1. Power System Overview 
The general outline of the power system is shown in Figure 2.1. The electricity delivered to 
residential and industrial or commercial customers is generated in large power plants. The 
electricity is then transmitted from the power plants via high voltage transmission lines, which 
are interconnected in a network configuration to distribution substations. From these 
substations, the power is then distributed via low voltage distribution feeders to different load 
points (customers) through transformers located at close proximity to the load points. The 
distribution feeders are made up of overhead and underground cables. The voltage is stepped 




Figure 2.1: Key Network Elements – Focusing on Medium Voltage Networks [15] 
2.1.1 Power Generation 
 
The generator is a machine that converts mechanical energy into electric power. The main 
movers such as engines and turbines convert thermal or hydraulic energy into mechanical 
power. Thermal energy is derived from the fission of nuclear fuel or the burning of common 
fuels such as oil, gas, or coal. The alternating current generating units of electric power utilities 
generally consist of steam turbine generators, gas combustion turbine generators, hydro 











LV network LV network 
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2.1.2 Alternating Current Power Transmission System  
 
The transmission system transfers power between the power generation station and the 
distribution station from which power is carried to the customer delivery point. It includes step-
up and step-down transformers at the generating and distribution stations, respectively. Power 
transmission systems may include sub-transmission stages to supply intermediate voltage 
levels. Sub-transmission stages are used to enable a more practical or economical transition 




Transmission lines supply distribution substations equipped with transformers which step the 
high voltages down to lower levels e.g. 132 kV to 11 kV. The transmission of large quantities of 
power over long distances is more economical at higher voltages. Power transmission at high 
voltage can be accomplished with lower currents which lower the I²R power losses and reduce 
the voltage drop. The consequent use of smaller conductors requires a lower investment. 
Standard power transmission systems are 3-phase, 3-conductor, overhead lines with or 
without a ground conductor. Transmission lines are classed as unregulated because the 
voltage at the generating station is controlled only to keep the lines operating within normal 
voltage limits and to facilitate power flow [15].  
 
2.1.3 Primary Distribution Systems 
 
The distribution system is commonly broken down into three components: distribution 
substation, distribution primary and secondary. The transmission system voltage is stepped 
down to lower levels by distribution substation transformers. The primary distribution system is 
that portion of the power network between the distribution substation and the utilisation 
transformers. The primary distribution system consists of circuits, referred to as primary or 
distribution feeders that originate at the secondary bus of the distribution substation. The 
distribution substation is usually the delivery point of electric power in large industrial or 
commercial applications. A typical South African primary distribution system voltage range can 
be anywhere from 132 kV down to 11 kV [15].  
 
2.1.4  Distribution Substations 
 
Distribution substations supply MV power to the distribution system. The substation contains 
one or more power transformers, voltage and current regulating equipment, bus bars and 
switchgear. A simple substation arrangement consists of one incoming line and one 
transformer. A more complicated substation arrangement results when there are two or more 
incoming lines, two or more power transformers, or a complex bus bar network [15]. 
2.1.5  Distribution Feeders 
 
The most common equipment found on primary distribution feeders are fuses, distribution 
transformers, reclosers, load break switches, tri-switches and voltage regulators. Most 
common distribution feeder configurations include feeder splitting, loop, radial and parallel. 
These configurations may be implemented closer to the substation side or downstream 
depending on what constraints are present when designing the feeder to meet customers’ 






The main function of a tie feeder is to connect two sources. It may join two substation buses in 

















A loop feeder has its ends connected to a source (usually a single source), but its main 
function is to supply two or more load points in between. Each load point can be supplied from 
either direction; so it is possible to remove any section of the loop from service without 
causing an outage at other load points. The loop can be operated normally closed or normally 
open. Most loop systems are, however, operated normally open at some point by means of a 
















A radial feeder connects between a source and a load point, and it may supply one or more 
additional load points between the two. Each load point can be supplied from one direction 
only. Radial feeders are most widely used by Eskom because the circuits are simple, easy to 
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Figure 2.4: Radial Feeder 
Parallel Feeder 
 
Parallel feeders join the source and a load which provides the capability of supplying power to 
the load through one or any number of the parallel feeders. Parallel feeders provide for 
maintenance of feeders without interrupting service to loads and quick restoration of service 

















Figure 2.5: Parallel Feeder 
 
2.1.6 Secondary Distribution Systems 
 
The secondary distribution system is that section of the network between the primary feeders 
and utilisation equipment. The secondary system consists of step-down transformers and 
secondary circuits at utilisation voltage levels. Residential secondary systems are mainly 
single-phase, but commercial and industrial systems generally use three-phase power. The 
voltage levels for a particular secondary system are determined by the loads to be served. 
The utilisation voltages are generally in the range of 230 V to 400 V.  
 
 






2.2.  Power Quality, Reliability, and Availability 
Power quality problem from a customer perspective might be defined as any electric supply 
condition that causes appliances to malfunction or stops their use. Power quality problem from 
a utility perspective might be perceived as nonfulfillment of various standards such as RMS 
voltage or harmonics. Power is equivalent to the instantaneous product of current and voltage, 
and formulating a meaningful definition of power quality is difficult. The best a utility can do is 
to supply customers with a perfect sinusoidal voltage source with constant frequency and 
amplitude [7]. Less than perfect power quality occurs when a voltage waveform is distorted by 
transients or harmonics, changes its amplitude, or deviates in frequency [7]. Customer 
interruptions are power quality concerns since they are a reduction in voltage magnitude to 
zero.  
Reliability is primarily concerned with customer interruptions and is, therefore, a subsection of 
power quality [7]. Sustained interruptions have continuously been categorised as a reliability 
issue, but many utilities have categorised momentary interruptions as a power quality issue 
[7]. Momentary interruptions are an important customer issue and most distribution engineers 
consider them a reliability issue. Therefore, reliability is all aspects of customer interruptions, 
together with momentary interruptions.  
Availability is defined as the proportion of time a voltage source is uninterrupted. Its 
complement, unavailability, is the fraction of time a voltage source is interrupted. Since 
availability and unavailability deal strictly with interruptions, they are classified as a subsection 


















Figure 2.6: Grading of Power Quality, Reliability, and Availability [7] 
 
2.3. Causes of Interruptions 
The supply of power or electricity to the customers (loads) can be interrupted for many 
reasons. The factors are classified or arranged into different categories namely, equipment 
failure, natural events, theft and vandalism, operational failure, third party and unknown. 
 





2.3.1 Equipment Failure  
 
Equipment failure occurs when any component at the substation or on the feeder results in 
loss of supply. The equipment which failed will be located visually if the defect is obvious or by 
a process of elimination if the fault is not obvious like when a recloser trips on SEF or when an 
insulator has failed. The consequence of equipment failure depends on how far from the end 
of the feeder the equipment has failed, although this is not always a reliable proxy to 
determine how much revenue loss may be incurred since LPU’s may be located at the end of 
a feeder. However in general if an equipment fails at or near substation location on a feeder 
resulting in loss of supply, many customers are affected and the revenue loss is usually 
substantial including the cost of restoration which includes paying personnel, repairing or 
replacing defective equipment. Other overheads include transportation of staff, equipment and 
tools. Power utilities may implement capital projects like reliability centred maintenance, 
preventative maintenance and condition monitoring systems strategies to reduce equipment 
failure rates to sustainable economic levels. 
 
Equipment failure includes the following [12]: 
 
 Failure of cable circuit (including any terminations to lines, joints, ferrules and lugs) 
 Failure of overhead line (including associated equipment, but excluding transformers) 
 Failure of a transformer (including tap-changers and voltage regulators, auxiliary, 
current, distribution, grounding, potential or voltage, power, rectifying, step-
down/conversion, and voltage regulating transformers) 
 Failure of reactive control devices (capacitors, reactors) 
 Failure of switchgear 
 Failure of terminal equipment and sundry substation plant (busbars, lightning arresters 
and instrument transformers, etc.)                    
 Protection system failure (fuse failure) 
 Control system failure (SCADA) 
 
2.3.2 Natural Events 
 
Natural events can be classified as any act of nature outside the control of human beings 
which may disrupt power supply which includes adverse weather conditions, animals and 
vegetation becoming in contact with live apparatus.  
 
2.3.3 Theft and Vandalism  
 
Theft and vandalism of distribution system equipment is one of the factors that cause 
interruptions. Vandalism of power equipment is prevalent in South Africa, and incidents 
targeting power equipment have escalated in the recent past to unprecedented levels. 
Transformer oil, copper and aluminium are the main targets of the vandals.  In the past 
problem of vandalism has been related to socio-economic conditions. However, this has now 
changed and vandalism is now largely driven by the soaring values of copper and aluminium 
in the international metals market due to increased world market demand fuelled by China and 
India’s growth in industrialisation [17]. Unfortunately, it is impossible for utilities to protect all 






2.4. The Importance of Reliability in Distribution Systems 
Distribution reliability primarily relates to equipment outages and customer interruptions. In 
normal operating conditions, all equipment (except standby) are energised and all customers 
are energised. Scheduled and unscheduled events disrupt normal operating conditions and 
can lead to outages and interruptions. 
 
The objectives of evaluating, planning and improving reliability in distribution systems are 
therefore to: 
 
 Maintain continuous supply of electricity to customers. 
 Reduce the frequency and duration of interruptions. 
 Minimise the severity of interruptions. 
 Determine the causes of interruptions in order to take corrective action to reduce 
interruptions in view of its enormous cost to customers. 
 Ensure compliance with standards. 
 Analyse and improve system performance. 
 
2.5. System Reliability Indices 
The performance of the electricity distribution networks can be evaluated by several different 
indices. These indices are a measure of the reliability and availability of supply of the network 
and of the interruptions experienced by the customers. The performance reliability indices 
quantify the loss of supply in terms of the frequency, duration, the amount of installed plant 
(transformers) affected and the number of customers affected by the events occurring on the 
network.  
 
The formulas and equations defined for each index are given below: 
 
2.5.1 Sustained Interruption Indices (≥ 2 minutes window) 
 
The following KPI all refer to sustained interruptions (≥ 2 minute window). The indices are all 
customer based (number of customers effected) KPIs and installed load based (KVA) [3].  
 
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index) 
 
The SAIFI of a network indicates how often the average customer connected would 
experience a sustained interruption per annum excluding re-interruptions [3]. It can be 
mathematically expressed as [3]:  
 
SAIFI =   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
    
 
“SAIFI is a measure of how many sustained interruptions an average customer will experience 
annually. For a fixed number of customers, the only way to improve SAIFI is to decrease the 
number of sustained interruptions experienced by customers [7]”.  






SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) 
 
The SAIDI of a network indicates the duration of a sustained interruption the average 
customer would experience over the course of a year excluding re-interruptions. It is usually 
measured in customer minutes or customer hours of interruption [3]. Mathematically SAIDI 
can be expressed as [3]:  
 
SAIDI =   
∑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
    
 
For a fixed number of customers, SAIDI can be improved by decreasing the number of 
interruptions or by decreasing the duration of these interruptions. Since both of these reflect 
reliability improvements, a drop in SAIDI indicates an improvement in reliability [7].  
 
CAIDI (Customer Average Interruption Duration Index) 
 
The CAIDI of a network shows the average duration of a sustained interruption that only the 
customers affected would experience annually. This excludes re-interruptions. It is normally 
measured in customer minutes or customer hours of interruption [3]. This index differs from 
SAIDI in that only the number of affected customers interrupted is used in the denominator 
and not the total number of customers served. CAIDI is also the ratio of SAIDI and SAIFI and 
can be mathematically expressed as [3]: 
 
CAIDI =   
∑𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑
   
 
or expressed as:  
CAIDI =   
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼
   
 
The general case is for CAIDI ≥ SAIDI, as CAIDI only takes into account the number of 
affected customers. CAIDI is also the index used to measure the average customer 
restoration times. 
 
CAIDI is a measure of how long an average interruption lasts, and is used as a measure of 
utility response time to system contingencies. CAIDI can be improved by decreasing the 
length of interruptions, but can also be reduced by increasing the number of short 
interruptions. Consequently, a drop in CAIDI does not necessarily reflect an improvement in 
reliability [7].  
 
CAIFI (Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index) 
 
The CAIFI of a network indicates how often (frequency) on average only the customers 
affected by an interruption experience a sustained interruption per annum. The customer is 
counted only once in this calculation regardless of the number of times interrupted [3]. This 
index differs from SAIFI in that only the number of customers interrupted is used in the 
denominator and not all the customers connected. Mathematically CAIFI can be expressed as 
[3]:  
CAIFI =   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑




Average System Interruption Frequency Index (ASIFI) 
 
ASIFI is similar to SAIFI, but instead of a number of customers interrupted, the load affected is 
considered [7]. 
 
ASIFI =   
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑





where, Li is the load interrupted at load point i. 
 
Average System Interruption Duration Index (ASIDI) 
 
ASIDI is a measure of duration of the load interrupted rather than interruption duration 
experienced by the number of customers [7]. 
 
ASIDI =   
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑





where, Li is the load interrupted at load point i. 
 
Average Service Availability (Unavailability) Index ASAI (ASUI) 
 
The ASAI represents the fraction of time (often expressed as a percentage) that a customer 
has received supply during one year. ASAI is a useful KPI for measuring the availability of 
customers with firm supplies [3]. Mathematically ASAI can be expressed as [3]: 
 
ASAI =   
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝.𝑎
𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝.𝑎.
   
  
Note: There are 8760 hours in a non-leap year and 8784 hours in a leap year. 
 
Alternatively ASAI can be expressed as: 
 
ASAI = 1-  
SAIDI
8760
   
 
ASUI = 1 - ASAI 
 
Energy not supplied index, ENS [7] 
 
ENS = total energy not supplied by the system = ∑ La(i)Ui 
 
where La(i) is the average load connected to load point i and Ui is the annual outage time [7]  
 
DSLI (Distribution Supply Loss Index) 
 
The DSLI of a network is the measure of the HV supply unavailability (HV/MV transformers 
and bulk loads) caused by sustained interruptions [3]. DSLI is expressed as minutes per 
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month (also expressed in hours per month). The index offers a KPI to measure network 
performance due to distribution interruptions only (HV supply) [3]. Mathematically DSLI can be 
expressed as [3]: 
 
DSLI =   
∑ 𝑀𝑉𝐴.𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠.𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑡("0"+"E"+"𝐹") 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝐻𝑉 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑀𝑉𝐴 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒+𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑉𝐴 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
   
 
Where  
“O” – Notified Outage 
“E” – Unplanned Emergency Outage 
“F” – Unplanned Fault 
 
RSLI (MV Supply Loss Index) 
 
RSLI is the measure of the MV supply unavailability (MV/LV transformers and bulk loads) 
caused by sustained interruptions [3]. RSLI is expressed as hours per month [3]. 
Mathematically RSLI can be expressed as [3]: 
 
RSLI =   
∑ 𝑀𝑉𝐴.𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠.𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑡("0"+"E"+"𝐹") 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑀𝑉 𝑀𝑉𝐴 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒+𝐵𝑢𝑙𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑀𝑉𝐴 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
   
 
Where  
“O” – Notified Outage 
“E” – Unplanned Emergency Outage 
“F” – Unplanned Fault 
 
Faults/100km (Sum of sustained interruptions per 100km) 
 
The Faults/100km of a network shows the average number of sustained interruptions 
experienced normalised per 100km of line length per annum. It is usually measured as a 
number of faults. Mathematically Faults/100km can be expressed as [3]: 
 
Faults/100km =   
∑𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎.  x 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ (𝑘𝑚)
   
 
2.5.2 Momentary Indices (< 2 minutes) 
 
The following KPI refer to momentary interruptions (< 2 minutes) on all networks where the 
supply voltage is ≥ 1 kV. The indices are a measure of the transient interruption performance 
of a network. 
 
MAIFI (Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index) 
 
The MAIFI of a network shows how often on (frequency) average the customers served would 
experience a momentary interruption per annum. Mathematically MAIFI can be expressed as 
[3]: 
 
MAIFI =   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎.
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
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MAIFI is attractive to utilities because it can be easily calculated from breaker and recloser 
counters [7].  
 
2.6. Load Point Reliability Indices  
2.6.1 The three basic load point reliability indices (failure rate (λ), outage 
time (r) and annual unavailability (U))  
 
Failure Rates, λ  
Distribution feeders are radial systems consisting of a set of series components. A feeder 
includes lines, cables, interruption devices, fuses, reclosers, etc. Each component of the 
series system has its failure rate λ, which is defined as [11]: 
 
λ = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 
 
 
For distribution feeders, this failure rate λ is directly related to the constructive aspects and the 
physical environment where the component is placed. This means that for improving the 
failure rate (λ) it is necessary to use more reliable components (lower λ) or modify the physical 
environment where the feeder is found, which is the equivalent to changing the line. 
 
There is a design (acceptable) number of faults that one can expect on a network. It depends 
on the following [29]: 
 
 The count of components (line length, structure count, transformer count etc.) 
 
 Acceptable failure rate per component for that specific network 
 Environment (condition) 
 Equipment specification, quality (manufacture) and application 
 Quality of construction 
 Quality of maintenance   
 










Figure 2.7: The Bathtub Curve [29] 
 
Component failures can be characterised as teething failures, random failures or ageing 
failures relating to the well-known bathtub curve. Teething failures are normally found by 
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onsite test and handled when the components are first connected to the system [29]. Random 
failures are caused by external factors such as weather conditions or excavator work. The 
random failure rate is constant over time. The operational age of the component has an 
obvious influence on the component reliability. Ageing failures are caused by electrical, 
thermal, mechanical, environmental stress and manufacturing. The ageing failure rate 
increases over time [29]. We are interested in the failure rate over the useful life i.e. failure 
rate is constant. 
Mean Repair Time (r)  
 
Another important index of distribution system reliability is the Mean Repair Time (r) of a 
component. This index is directly related to the duration of supply interruptions and, therefore, 
to how the distribution firm is to face failures in the network. This means that, in order to 





The final and also important index of distribution system reliability is unavailability. Availability 
is the probability of something being energised. It is the most basic aspect of reliability and is 
typically measured in percent or per-unit. The complement of availability is unavailability [7].  
 
Availability — the probability of being energised. 
Unavailability — the probability of not being energised [7] 
 
2.7. Analysis of Reliability  
2.7.1 Using Load Point Reliability Indices 
 
The analytical approach calculates the average reliability indices using a set of mathematical 
equations hence the procedure is relatively simple and requires a reasonably small amount of 
computer time. The analytical approach is based on assumptions relating to the statistical 
distributions of failure rates and repair times [38]. The most well-known evaluation techniques, 
using a set of approximate equations, are failure mode analysis or minimum cut set analysis. 
The main focus on the analytical methods is on the index calculations. 
 
The analytical method looks at how the load points would be affected if a specific component 
fails. The average values of the three fundamental load point indices for load point i can be 
calculated from the load point up-down operating history using the following formulae [26]: 
 
 





















Reliability indices such as SAIFI and SAIDI can be calculated using equations given below 
[37]. These indices relate to either frequency or duration of the service interruption and 




























Where λi is the failure rate, Ui is the unavailability and Ni are the number of customers at load 
points i. 
 
2.7.2 Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 
An FMEA is often the first step of a distribution system reliability study. It involves reviewing as 
many components, assemblies, and subsystems as possible to identify failure modes, and 
their causes and effects. For each electrical component, the failure modes and their resulting 
effects on the rest of the system are recorded in a specific FMEA worksheet. This method is 
one of the simplest approaches for estimating reliability. It is based on failure mode of 
components in a distribution system affected by a loss of power supply due to a specified 
load. FMEA classifies the single component failure state that occurs independently and is 
repaired before another occurs. It can be used in other techniques such as cut set and fault 
tree analysis to evaluate the failure behaviour of the components. The failure states can be 
tabulated in terms of the number of components affected and duration of the event [46].  
The disadvantage of FMEA is that it is difficult to examine multiple failures, although it has an 
advantage of providing a full detailed description of the system failure behaviour, while 























Chapter 3: Electricity Quality Regulation  
3.1. Introduction 
The utilities are responsible for the local distribution of electricity to homes and businesses, 
transporting electricity along overhead power lines and through underground cables. They 
have a responsibility to ensure that their customers have a reliable supply of electricity and 
must restore customer’s electricity supply promptly in the event of an interruption, hence 
fulfilling the Electricity Regulation Act is essential. 
 
The objects of this Electricity Quality Regulation Act are to [63]:  
 
(a) achieve the efficient, effective, sustainable and orderly development and operation of  
     electricity supply infrastructure in South Africa;  
 
(b) ensure that the interests and needs of present and future electricity customers and end 
users are safeguarded and met, having regard to the governance, efficiency, effectiveness 
and long-term sustainability of the electricity supply industry within the broader context of 
economic energy regulation; 
 
(c) facilitate investment in the electricity supply industry;  
 
(d) facilitate universal access to electricity; 
 
(e) promote the use of diverse energy sources and energy efficiency;  
 
(f) promote competitiveness and customer and end user choice; and 
 
(g) facilitate a fair balance between the interests of customers and end users, licensees,  
     investors in the electricity supply industry and the public [63]. 
 
3.2. Utility Cost 
 
In evaluating the benefit to cost ratio for any investment in automation, the utility computes its 
margin based on standard cost accounting practices for operating costs (burdened man-hour 
rates, maintenance costs, energy cost, etc.) and capital costs, all on a yearly basis. The cost 
of energy can vary from an average purchase price to the utility or as an opportunity cost of 
the selling price to the end user in the situation where the distribution entity still retains the 
supply business. The cost of losses is a direct cost, being a combination of the energy cost 
with a capacity investment component necessary to cover the network capacity to 
accommodate the losses. It is usual for most utilities to have set an energy value policy as 
part of their cost of service pricing for delivering the energy. In reality, the economic value of 
energy not delivered, by itself, using this type of evaluation is seldom sufficient to justify any 
network performance improvement measures in contrast to a penalty based environment [5].  
In several countries where deregulation has been implemented as well as in South Africa, the 
regulator is designing incentives in the form of penalties, and in some cases rewards, to 
directly encourage utilities to improve their performance. These are output focused, and any 
performance improvement project can be compared with a specific economic penalty value. 
Under a penalty regime, the benefit to cost calculation is dominated by the resulting value of 
energy not supplied because the regulator tends to set the value closer to the customer’s cost 
for loss of supply than that of the utilities. The major standards relate to interruptions to supply 
without notice and are typically either a number of interruption based or interruption duration 




Today many regulatory bodies are using reliability indices in order to give electricity distribution 
companies the economic signs to improve reliability. The sign is given in the form of an 
economic penalty or compensation that must be paid to the affected customers. To avoid 
being given a penalty or paying compensation, distribution companies must improve the 
reliability by investing the optimal amount of money so that they can maximise their profits. 
 
The basic function of a power distribution system is to provide electric power to its customers 
at the lowest cost with an acceptable level of reliability [5].  
 
3.3. Promoting Continuity of Supply 
Most regulators have taken a step to introduce methodologies that will motivate companies to 
increase the reliability of the network and maintain continuity of supply. There are four basic 
instruments that the regulator might use to ensure secure and desirable levels of quality of 
supply, service rendered and promote continuity of supply. Figure 3.1 below shows four basic 




















Figure 3.1: Instruments for Promoting Quality Regulations [53] 
 
The instruments and incentives used by regulators to maintain and promote high levels of 
quality of supply, to increase reliability and hence maintain good standard of continuity of 
supply are as follow: 
 
 Publication of company’s performance data - provides incentives for investment in 
quality. 
 
 Setting Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) - The MQS that are placed are the 
minimum level of performance which the company is not supposed to operate below, 
non-compliance with the MQS could lead to penalties. This may include KPI’s and 
compliance with stipulations outlined in documents like NRS048-2:2007.The motivation 
behind MQS is to protect customers from a poor quality of supply. Therefore, 




 Reward and Penalty Schemes - This involves rewarding companies for exceeding 
MQS and KPI and penalising them for the converse scenario. 
 
 Premium Quality Contracts - This entails the customer negotiating their performance 
standards with the power utility to provide a unique quality of supply and reliability 
levels usually at higher tariff to this individual customer. 
 
Overall these incentives provide adequate push and pull levers to coerce the power utility to 
provide good quality of supply and reliability levels to customers. This section of the 
dissertation only focuses on MQS and the reward and penalty scheme as they motivate the 
company to focus on improving reliability and, on the other hand, protecting customers which 
receive poor quality. Even though the reward and penalty schemes are considered complex to 
design, they have delivered positive results on the regulated quality indicators [49]. 
 
3.4. Continuity Standards 
In the promotion of continuity of supply, the regulators need to make sure that all the 
customers are supplied at minimally acceptable levels. Using MQS, they specify the minimal 
level of performance which the utility is not supposed to breach. Non-compliance with those 
minimal standards can lead to penalties in the form of payment. Figure 3.2 below shows 










Figure 3.2: Reward and Penalty Plot for Incentive Scheme [2] 
 
There are often different types of regulated indicators which are used to set minimum 
continuity standards, the indicators setting standards of continuity which are reported from [2] 
are: 
 Annual number of long unplanned interruptions 
 Annual number interruptions (short and long) 
 Duration of a single long unplanned interruption 
 Cumulative annual duration of long unplanned interruptions 
 
In the setting of penalties for deviations from standards of continuity, there are exemptions 
which regulators might apply for certain exceptional events. The exceptional events mostly 
include interruption resulting from force majeure (a disaster from an act of God), this is from 
the fact that those acts are beyond the company’s control. The charges increase as a function 





3.5. Reward and Penalty Scheme  
Reward and penalty scheme is the incentive scheme which regulates the revenue of utilities in 
accordance to its reliability performance. Better performance leading to reward and poor 
performance leading to a penalty. When designing the reward and penalty scheme there are a 
number of factors that the regulator has to consider including types of interruption that the 
scheme will be based on. Either planned or unplanned interruptions can be considered, 
unplanned and planned interruptions are given different weights of charges [50] and also the 
performance index to be used. 
Other characteristics that are considered in the design of incentive/penalty schemes include 
baseline standards, a form of financial incentive and consideration of the effectiveness of the 
scheme. In the design of incentive/penalty scheme, the regulator should always keep in mind 
that the utilities will deliver the level of quality depending on the choices made by the 
regulators of the level of financial incentive and performance standards [49]. 
 
Indicators that are regulated in Incentive Scheme 
 
Incentive schemes focus on indicators derived from the recording of long interruptions events; 
this is due to the fact that long interruptions determine to a major extent the level of customer 
satisfaction with the quality of services. The indicators that are used in different countries 







Performance is usually based on average customer interruption measures such as SAIDI and 
SAIFI. A common method of implementing a Performance Based Rate (PBR) is to have a 
“dead zone” without bonuses or penalties. If reliability is worse than the upper dead zone 
threshold, a penalty is assessed. Penalties rise as the performance gets worse and are 
capped when a maximum penalty is reached. Rewards for good reliability can be applied in a 
similar manner. If reliability is better than the lower dead zone threshold, a bonus is given. The 
bonus grows as reliability improves and is capped at a maximum value. Bonuses are far less 
common than penalties since regulatory agencies do not have sources of revenue. A graph of 
a PBR based on SAIDI is shown in Figure 3.3. Regulatory agencies can simulate bonuses and 
rewards by yearly adjusting rates based on reliability performance. Rates are improved if 
reliability targets are exceeded and are reduced if reliability targets are not met. The optimal 
solution occurs when the marginal cost of increasing reliability is equal to the marginal 















Figure 3.3: A Typical Performance-Based Rate Structure [7] 
 
An example of a Swedish plot is shown below in Figure 3.4 how the compensation (reduction 
of tariffs) to customers increases annually as a function of interruptions length. As the hours of 
interruptions rises, the compensation towards the customers also rises, meaning the company 

















Figure 3.4: Sweden Customer Compensation versus Performance Standards (Data from  












Chapter 4:  MV Overhead Feeder Automation 
4.1. Introduction  
“Distribution Automation Systems have been defined by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers (IEEE) as systems that enable an electric utility to monitor, coordinate, 
and operate distribution components in a real time mode from remote locations [18]. An 
electric power distribution system is an important part of electrical power systems in the  
delivery of electricity to consumers. Automation in the distribution field allows utilities to 
implement flexible control of distribution systems, which can be used to enhance efficiency, 
reliability, and quality of electric service [18]”. 
The word Automation means doing the specific task automatically in a sequence with faster 
operation rate. Application of automation within power distribution system entails automatically 
monitoring and switching apparatus to restore continuity of supply or isolate faulty part of a 
network with the distinct objective of keeping as many customers connected as possible 
without delay in real time. This automation allows network loading to be monitored in real time 
and implement predefined contingency switching plans based on current fault locations and 
feeder loadings. This process may not entirely provide fully automated process but depends 
on how many contingency switching levels has been pre-programmed in its automation 
functionality. Therefore, it simply reduces outage time for distribution systems by isolating fault 
locations and restoring power supply to customers where an alternative power source is 
available. Operators and responsible persons still have to drive out and fix or replace faulty 
apparatus when needed. Hence, automation does not just replace manual procedures; it 
permits the power system to operate in the best optimal way, based on accurate information 
provided in a timely manner to the decision-making applications and devices [5].  
  
Distribution automation has to address enhancements in efficiency as well as reliability and 
quality of power distribution. Utilities are motivated to invest in Distribution automation systems 
which will enhance their efficiency, reliability of supply and quality of supply to prevent 
incurring penalties and maximising profits by exceeding MQS targets. This also encourages 
the customer to negotiate premium quality contracts with the power utility, hence improving 
and strengthening extra revenue streams for the utility [5].  
 
4.2. Benefits of Distribution Automation System Implementation 
The benefits of distribution automation system implementation can be classified in three major 
areas as follows: 
 
4.2.1 Operational & Maintenance Benefits [5] 
 
 Improved reliability by reducing outage duration using auto restoration scheme. 
 Improved voltage control by means of automatic VAR control. 
 Reduced man hours and man power. 
 Accurate and useful planning and operational data information. 
 Better fault detection and diagnostic analysis. 







4.2.2 Financial Benefits 
 
 Increased revenue due to quick restoration. 
 Improved utilisation of system capacity. 
 Customer retention for improved quality of supply. 
 
4.2.3 Customer Related Benefits 
 
 Better service reliability. 
 Reduce interruption cost for Industrial and Commercial customers. 
 Better quality of supply. 
 
4.3. Distribution Automation Technologies - An enabling technology for the 
smart grid 
4.3.1 Automatic Reclosers     
                                                                                                      
The majority of faults on a distribution network can be considered temporary in nature 
meaning that they do not re-occur if the power is returned to the network soon after a trip. 
Automatic reclosing devices are therefore specifically designed to trip and clear transient fault 
conditions. Automatic reclosers are hydraulically or electrically operated devices that can 
sense over-current (O/C), earth-fault (E/F) or sensitive earth-fault (SE/F) conditions. Under 
these conditions the recloser will, subject to pre-determined settings, trip and after a time 
delay reclose automatically. If the fault is not cleared the recloser will go through a fixed 
sequence of a trip and reclose cycles after which it will lockout. When the recloser is in the 
lockout mode the faulted section will be isolated from the supply and human involvement is 
required to close the recloser. Most reclosers have 4 trips to lockout, typically set to 2 fast, 2 




The influence of the pole/pad-mounted recloser (circuit recloser) is comparable to the circuit 
breaker located at the primary substation. It detects and separates the faulted lines that are 
located after the recloser. The operation of the recloser is similar to that of a circuit breaker 
when the fault is momentary. This protects the customers before the recloser against the faults 
occurring after the recloser. However, a circuit recloser provides a good means to improve the 












































Figure 4.2:  Components of a MV Recloser Structure 
 
4.3.2 Automatic Sectionalising Devices  
 
Sectionalisers are hydraulically or electronically operated devices that are used in conjunction 
with an upstream recloser to isolate a fault. These devices do not have fault breaking 
capability and rely on the upstream recloser to detect and open for a downstream fault. The 
device isolates the faulted section before the recloser finishes a sequence of automatic 
reclosing cycles (ARCs) and locks out. Sectionalisers can be current operated, voltage 
operated or a combination of both [6].  
Sectionalisers simplify the job of restoring service after a fault has been removed since they 
do not require replaceable elements such as fuse links and they may be reclosed with a 
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Figure 4.3: Single or Three Phase Electronic Sectionaliser 
 
4.3.3 Fuses  
 
The Expulsion fuses, installed in a fuse cut-out base, are used extensively in many utilities 
throughout the world. These fuses provide a fairly low cost, yet effective, method for clearing 
fault current. Expulsion fuses are defined by their type and rating. The type i.e. K, T or D 
defines the gradient of the fuse on the current (I) versus time (T) curve. (A table showing 
Standard Fuse ratings can be found in Appendix A) This curve is commonly referred to as the 
Time Current Characteristic (TCC) of the fuse. The rating of a fuse refers to the continuous 
load current that the fuse can carry safely. It is, in other words, the highest current that can 
flow through the fuse, for an unlimited period, without damaging or melting the fuse. There is, 
however, a ‘safety factor’ of 2.25 included in the fuse rating because the fuse will in fact only 
start to melt at 2.25 times its rating [6].  
A fuse should however not be selected purely on its current rating, the TCC of the fuse must 
be used to ensure proper coordination with up and down stream protection devices. Two 
TCC’s are defined for each fuse rating: 
 
• Minimum Melting TCC - The time at which the fuse will start to melt for a certain current [6].  
• Total Clearing TCC - The total time that it will take before the fuse clears a certain current [6].  
 
(Graphs showing the Time Current Characteristics (TCC) can be found in the Appendix B and    
Appendix C) 
Some utilities standardise on a range of only seven different expulsion fuses in order to 
rationalise stock holdings and simplify application. Only the standard ranges of fuses will be 






Figure 4.4: A Traditional MV Drop-Out Fuse and Fuse Holder 
Most rural medium voltage networks are configured with the primary feeder protected by a 
circuit breaker or recloser, whilst a fuse protects the lateral line as shown in Figure 4.4 above. 
 
When a fault occurs on the lateral line the fuse operates to clear the fault. When the fuse 
protection is graded correctly with the upstream recloser, the recloser will never need to 
operate on a lateral line fault. This means only the customers on the faulted lateral line 
experience an outage. The problem with this configuration is that the fuse blows on all faults, 
both permanent and transient, causing downstream customers to always experience a 
sustained outage and always requiring a line crew to replace the fuse incurring significant 
operating costs for the network owner. In most cases, this sustained outage is unnecessary as 
the fault is transient. 
A fuse that has blown will drop down and provide a visual indication to passing line crews as 
to the faulted line. When in the dropped down position the fuse provides a genuine electrical 
isolation due to the large air gap. Whilst fuses possess a low capital cost, up to 80% of fuses 
blow unnecessarily [22]. Although fuses are quick and easy to install on site, a line man or 
crew, in an average rural environment may take hours to travel, patrol the line for potential 
fault, search for and repair the blown fuse, costing the utility lots of money for a single fuse 
operation [22].  
A fuse has no electronics or intelligence and, therefore, no capability to record historical data 
about fault events or reliability data. Without communication functionality, it cannot 
communicate device status remotely. It makes no contribution to the formation of an intelligent 
grid. 
 
When applying fuses to a network, it is imperative that the following points are considered:  
 
a) A fuse is not placed in the network to protect the device connected downstream from it, e.g. 
distribution transformer. It rather protects the rest of the network against the effects caused 
by the failure of that device, i.e. it disconnects the failed unit from the healthy network [6].  
b) Fuses are susceptible to transient damage, e.g. lightning current. The risk of lateral line 
fuse operations increases the lower the fuse rating. Fuses rated at 15 amperes and higher 
are generally considered to be transient insensitive [6].  
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c) Fuses cannot operate fast enough to clear lightning surges, travelling at roughly half the  
    speed of light [6].  
 
d) Application of fuses is prone to human error (incorrect rating replacement etc.).  
e) Fuses tend to degrade with time. 
 
f) Fuses introduce a ‘weak link’ on the system which can blow from inrush current, etc. if not  
   applied correctly.  
 
g) Fuses do not protect equipment from low value overload conditions, they only operate for  
    fault conditions [6].   
 
h) Low fault levels are not conducive to the use of fuses. Coordination problems between  
    fuses and SE/F and E/F settings are experienced, especially with larger rated fuses [6].  
 
i) High fuse ratings (20 K to 50 K) on ‘weak’ systems (end of line fault level < 200 A) cause        
dips [6]. 
4.3.4 Fault Path Indicators  
 
A Fault Path Indicator (FPI) is a device that provides a visible indication that fault current 
passed through the location at which the FPI is installed. It is thus a very useful fault finding 
device. FPIs installed on distribution networks are usually pole mounted at between 1.8 m and 

















Figure 4.5: Line Tracker Conductor Mounted Sensor - Fault Path Indicator (FPI) 
 
The FPIs should be installed:  
 
a) On rogue feeders (performance related)  
b) Important sectionalising points  
c) Major lateral take offs  
d) On solid networks 
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4.3.5 IntelliRupter PulseCloser 
  
IntelliRupter PulseCloser is a breakthrough in overhead distribution system protection. The 
IntelliRupter features ground breaking PulseClosing technology with a unique means for 
verifying that the line is clear of faults before initiating a close operation. Pulseclosing is 
superior to conventional reclosing. After a conventional recloser or relayed circuit breaker 
opens to interrupt a fault, it typically recloses into the fault several times to determine if the 
fault is still present. Pulseclosing, on the other hand, tests fault persistence without causing 
feeder stress due to high current surges. The Pulsecloser very quickly closes and re-opens its 
contacts at an exact point on the waveform to send a very short low current pulse down the 
line, then analyses the pulse to determine the course of action. If the pulse indicates a 
persistent fault, the Pulsecloser will keep the contacts open, wait for a user configurable 
interval, and pulse again. This process can repeat several times until the Pulsecloser 
determines that the line is no longer faulted; it then closes to restore service. If the fault 
persists for the duration of the test sequence, however, the Pulsecloser will lock out [9].  
The IntelliRupter PulseCloser greatly reduces stress on system components, as well as 
voltage sags experienced by customers upstream of the fault. It provides full live switching 
performance under all ice conditions; circuit making, circuit breaking, and Pulseclosing are 
accomplished within the interrupters. The component’s life is extended, eliminating costly 
replacement. Pulseclosing dramatically reduces through faults which are a leading cause of 
premature aging of substation transformers and power quality is improved since Pulseclosing 
doesn’t disturb source side customers with irritating voltage sags and blinks [8]. Its rapid self-
healing feature accomplishes restoration in seconds and minimises the number of customers 
experiencing an extended power interruption, tremendously improving the System Average 
Interruption Duration Index. 
 
Features and Uses of PulseClosing 
 
Conventional reclosers trip to clear an initial fault, but then reclose several times to determine 
if the fault has disappeared or if it still remains. If the fault was only temporary, then one of the 
reclosing attempts will hold closed, and service is restored to the line. If the fault still exists at 
the end of the reclosing sequence, the recloser locks out, indicating that there is a permanent 
fault on the line that needs to be removed by a line crew. The problem with conventional 
reclosing is that each reclose attempt re-establishes full magnitude fault current until a tripping 
condition is reached according to the Time Current Characteristic (TCC) curve that has been 
configured for each operation. Depending on the fault current magnitude and the selected 
TCC curve, the fault current may flow for anywhere from many cycles to a few seconds. Each 
conventional reclose attempt reignites arcing at the fault location, potentially causing more 
damage to power system equipment and nearby surroundings. The bus voltage sags, 
affecting customers on the faulted feeder and possibly those on nearby feeders as well [8].  
Fault currents create thermal and mechanical stress on all distribution system equipment that 
carry the fault current, so removing the fault as quickly as possible is critical. Nothing is more 
sensitive to through faults than the substation transformer. Each surge of fault current reduces 
the life of the transformer, so a method of reducing the size and quantity of these surges can 








PulseCloser Features [8] 
 
Utilities have standardised on the IntelliRupter with Pulseclosing technology as the fault 
interrupting device on 11 kV systems. One reason is that it includes many standard items that 
simplify installation: 
 
• Completely integrated construction - installation is accomplished with a single lift. 
 
• Integrated control and communications modules protect the electronics from vandalism, 
severe weather and electrical surges. WiFi connectivity from work vehicles enhances worker 
safety and comfort. 
 
• Three built-in Rogowski coil current sensors and six voltage sensors eliminate the clutter and 
complexity of adding separate high accuracy sensors in the field. 
 
Another factor in selecting the IntelliRupter as the standard equipment is that a single device 
can be used for many different types of applications. Additional features can be enabled as 
needed for the application: 
 
• Single-phase tripping is useful in reducing momentary outages by approximately two-thirds 
 
• Intelligent Fuse Savings automatically determines if a fuse saving “fast” trip should be used 
based on the fault current magnitude. At high fault currents, a mechanical device cannot trip 
faster than a fuse will operate, so Intelligent Fuse Savings will avoid using the fast trip, 
thereby reducing momentary outages. 
 
• Multiple pulse closers can be installed in series with identical protection settings if proper 
Time Current Characteristic coordination becomes difficult. By simply checking the 
PulseFinding option for each pulse closer, the devices will properly sectionalise the faulted 
section. Communications are not needed for this feature. 
 
• IntelliRupter allows for simultaneous bi-directional overcurrent protection and has multiple 
protection profiles to allow for quickly switching between applications. 
 
The Figures 4.6 (a) and (b) below show the IntelliRupter in the upright cross arm and compact 
cross arm mounting configuration, with or without an integral, hookstick operated disconnect 
for visible air gap isolation of switched open circuits. All components are mounted to the 





                                       (a)                                                                           (b) 
Figure 4.6: Different Components of the Intellirupter Pulsecloser - (a) without integrated    
disconnectors, (b) with visible air gap isolators  
  
Fault Testing with an IntelliRupter PulseCloser 
 
Every time conventional reclosers reclose into a fault, they stress the circuit with fault current. 
But after the IntelliRupter interrupts a fault, it pulsecloses to intelligently test for fault current 
before closing. 
The oscillograms in Figure 4.7 show the significant difference in current versus time during 
fault testing with a conventional recloser and IntelliRupter Pulsecloser [8]. Figure 4.7 shows 
the fault current that exists when a recloser or breaker is closed into a permanent fault and the 
impact on the unfaulted phases when this is done. This clearly shows the improvement when 
Pulseclosing technology is used to test a permanent fault. 
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The relative let through energy, in I²t, of a Pulseclosing operation is typically less than 2 % of a 
conventional reclosing operation, as shown in Figure 4.8 [8].  
Low-current Pulseclosing Technology as seen in Figure 4.8 below can safely test as many 
times as required to determine if a fault is permanent. It also will improve conductor life, 
conductor accessory life, and transformer life compared to the hard reclose used by a 













Figure 4.8: Relative let-through energy for a typical 5 kA fault [8] 
An example of a 5,000 ampere fault is displayed graphically in Figure 4.8. To calculate the 
conventional reclosing energy, a common delayed TCC is used, and it will allow a 5,000 
ampere fault to remain on the system for 0.160 seconds. The equivalent I²t is approximately 
4,000,000 A²s. Pulse closing does not use a TCC curve for testing. Instead, a pulse of current 
lasts for approximately 5 ms, and due to precision point-on-wave closing, the RMS equivalent 
fault current is limited to approximately half that of the symmetrical fault current experienced 
with conventional reclosing. So, the I²t for a pulse is approximately 30,000 A²s. Using an 
IntelliRupter dampens the forces experienced by overhead line equipment by a factor of 
0.75% since it does not reclose under fault conditions [8]. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows how a conventional recloser operates in response to a permanent single 
phase to ground fault. The uncontrolled closing often results in asymmetric fault current, 
significantly increasing peak energy into the fault [8].  
 
Figure 4.9: Conventional reclosing in response to a Permanent fault [8] 
After the IntelliRupter clears a fault, it will test for the continued presence of the fault using an 
advanced PulseClosing technology to intelligently close at a precise point on the voltage 
wave. Figure 4.10 shows how the IntelliRupter operates in response to a permanent single-
Initial 
trip 
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phase-to-ground fault, with a typical current pulse of just 5 milliseconds. The IntelliRupter 
causes the system to only experience overcurrent stress from the initial fault and not from 
every reclosing operation. The opposite polarity pulse detects magnetising inrush current; if 
the transformer is not faulted the IntelliRupter will be automatically instructed to close [8]. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Pulseclosing in response to a Permanent fault [8] 
 
The figures below show the Pulsecloser clearing a temporary fault on the B - Phase and A to B      
Phase Permanent Fault 
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Installation of IntelliRupter PulseCloser using Different Network Configurations  
  
Loop Restoration Applications 
 
Loop automation uses time, voltage, power flow, and some simple rules to isolate the fault and 
reconfigure the network, without any communications or operator assistance. In a loop 
automation network, the following actions will take place when a fault occurs [41]: 
 
• The recloser immediately upstream of the fault automatically trips, recloses to lockout, and  
   remains  open. 
 
• Reclosers downstream of the fault automatically change the protection settings in the   
  anticipation of power flowing in the opposite direction. 
 
• The normally open tie recloser closes automatically. 
 
Due to the fault still being present, the recloser immediately downstream of the fault trips, and 
locks out without reclosing. This will automatically restore power to the healthy parts of the 
network. An operator can now despatch line crews to the faulted segment [41].  
 
The IntelliRupter can boost the performance of loop restoration schemes using conventional 
reclosers, by eliminating the need to subject the alternate circuit in the loop to a fault when 
closing the tie. To take advantage of PulseClosing Technology, the conventional recloser in the 
tie position is replaced with an IntelliRupter. Where all protective points are using the 
IntelliRupter Pulsecloser, an even superior benefit can be achieved in loop schemes. “Its fast 
interrupters and accurate sensing and control enable significant reductions in protection 
margins. With the negligible effect Pulseclosing has on source side customers, the system can 
be segmented as needed without sacrificing protection [8]”. With the IntelliRupter protecting 
the loop, customers won’t experience voltage sags on their good circuit during testing of a 
faulted circuit [8]. 
 
Pulse Finding Application - Radial Circuit Protection Applications 
 
The IntelliRupter enhances reliability on radial circuits by overcoming the limits of conventional 
coordination methods. Series connected IntelliRupters can be configured so that after one unit 
opens to isolate a fault, those downstream, with the same settings, also open. When power 
returns, each IntelliRupter starting at the source pulsecloses, in turn, to verify that its line 
segment is unfaulted then closes to restore service. It will never close into a fault. Cold load 
inrush is alleviated because only one line segment is energised with each closing. No 
communication system is required to take advantage of this enhanced coordination and inrush 
mitigation. 
 
Only a limited number of series connected reclosers or relayed breakers can be coordinated. 
The ability to detect a faulted line section without relying on a Time Current Characteristic 
curve allows a virtually unlimited number of series connected Pulseclosers to be coordinated, 









Pulseclosing utilises very fast, about one or two milliseconds, closing and the opening of the 
main switchgear vacuum interrupter contacts, introduced at a pre-determined point-on-wave 
after a voltage wave peak. This controlled point on wave closing is important because it limits 
peak pulse current to approximately half the expected symmetrical fault current occurring with 
a hard close into the fault [8].  
 
Pulseclosing is accomplished by a sub-cycle close-open of the switchgear contacts. The 
contacts are closed for less than 2 ms. Current flow is established as the contacts close, but 
the contacts open before the first current zero crossing, at which time the current flow is 
extinguished. Another important part of the technology is the ability to close the interrupter 
contacts at a specified point on the voltage wave. The ideal point-on-wave closing angle must 
generate enough current to measure and analyse while still keeping the energy let through 
into the fault as low as possible. The target range for point-on-wave closing is shown in 
Figures 4.13 - 4.15. The interrupter contacts are closed after the voltage peak with the 
intention of creating an asymmetrical current, but with the first loop being a minor loop. Since 
the contacts part before the zero crossing, only the first minor loop of current is allowed to 
flow. Therefore, the peak magnitude of the current is reduced and the duration is limited to 3 – 










Figure 4.13: Symmetrical fault current - Closing angle = 90° (voltage peak) [8] 
 
Pulseclosing uses fault asymmetry to its advantage, such that the first current loop is the 
much smaller minor loop; it then interrupts the current before the major loop occurs. Current 
flows from contact touch until the next current zero, typically resulting in a pulse current of 
approximately 5ms duration. This very fast mechanism hits the point-on-wave closing target 
and then quickly reverses momentum to open the contacts. The magnetic actuators used in 
the Pulsecloser employ real-time feedback to ensure that each pulse is highly accurate, 

























Figure 4.15: The closing angle of 118° after a voltage zero yields initial minor loop and  
                     opens the contacts before the major loop [8]  
 
4.3.6 FuseSaver  
 
The partner fuse protects the lateral line from permanent faults and the FuseSaver protects 
the partner fuse from being blown by transient faults. The FuseSaver is a self-powered, 
electronically controlled, single-phase fault interrupting device that works in partnership with a 
fuse to protect a lateral or lateral line from both transient and permanent faults. The 
FuseSaver is capable of detecting, opening and clearing a fault in a half cycle which in most 
cases is less time than it takes for the fuse to melt.  The FuseSaver is primarily targeted at 
providing protection and automation of low fault level lines. By installing FuseSavers, the utility 
will gain the benefits of improved network availability and reduced maintenance callouts 










Figure 4.16: FuseSaver Principle [19] 
 
Also shown in Figure 4.16 is a communications module plugged into the underside of the 
FuseSaver. The communications module connects directly to the electronics module in the 
FuseSaver and has a short range wireless communications capability so that the FuseSaver 
can be configured, interrogated and controlled from ground level. The communications module 
is needed to install and commission a FuseSaver but is optional thereafter. The 
communications module can only communicate with other control devices such as a computer 
loaded with the Siemens Connect software and fitted with the USB antenna or the remote 
control cubicle. When the communications module is left permanently fitted this allows 
FuseSavers on two or three phase lines to be operated in a ganged mode [19].  
 
In most network configurations as shown in Figure 4.17 below, both the fuse and FuseSaver 
must be in series on the lateral line. From this arrangement a number of points are relevant: It 
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does not matter whether the fuse or the FuseSaver is neighbouring to the feeder line, either 
configuration is acceptable.  Although it is preferable for the fuse and FuseSaver to be located 
as close together as is practical, mounting the FuseSaver on a different pole is acceptable. 
The only risk is if a transient fault occurs between the fuse and the FuseSaver then if the 
FuseSaver is the downstream device it will not be able to save the fuse [19].  
 
 
Figure 4.17: Location of FuseSaver on a Typical Rural Network [19] 
 
FuseSaver Components 
   
The FuseSaver is attached on the dead end of the lateral line by line clamp assembly. Status 













Figure 4.18: FuseSaver with bird saver and line clamp assembly [19] 
Status Indicator  
 
An indicator of the OPEN/CLOSE contact status of the vacuum interrupter is visible by a 
transparent window from ground level. The indicator is directly coupled to the magnetic 
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Table 4.1: Status Indicator 
Colour Vacuum Interrupter 
Green Contacts OPEN 
Red Contacts CLOSED 
 
Usually the vacuum interrupter contacts are closed (red indicator) and only open momentarily 
for the dead time during a protection sequence. Alternatively when the FuseSaver is manually 
opened the green open indicator will be visible. After installation line current flows through the 
FuseSaver, the electronic module will power up and start charging the actuator capacitors. If 
there is a communications module fitted the charge time will be approximately 30 s [19].  
 
Bird Guard  
 
When the FuseSaver is hung directly from the MV line it is recommended to fit a bird guard 
over the load side terminals. The bird guard provides additional electrical insulation to the line 
side conductor which is directly above the load side terminal. The bird guard is fitted over the 
last shed on the FuseSaver and shrouds the FuseSaver connections and cable lug [19].  
 
Purpose of the Communications Module  
 
The communications module plugs into a three pin connector on the bottom of the FuseSaver 
and provides a short range wireless link between the FuseSaver and other devices. It also has 
a built-in battery [19].  
 
The communications module has multiple purposes. It can be:  
 
 Installed temporarily at the time of commissioning to allow the FuseSaver to be 
configured and tested.  
 Installed temporarily during service to allow FuseSaver to be manually operated, 
fault data to be read and event logs downloaded.  
 Installed permanently to allow three phase lockout functionality.  
 Installed permanently to improve the FuseSaver performance by reducing the 
capacitor recharge time and increasing the accuracy of the event log.  
 Installed permanently to not only enable the above but also to connect to a remote 
control cubicle and thereby integrating the FuseSaver into the utilities SCADA 
network.  
 
Wireless Communications  
 
Inside the communications module is an intelligent short range wireless transceiver which 
enables communication to the FuseSaver from ground level. The wireless link uses the public 
2.4 GHz band with a proprietary protocol. The operative range of the communications module 




The communications module is normally powered by energy extracted from line current by the 
FuseSaver. The communications module includes a battery to provide power to run the 
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communications module radio and to manually operate the FuseSaver when the line current is 














Figure 4.19: FuseSaver breaker protecting the Medium Voltage Fuse from Transient  
















Figure 4.20: Components of a FuseSaver 
 
FuseSaver Breaker Operational Process 
 
In most network configurations, the feeder is protected by a circuit breaker or recloser. Lateral 
lines are usually protected by fuses. However, a fuse is unable to distinguish between 
temporary and permanent faults. Since most of a network’s faults are temporary, 80 percent of 
its fuses are blown unnecessarily [19].  
The FuseSaver is the perfect protection solution for overhead lateral lines. It is capable of 
almost completely removing the impacts of temporary fault currents on the lateral lines. The 
FuseSaver protects the fuse in the case of temporary faults with its unique fault-clearing 
speed (one-half cycle). The FuseSaver is designed to be installed in series to the fuse. It will 
open and stay open for a pre-determined dead time when it senses a fault current. Then the 
FuseSaver closes again and remains closed. There are distinct effects on the feeder 


































Figure 4.21: FuseSaver Breaker Operational Process (a) Temporary Faults, (b)  
                    Permanent Faults [19] 
 
 Performance with Temporary Faults 
 
Figure 4.21 (a) shows the FuseSavers response to temporary faults. In this case, the fault 
disappears after closing and the power supply is restored. The fuse did not operate, and the 
FuseSaver is ready for the next fault. Only the customers on the affected T- off experienced 
an interruption in power during the FuseSaver dead time, while all other customers on the 
feeder, including nearby T- offs, did not even notice its operation in less than one cycle [19]. 
 
Performance with Permanent Faults 
 
As shown in Figure 4.21 (b), when the FuseSaver closes, the fault is still present, resulting in 
an immediate fault current. The FuseSaver will not operate again and allows the fault current 
to blow the fuse. Loss of power is unavoidable for customers on this T - off while all other 
customers receive an uninterrupted power supply. The FuseSaver restricts blown fuses on T-
off lines to unavoidable cases of permanent faults [19].  
 
4.3.7 Tripsaver Cutout - Mounted Recloser 
 
Most temporary faults on overhead distribution circuits occur on lateral lines [13]. Over time, 
utilities have dealt with lateral protection a couple of ways. Some utilities implement a “fuse 
blowing” philosophy i.e. the substation feeder breaker is properly coordinated with the lateral 
fuse so that the fuse will clear any downstream fault within its rating and not the breaker. 
 
The problem with the “fuse blowing” philosophy is that the service to customers on the lateral 
lines is permanently interrupted even for a temporary fault as shown in Figure 4.22 and the 















Figure 4.22: “Fuse blowing” philosophy for momentary and permanent faults [13] 
Other utilities employ a “fuse saving” philosophy: The first trip of the substation feeder breaker 
is intentionally miscoordinated so that the breaker operates faster than the lateral fuse to clear 
a fault downstream of the lateral fuse. The second trip of the breaker is slower so that if the 
fault is still present, the lateral fuse will operate to clear it as shown in Figure 4.22 [13]. The 
problem with the “fuse saving” philosophy is that all customers on the feeder experience a 
momentary interruption for all faults as shown in Figure 4.23. 
 
 








Figure 4.23: “Fuse saving” philosophy [13] 
 
The Tripsaver provides better lateral line protection and eliminates these problems. It 
eliminates the permanent outage which results when the lateral fuse operates in response to a 
temporary fault. Improvement in SAIFI without sacrificing MAIFI will be seen by the utilities 
using the “fuse blowing” technique. Tripsaver eliminates the momentary interruption on the 
feeder in instances where the breaker is tripped to save the lateral fuse during a temporary 

























Figure 4.24: Tripsaver Cutout Mounted Recloser [19] 
4.4. Device Location  
The investment and the placement of Distribution automation equipment in a radial feeder are 
designed to maximise network reliability that significantly affects the system reliability index 
[54].So, it is important to identify the optimal position of these devices along the feeder [56]. 
Otherwise, huge costs will be imposed on the distribution company and customers satisfaction 
would not be achieved [54]. 
The main purpose of utilising automation equipment is to restore the upstream loads when a 
fault occurs on the network. This is reached by disconnecting the downstream faulted section. 
Sensitive loads to the reclosing operation should be placed above the automation equipment 
[55].This cost must be balanced against the equipment installation cost [55].  
 
Optimal placement of the distribution automation equipment can be determined by balancing 
the savings obtained by the installation of these devices and their costs. These savings also 
depends on economic and technical factors. Technical factors are the annual number of 
various types of faults occurrence on the network, the network dimensions, the required 
maintenance time and the energy demand of the network. Economic factors consist of the 
period of study, interest and inflation rates, costs of equipment installation and load growth 
[55]. Significant time must be invested in selecting the optimal location to install DA apparatus 
on feeders in order to maximise profit and performance levels which accelerate the period of 
time before the break-even point in time on investment is reached which ultimately optimises 
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Chapter 5: Reliability Evaluation of Waterkloof Distribution Network                   
5.1. Introduction 
Historical assessment and predictive methods are normally used to evaluate the reliability of a 
distribution network. Most utilities focus more on historical assessment rather than predictive 
methods. Predictive methods are categorised into analytical and simulation methods. The 
difference between these methods is the way in which the system reliability indices are 
evaluated. This chapter is aimed at evaluating the reliability of the pilot feeder, Waterkloof 
Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder distribution network using Historical Data, FMEA and DIgSILENT. 
The results obtained from the historical, analytical and simulation methods are compared 
using the reliability indices such as System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) and 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) for the Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder. 
 
5.2. Trial Feeder Historical Data 
An extensive analysis of fault records for the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder has been 
carried out to identify the major causes of the faults and their characteristics. The main 
purpose of carrying out this analysis is to identify the statistical significance of different fault 
incidence frequency of individual fault causes according to the season, time of day and 
climate. The objective is to apply this data to the network reliability studies [4] and for network 
performance improvement. 
 
5.2.1 Feeder Fault Frequency Statistics 
 
Records of faults occurring on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV distribution feeder over a 6 -
year period has been collected. Over 155 faults (fault event data captured from Eskom Plant 
spreadsheet _ 2008 - 2013) were analysed to find statistical relationships between local 
climate, key design parameters of the overhead lines, and the main causes of power system 
faults were identified as bird related problems, overhead power line problems (unknown), 
weather related problems, vegetation and jumper failures. 
 
Figure 5.1 below shows the number of faults that occurred on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV 
Feeder from 2008 to 2013. 
 
Figure 5.1: Feeder Fault Frequency Statistics 
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5.3. Analysing the Feeder Faults 
5.3.1 Network Description 
 
Waterkloof 66/11 kV 2x20 MVA transformer substation was commissioned in 2006. Waterkloof 
substation, shown in the aerial photograph in Figure 5.2 is situated north of the N2 highway 
and on the Eastern side of Somerset West Business Park in Cape Town, South Africa. The 
substation comprises of six outgoing 11 kV feeders i.e. Waterkloof / Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder, 
Waterkloof / Farmers 2 11 kV Feeder, Waterkloof / Munic Chrisnissen 1 11 kV Bulk Load 
Feeder, Waterkloof / Munic Wedgewood 1 11 kV Bulk Load, Waterkloof / Munic Chrisnissen 2 
11 kV Bulk Load Feeder, Waterkloof / Munic Wedgewood 2 11 kV Bulk Load. The substation 
has greatly improved the QOS to all the customers in the Sir Lowry’s Pass basin. 
 
Figure 5.2: Waterkloof Substation 
 
Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder has been identified as one of the worst performing 
feeders within the western region. The feeder is supplied from Waterkloof substation, has a 
total line length of 24.3 Km and the line mostly consist of 0.075Cu and 0.50Cu conductor and 
several parts consists of Chickadee and Acacia conductors. The feeder supplies a total of 86 
customers i.e. it supplies 11 larger power customers (LPU), 73 small customers (SPU) and 2 
prepaid users (PPU), which consist of many 3 phase pumps & compressors. The network 
footprint incorporates a mix of major regional towns, industrial areas, residential growth areas, 
and long networks.  The distribution network is based on urban, rural, and rural long 
networks.There are 62 transformers used on the feeder with a total installed capacity of 7822 











Below is the Aerial photograph of Waterkloof Farmers 1 and the installation positions for the 
new innovative equipment. (See Appendix D for the detail Single Line Diagram of Waterkloof 
Farmers 1) 
 
Figure 5.3: Aerial photographs of Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
 
5.3.2 Fault Data Analysis - Before Installation of Equipment 
 
Fault data records were collated in a spreadsheet format with standardised line descriptions, 
operating voltage, start date and time of an event, original fault description, assigned fault 
cause and sub-cause and Eskom distribution system region. 
A total of 155 faults occurred on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder during the period 
2008 to the end of 2013. The figures below illustrate the breakdown of fault causes. The six 
most significant individual causes of faults are the wind, weather, jumper failures, vandalism, 
trees/branches in contact with power lines and overhead power line problems, together 
causing 73 % of all faults, including those not classified. The dominant part, at least 30 % 











The top causes affecting unplanned customer interruptions is 51 % of unknown overhead 
power line problems, 12 % insulator related problems, 10 % due to vandalism and 9 % due to 
fire/terrain conditions. Their individual contribution is plotted on a pie chart in Figure 5.5 below. 
 







Sustained Interruptions is the interruption of supply, include outages not classified as 
momentary events and that last for more than two minutes. There was a sharp increase in the 
sustained interruptions of the feeder in the years 2009 and 2012 due to the wind and 
overhead line problems, then a slight decrease in the sustained interruptions in years 2010, 
2011 and 2013. The figures below illustrate the yearly sustained interruptions from 2008 to 
2013. 
 
Figure 5.6: Sustained Interruptions for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder (2008-2013) 
 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the failure causes of sustained interruptions for the Waterkloof Farmers 1 
11 kV Feeder. According to the Eskom statistics, the dominant part, at least 51 %, of the 





Figure 5.7: Causes of Sustained Interruptions for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder  






Momentary interruption is the interruption of supply with duration less than two minutes. The 
graphs below illustrate the number and causes of momentary interruptions from 2008 to 2013. 
The most significant causes of momentary interruption were overhead power line problems, 
including those not classified. (See Appendix G for details of momentary interruptions) 
 
Figure 5.8: Momentary Interruptions for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
 
Figure 5.9 illustrates the failure causes of momentary interruptions for the Waterkloof Farmers 
1 11 kV Feeder. 
 
 







Unplanned MV Supply Unavailability 
 
The top causes of unplanned RSLI are shown in Figure 5.10. 17 % of MVAhrs lost were due to 
unknown overhead power line problems, 28 % due to line conductor (infra-structure) 




Figure 5.10: Top causes of unplanned RSLI 
 
5.3.3 Time-of-Day and Time-of-Year Analysis 
 
This analysis identifies relationships that exist between local climate and causes of power 
system faults. The time-of-day and time-of-year analysis for networks and specific fault causes 
can be graphically represented using bar charts that associate seasonal and time-of-day 
intervals with interruption indices proposed for system reliability studies [20]. Using a limited 
number of fault causes and time-season categories ensures sufficient events for statistically 




Figures 5.11 and 5.12 below show the number of unknown causes of overhead power line 
faults for the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder. The highest incidences occur in the early 
hours of the afternoon from 12:00 until 17:59 during season 1 (January to March), season 2 
(April to June) and season 4 (October to December) and early morning from 06:00 until 11:59 
during season 3 (July to September). The underlying causes of these could be related to 






Figure 5.11: Seasonal frequency of unknown causes of overhead power line faults on  
                    the Waterkloof Feeder  
 
                      
 
Figure 5.12: Hour-of-day dependent frequency of unknown causes of overhead    




Birds cause flashovers on the power lines in three ways [6] i.e. Bird Streamer, Bird pollution 
and electrocution.  One of the key attributes of bird faults is a clear diurnal and seasonal 
pattern of occurrence. The interactions between birds and power lines differ according to the 
voltage level of the line [8]. Faults are due to the electrocution of birds bridging the 
conductors-to-tower air gap and phase to phase by the wings and body [8] Flash-overs are 
caused by large birds i.e. Guinea Fowls, Crows and the Blue Cranes. Birds move in and out of 
the area late afternoon/ early evening and early mornings when it is still dark. Figure 5.13 
illustrates the diurnal and seasonal patterns commonly associated with bird faults on the 
Waterkloof Feeder. Fault frequency on the feeder is at its peak for Seasons 3 (July –
September) and 4 (October – November) in the early hours of the morning from 06:00 until 
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11:59 and early afternoon from 12:00 until 17:59. The underlying causes for this could be 
related to the birds colliding with conductors, birds making nests with scrap wire that results in 




Figure 5.13: Seasonal and time dependent frequency of bird faults on the Waterkloof   
                    Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
 
Weather Related Problems 
 
Wind and lightning have been identified as the two major weather-related causes of outages 
[44]. The Eskom classification does not include the wind as a major cause of faults in South 
Africa. The results of the time dependant characterisation of faults due to wind and lightning 
for the feeder are presented in Figure 5.14 and 5.15 below. The results indicate higher levels 
of severe weather conditions mainly wind and lightning initiated faults in the early morning and 
afternoons during the periods Season 1 (January–March), Season 3 (July–September) and 
Season 4 (October–December). These months coincide with winter and summer in South 
Africa and the results indicate a significant increase in the frequency of faults on the feeder. 





Figure 5.15: Time dependent frequency of weather related faults on the Waterkloof  
                     Feeder 
 
Fuse Failures and Vegetation 
 
Results are illustrated in Figure 5.16 and 5.17 for the feeders fuse failure number of faults and 
vegetation related problems that fall mostly within season 2 (April - June) and season 4 
(October – December). The highest incidence occurs in the early morning hours from 06:00 




Figure 5.16: Season and time dependent frequency of fuse failure faults on the  





Figure 5.17: Season and time dependent frequency of vegetation faults on the  
                     Waterkloof Feeder 
 
Number of Equipment Operations 
 
Figure 5.18 below shows the number of equipment operations faults for the Waterkloof 
Farmers 1 from 2008 to 2013. Section fuse 617, Section fuse 451 and Waterkloof Farmers 1 
11 kV main breaker operated frequently, the underlying causes were related to the unknown 









5.3.4 SAIDI and SAIFI Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis of this feeder will show the trends of the SAIDI over the past five years as 
well the causes associated with the poor performance. The feeder experienced a total of 155 
unplanned interruptions (faults, emergency and customers) due to overhead power line 
problems (unknowns), weather, birds, fuse failures, jumper failures and line conductor 
problems. 
Performance analysis done based on factors affecting SAIDI and SAIFI for this overhead line 
is specified below for the period 2009 to 2013. The system did not perform very well in 2009 
and 2012 in terms of the duration of interruptions (SAIDI) compared to other years. There was 
a sharp decrease in the SAIDI in the years 2010 and 2011. Analyses on the reference data 
show that overhead lines interruption play a dominant value on total indices. Over the five-
year period, in the years 2009 and 2012 customers were without power the longest. The figure 
below shows the average time a customer was without power for the five year period: (See 
Appendices E and F for details). 
 















The SAIFI measure indicates that the feeder’s customers being served by Eskom faced the 
highest frequency of interruption in 2012. i.e. approximately 21.84 outage interruptions in 
2012. 
 
Figure 5.20: SAIFI Performance of Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder (2009 - 2013) 
 
The following failures are the contributors on the network performance of Waterkloof Farmers 
1 11 kV Feeder from 2009 to 2013.The performance of the feeder for the five year period, in 
terms of unplanned SAIDI, is shown in the figure below. 22 % of the unplanned SAIDI was 
caused by insulators problems, 21 % was due to line conductors (infra-structure), 20 % due to 
vegetation and 7 % due to overhead power line problems.  




The SAIDI value indicates that Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder customers being served by 
Eskom were without power approximately 9.55 hours on average in December 2013. In 
January 2009, on average the feeder’s customers were without power the longest, 




Figure 5.22: The performance of the feeder since January 2009 – December 2013, in   
                    terms of  unplanned SAIDI 
 
The graph in Figure 5.23 below shows the unplanned SAIFI for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV 
Feeder in the years 2009 through 2013. The graph suggests that customers were the longest 
without power in November 2012, on average 24.89 times per year. At the end of December 




Figure 5.23: The performance of the feeder since January 2009 – December 2013 in  
                     terms of unplanned SAIFI 





5.4. Reliability Evaluation of a Test System using FMEA 
5.4.1 Example of utilising Failure Mode Effect Analysis - Reliability Analysis 
of Bus 6 of the RBTS 
 
The procedure for the real network is first applied on the Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 
6) Feeder 4 [10], [60]. Feeder 4 of bus 6 is a relatively long 33 kV feeder with 3 sub feeders 
and the load is a combination of residential and agricultural customers. The total load is 4.815 
MW and the total number of customers connected to Feeder 4 is 1183. The authors have used 
a failure rate of 0, 065 failures/km.yr for the main feeder and lateral distributors as per the data 
provided in reference [10], [60] i.e. the data given for 11 kV feeder sections. 
 






















Figure 5.24: Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 [10], [60] 
  
Conventional FMEA Approach 
 
The conventional techniques for distribution system reliability evaluation are generally based 
on failure mode and effect analysis using FMEA. The FMEA technique has been used to 
evaluate the Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 with complex configurations and 
a wide range of components and element operating modes, the list of basic failure events can 
become lengthy and can include thousands of basic failure events. This requires extensive 
analysis when the FMEA technique is used as shown in Table 5.1 below. It is, therefore, 
difficult to use FMEA directly to evaluate a complex radial distribution system [62].  
 
If any division of the main feeder fails, then the circuit breaker for Feeder 4 will be activated 
and all load points will be without a supply for a short period of time. When this happens, the 
relevant switches will be opened to isolate the faulted part of the network only. Then the circuit 
breaker will be closed and healthy parts of the system are restored (if possible). The faulted 
part of the system will only be restored once the component is repaired. It is assumed that the 
busbar and the circuit breakers operation are 100 % reliable. The repair time for both the main 
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and lateral sections is 5.0 hours and switching time is 1.0 hour. Replacement time by a spare 
for transformers is assumed to be 10 hours.  The system data of main and lateral sections 
including the load point information for Bus 6 Feeder 4 are shown in Appendix N.  
 






section λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs)U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
35 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
36 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
37 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
38 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
39 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
40 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
42 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
44 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
45 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208
46 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182
48 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275
49 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.039 5 0.195 0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04875 5 0.24375
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F6 - LP28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F6 - LP29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F6 - LP30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 - LP31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 - LP32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 - LP33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 - LP34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F5 - LP35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 - LP36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 - LP37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 - LP38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 - LP39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
F7 - LP40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transformers 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
Total 1.6725 3.32 5.5515 1.6725 3.31928 5.5515 1.6725 3.32 5.5515 1.6725 3.32 5.5515 1.6725 3.3 5.5515 1.7115 3.36 5.7465 1.72125 3.367 5.79525
Load Point 23Load Point 18 Load Point 19 Load Point 20 Load Point 21 Load Point 22 Load Point 24
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.039 5 0.195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5525 5 2.7625 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5525 5 2.7625 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5525 5 2.7625
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
1.6725 5.04 8.4375 1.7115 5.04 8.6325 1.6725 5.045 8.4375 2.225 5.03 11.2 2.225 5.034 11.2 2.225 5.034 11.2
Load Point 25 Load Point 26 Load Point 27 Load Point 28
Feeder 6 (F6)







λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208
0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182
0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275
0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8645 5 4.3225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.9165 5 4.5825 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8645 5 4.3225 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8645 5 4.3225 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8645 5 4.3225
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
2.537 3.892 9.874 2.589 3.91 10.134 2.537 3.89 9.874 2.537 3.89 9.874 2.537 3.89 9.874
Feeder 5 (F5)
Load Point 34 Load Point 35Load Point 31 Load Point 32 Load Point 33
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.8385 5 4.1925 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.88725 5 4.43625 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8385 5 4.1925 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8385 5 4.1925 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8385 5 4.1925
0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
2.511 5.03 12.63 2.55975 5.029 12.8738 2.511 5.03 12.63 2.511 5.03 12.63 2.511 5.03 12.63
Feeder 7 (F7)
Load Point 39 Load Point 40Load Point 36 Load Point 37 Load Point 38
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The system indices - SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI can then be calculated using the conventional 
FMEA approach from the load point indices, the number of customers and load connected at 
the load point [62]. The detail calculations shown below are the system indices for Feeder 4 of 
Bus 6 of the RBTS. 
 
  
𝑺𝑨𝑰𝑫𝑰    =  
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 = 4.16 hours/customer interruption 
 
 
Table 5.2: System Indices for Feeder 4 using Conventional FMEA  Approach. 
 
Index  
SAIDI (hours/ customer.year) 8.22 
SAIFI (interruptions/ customer.year) 1.98 








Reliability Network Equivalent Approach 
 
Calculating the reliability indices for Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 using the 
reliability network equivalent approach is summarised below. As shown in Figure 5.24 and 
Figure 5.25 all the Sub Feeders F5, F6 and F7 were replaced by corresponding equivalent 
lateral sections [see Appendix N for detail procedure of the equivalent lateral sections]. The 
system is reduced to a general distribution system. The load-point indices in Feeder 4 and the 


































                                                                    (c) 
 
Figure 5.25: Reliability Network Equivalent Approach - RBTS Bus 6 Feeder 4 (a) Sub  
                    Feeder 5 (b) Sub Feeder 6 (c) Sub Feeder 7 
 
The first step was to find the equivalent lateral sections of Sub Feeders 5, 6 and 7. The 







Table 5.3 below shows the total length for Sub Feeders 5, 6 and 7 calculated by adding the 
lengths of the feeder sections (see Figure 5.24 for feeder section numbers).  
 
Table 5.3: Feeder section numbers and lengths (Table of feeder types and lengths can be 
found in Appendix N) 
 
Sub Feeders Feeder Section Numbers Length (km) 
      
Feeder 5      
  53 3.2 
  54 1.6 
  56 2.8 
  57 2.5 
  58 3.2 
Total length for Feeder 5 (F5) 13.3 
  
Feeder 6 51 3.2 
  52 2.5 
  59 2.8 
Total length for Feeder 6 (F6) 8.5 
  
Feeder 7      
  59 2.8 
  60 2.5 
  62 1.6 
  63 3.2 
  64 2.8 
Total length for Feeder 7 (F7) 12.9 
 
For Feeder 5: 
 
Note that the repair time r (hours) and switching time s (hours) for Feeder 4 is 5 hrs and 1 hr 
respectively. Also, note that the failure rate of the feeder and laterals is actually a function of 
their length (f/km year). The failure rate is calculated by simply multiplying the total length of 
the feeder sections of Sub Feeders 5, 6 and 7 with the component failure rate (λ = 0.065 
f/km.year) [62]. i.e.  
 
𝜆𝑒51 = (13.3 km) x (0.065 f/km.year) = 0.8645 (occ/year) 
𝑈𝑒51 = 𝜆𝑒51 x r (hours) = 0.8645 (occ/year) x 5 (hrs) = 4.3225 (hrs/year) 
𝑟𝑒51 = 5 (hrs) 
 
For Feeder 6: 
 
𝜆𝑒61 = (8.5 km) x (0.065 f/km.year) = 0.5525 (occ/year) 
𝑈𝑒61 = 𝜆𝑒61 x r (hours) = 0.5525 (occ/year) x 5 (hrs) = 2.7625 (hrs/year) 






For Feeder 7: 
 
𝜆𝑒71 = (12.9 km) x (0.065 f/km.year) = 0.8385 (occ/year) 
𝑈𝑒71 = 𝜆𝑒71 x r (hours) = 0.8385 (occ/year) x 5 (hrs) = 4.1925 (hrs/year) 
𝑟𝑒71 = 5 (hrs) 
 
After the equivalent lateral sections of Feeders 5, 6 and 7 have been found, Feeder 4 
becomes a general distribution feeder [62]. The next step is to calculate the load point indices 
in Feeder 4 using FMEA. As shown in Table 5.4, the load point indices i.e. the average failure 
rate λ, average outage time r and average annual outage time or unavailability U are 
calculated using equations (2.1) to (2.3) for LP18 to LP27 and Sub Feeders 5,6 and 7 of 
Feeder 4 [62]. The data used in these studies are given in Appendices N. 
 












Note: Trfr – Transformer 
section λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
35 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
36 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
37 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
38 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
39 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
40 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
42 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
44 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
45 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 1 0.208
46 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 1 0.182
48 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 1 0.2275
49 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 1 0.104
41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.039 5 0.195
43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
47 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reliability-network equivalent- Feeder 5 (F5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reliability-network equivalent - Feeder 6 (F6) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reliability-network equivalent - Feeder 7 (F7) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transformers 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
Total 1.6725 3.3193 5.5515 1.6725 3.31928 5.5515 1.6725 3.3193 5.5515 1.6725 3.3193 5.5515 1.6725 3.319 5.5515 1.7115 3.358 5.7465
Load Point 23Load Point 18 Load Point 19 Load Point 20 Load Point 21 Load Point 22
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125 0.1625 5 0.8125
0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925 0.0585 5 0.2925
0.208 1 0.208 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 1 0.208 0.208 5 1.04 0.208 5 1.04
0.182 1 0.182 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 1 0.182 0.182 5 0.91 0.182 5 0.91
0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 1 0.2275 0.2275 5 1.1375 0.2275 5 1.1375
0.104 1 0.104 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 1 0.104 0.104 5 0.52 0.104 5 0.52
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.04875 5 0.24375 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.039 5 0.195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8645 5 4.3225 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5525 5 2.7625 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8385 5 4.1925
0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15 0.015 10 0.15
1.7213 3.367 5.7953 1.6725 5.0448 8.4375 1.7115 5.044 8.6325 1.6725 5.0448 8.4375 2.537 3.892 9.874 2.225 5.03371 11.2 2.511 5.02987 12.63
Feeder 7 (F7)Load Point 24 Load Point 25 Load Point 26 Load Point 27 Feeder 5 (F5) Feeder 6 (F6)
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The system indices - SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI can then be calculated from the load point 
indices, the number of customers and load connected at the load point [62]. The detail 
calculations shown below are the system indices for Feeder 4 of Bus 6 of the RBTS. 
 




        = 8.22 hours/ customer.year 
 
 
        𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 =  (1.6725∗147)+(1.6725∗126)+(1.6725∗1)+(1.6725∗1)+(1.6725∗132)+(1.7115∗147)+(1.72125∗1)+(1.6725∗79)+(1.7115∗1)+(1.6725∗76)+(2.537∗158)+(2.225∗156)+(2.511∗158)
1183
  
        = 1.98 interruptions/ customer.year 
 
 




 = 4.16 hours/customer interruption 
 
Table 5.5: System Indices for Feeder 4 using Reliability Network Equivalent Approach 
 
Index  
SAIDI (hours/ customer.year) 8.22 
SAIFI (interruptions/ customer.year) 1.98 
CAIDI (hours/customer interruption) 4.16 
 
The basic load point and system indices thus calculated are expected values. This agrees with 
the results published in [10], [60].  
 
Conventional FMEA Approach versus Reliability-Network-Equivalent Approach 
 
The conventional FMEA approach was initially used for evaluating the reliability of a complex 
radial distribution test system, RBTS Bus 6, Feeder 4 and then compared to the reliability-
network-equivalent approach. A reliability-network-equivalent approach is introduced to 
simplify the analytical process and to provide a more simplified approach to the reliability 
evaluation of complex distribution systems. Reliability evaluations for the test distribution 
system have shown this technique to be superior to the conventional FMEA approach. This 
method avoids the required procedure of finding the failure modes and their effect on the 
individual load points, and results in a significant reduction in analytical calculation time [62]. 
 
As shown in Table 5.6 below, after comparing the results of the conventional FMEA approach 
and reliability-network-equivalent method, it can be seen that the reliability indices of the 
Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 are the same [62]. 
 
Table 5.6: Comparison between Conventional FMEA and Reliability Network Equivalent    
                 Approach 
 





SAIDI 8.22 8.22 0.00 
SAIFI 1.98 1.98 0.00 
CAIDI 4.16 4.16 0.00 
 




5.5. Implementation of the FMEA on the Pilot Feeder – Waterkloof Farmers 1  
   11 kV Feeder   
FMEA was used to evaluate the contingencies of the components failing and to see how this 
affects the load points. It is difficult to use FMEA only to evaluate a complex radial distribution 
system. A Reliability Network Equivalent Approach is introduced to simplify the analytical 
process. This method was demonstrated in section 5.4 using a test system. 
 
5.5.1 Evaluation Technique - Modelled Network Reliability Calculations 
 
The overview of Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder network is illustrated in Figure 5.26. The detailed 





































Figure 5.26: Waterkloof Farmers 1 Overview [6] 
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The Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder is a complex radial feeder that contains a number of sub-
feeders. In order to simplify and make failure mode calculations possible a number of sub-
feeders are combined into one lateral equivalent. In order to make sub-feeders A-M, as one 
load point, the author had to treat them as single feeders and then calculate the number of 
outages and their duration for individual customers as well as the overall system indices using 
the reliability network equivalent approach and FMEA. If any section of the main feeder fails, 
then the circuit breaker will be activated and all load points will be without supply. When this 
happens, the relevant switches will be opened to isolate the faulted part of the network. Then 
the circuit breaker will be closed and the healthy parts of the system are restored (if possible). 
The faulted part of the system will only be restored once the component is repaired. If one of 
the distributors fails, the section fuse will isolate the fault and hence only the local load point 
will be affected. To simplify the evaluation, it is assumed that the substation circuit breaker 
and the section fuse do not fail.  






























Figure 5.29: Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder – Sub-feeders F-M [6] 
 
The Reliability Network Equivalent Approach provided a practical technique for evaluating 
distribution system reliability in complex configurations. Figure 5.30 presents the network 
reliability equivalent of the load points A - M for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV. The procedure 
involves the development of equivalent lateral sections. The basic concepts in this approach 










Figure 5.30: Network reliability equivalent of lateral sections for Waterkloof Farmers 1  











The network in Figures 5.27 – 5.29 is a series network and the equations (2.1) to (2.3) can be 
used to calculate the load point indices. Recall:  
 









Us = ∑λiri (2.3) 
 
The above equations will be used to calculate indices for each of the load points. 
 
Based on the failure rate from Historical data as obtained from Eskom, the lines and cables 
average failure rate per 100 km per annum recorded was 1.0947 for the period of 5 years 
(January 2009 - December 2013) (see Appendix G for details). The transformer failure rate 
per annum is 0.015. The protection devices have a 5% failure rate per annum. The average 
restoration time for the components is 5 hours before installation of equipment, irrespective of 
any failure due to the availability of spares at the store room. Using the above data the load 
point and system indices were calculated and the results of the reliability analysis of the pilot 
network were achieved. 
 
The reliability parameters of this network are tabulated below.  
 




Table 5.7: Reliability parameters for system before installation of equipment (main section 





Table 5.8: Reliability parameters for system before installation of equipment (Lateral section  
                 and transformer data)  
 
 
Table 5.9: Reliability parameters for system before installation of equipment (Waterkloof  
                 Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder - Number of customers connected per load point) 











5.5.2 Load Point and System Indices Calculations before Installation of 
Equipment 
 
The load point and system indices are very useful in assessing the severity of the system 
failure for predicting future reliability. The two indices are also good and play a major role in 
assessing the past performance of the system. However, it is impossible to use these indices 
to make a prediction on the system future performance because of the changes on the 
topology, protection schemes and switches that are undertaken on the network.  
In order to assess the past performance of the system, three important procedures should be 
followed [37]: 
  
(a) Establishment of the chronological changes in system performance and, therefore, helps to  
      identify weak areas and the need for strengthening. 
  
(b) Establishment of the existing indices which serve as a guide for acceptable values in future  
      reliability assessments. 
  
(c) Compare previous predictions with actual operating experience [37].  
  
Indices are evaluated for faults due to the overhead line, cables, transformers and the 
protection devices since they are the only equipment that are mostly exposed to failure. The 
lengths of the overhead lines are given in the network diagrams and Tables 5.7 - 5.8 above. 
The lengths of the overhead line serve a very useful purpose since the calculations of specific 
line failure rate require such data. It is assumed that the busbars operations are 100 % reliable 
since the busbar is just an aluminium bar that provides the connection of the incoming and 
outgoing voltages within substations.  
 
Note that the switching time for all switches is between 0 to 5 hours. Also, note that the failure 
rate of the feeders and distributors is actually a function of their length (faults/km.year). The 
failure rate in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 was calculated by simply multiplying the length of the feeder/ 
distributors with the components failure rate (f/km.year). For example, components 1 (main 
feeder sections) has a failure rate of 1.0947 (f/km.year). To get the overall λ (f/km.year) of the 
components, the failure rate must be multiplied by the length of this feeder, 0,485 km.  
 
So λ =1.0947 x 0,485 = 0.5309 (f/km.year) 
 
The approach is to make an FMEA table with four different configurations used on the pilot 
feeder. i.e.  
 
 Configuration 1: Standard Eskom MV Network with fuses, disconnects and reclosers  











 λ = 1.0947
section λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
1 0,5309 5 2,654648 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,531 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
2 0,0307 5 0,153258 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,031 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
3 0,0416 5 0,207993 0,0416 5 0,208 0,042 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208
4 0,2791 5 1,395743 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,279 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957
5 0,0033 1 0,003284 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,003 5 0,0164 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033
6 0,1675 5 0,837446 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,167 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374
7 0,012 5 0,060209 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602
8 0,277 5 1,384796 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848
9 0,0077 5 0,038315 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,008 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383
10 0,0493 5 0,246308 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,049 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463
11 0,104 5 0,519983 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52
12 0,2562 5 1,280799 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,256 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808
13 0,127 5 0,634926 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349
14 0,0799 5 0,399566 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,08 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996
15 7,5272 0,1 0,752716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0,1 0,0004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,3667 5 1,8336 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,1451 5 5,7253 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,6689 5 3,3443
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transformers 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
Total 9,508 1,13 10,72 1,981 5,03123 9,967 1,985 5,027 9,9808 2,348 5,03 11,8 3,126 5,02 15,69 2,6499 5 13,31
Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C Load Point D Load Point E Load Point F
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0,5309 5 2,65465 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
0,0307 5 0,15326 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
0,0416 5 0,20799 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208
0,2791 5 1,39574 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957
0,0033 1 0,00328 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033
0,1675 5 0,83745 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374
0,012 5 0,06021 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602
0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848
0,0077 5 0,03831 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383
0,0493 5 0,24631 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463
0,104 5 0,51998 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52
0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808
0,127 5 0,63493 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349
0,0799 5 0,39957 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,6229 5 13,1145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0,4499 5 2,2496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0,9261 5 4,6306 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,2293 5 6,1467 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,7406 5 8,7029 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
4,604 5,01 23,082 2,431 5,03 12,217 2,907 5,02 14,6 3,21 5,02 16,11 3,722 5,02 18,67 1,981 5,03 9,967 1,981 5,03 9,967
Load Point K Load Point L Load Point MLoad Point G Load Point H Load Point I Load Point J
This is done in Table 5.10 below. 
 
 
Configuration 1 - Repair time r = 5 hrs (before installation of the new devices) 
                           
Table 5.10: Load point indices for the pilot network – Configuration 1  
Where λS =∑λi     , rs =Us
λs
 =
 ∑λi  ri    
∑λi
, Us = ∑λiri     
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Figure 5.31: FMEA load point indices where r (hrs) = 5 hrs 
 
The results shown in Table 5.10 can be used to obtain the system performance indices for the 
Configuration 1 used on the pilot feeder. In order to calculate the system indices, the value of 
the feeders load point indices, equivalent lateral sections and the number of customers 
connected to the feeder must be known. System indices calculations for Configuration 1 are 
shown below. 
  




  = 15.24 interruption/ (customers.year)  
 
 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = (9.5082∗20)+(1.9811∗1)+(1.9855∗1)+(2.3478∗2)+(3.1261∗12)+(2.6499∗3)+(4.6040∗15)+(2.4310∗5)+(2.9072∗6)+(3.2104∗11)+(3.7217∗6)+(1.9811∗3)+(1.9811∗1)
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 = 3.21 hours/customers interruption 
 
Configuration 2, 3 and 4 will be explained in Chapter 8 after the installation of the equipment.  
 
5.6. Comparison between Historical Assessment, FMEA and Simulation 
(DIgSILENT) 
5.6.1 Comparison and Discussion of Load Point Indices Results 
 
In order to assess the reliability performance of the system, the load point reliability and 
system reliability indices for the chosen distribution network were determined using 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory software. Network reliability assessment was used to calculate the 
expected interruption frequencies, duration and annual interruptions costs [51]. 
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Figure 5.32: Network reliability assessment modelled for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV  
                    Feeder using DIgSILENT PowerFactory Software 
 
For the simulation, DIgSILENT PowerFactory (DPF) software was used to perform system 
reliability evaluation to obtain the load point indices as well as the system indices such as 
SAIFI, SAIDI and CAIDI. The load point indices results were simulated over the period of a 
year. According to the results compared between DIgSILENT PowerFactory and FMEA (from 
section 5.5.2) as tabulated below, a small number or no deviations were recorded for the 
failure rate analysis and unavailability. This is because the input data and switching time used 
for FMEA and DIgSILENT PowerFactory were the same. A higher failure rate is experienced at 
some of the load points because the protection devices such as fuses failed to operate in 











Table 5.11 and Figure 5.33 below show the load points indices of Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV 
Feeder using the analytical (FMEA) and DIgSILENT PowerFactory simulation approaches. 
 







Figure 5.33: Comparison of FMEA and DPF failure rate 
 
Comparing the results in Table 5.11 shows that Load point indices were found to be similar 
since all the assumptions made in FMEA, were stipulated in DIgSILENT Powerfactory. The 
results shown for both the simulation and analytical approaches are very much comparable, 






DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF
Load Point A 9,51 9,51 0 1,13 1,13 0 10,72 10,72 0
Load Point B 1,98 1,98 0 5,03 5,03 0 9,97 9,97 0
Load Point C 1,99 1,99 0 5,03 5,03 0 9,98 9,98 0
Load Point D 2,35 2,35 0 5,03 5,03 0 11,80 11,80 0
Load Point E 3,13 3,13 0 5,02 5,02 0 15,69 15,69 0
Load Point F 2,65 2,65 0 5,02 5,02 0 13,31 13,31 0
Load Point G 4,60 4,60 0 5,01 5,01 0 23,08 23,08 0
Load Point H 2,43 2,43 0 5,03 5,03 0 12,22 12,22 0
Load Point I 2,91 2,91 0 5,02 5,02 0 14,60 14,60 0
Load Point J 3,21 3,21 0 5,02 5,02 0 16,11 16,11 0
Load Point K 3,72 3,72 0 5,02 5,02 0 18,67 18,67 0
Load Point L 1,98 1,98 0 5,03 5,03 0 9,97 9,97 0
Load Point M 1,98 1,98 0 5,03 5,03 0 9,97 9,97 0
Failure rate (faults/year) Outage Time (hrs) Unavailability (hrs/year)
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5.6.2 Comparison and Discussion of System Indices Results 
  
The System Indices are computed using FMEA and DIgSILENT PowerFactory for the network 
Configuration 1. The load point indices are not presenting the full behaviour of the network 
which is the reason why system indices were computed to determine the performance of the 
modelled network. 
 




The comparison of the total system indices using FMEA and DPF are as shown in Tables 5.12 
above. The results shown in Table 5.12 for both the simulation and analytical approaches are 
very much comparable, proving that any of these methods can be used to assess the 
reliability of a distribution network. Also from the table, it can be seen that no percentage 
differences are observed between the results since all inputs specified in FMEA were also 
specified in DIgSILENT Powerfactory. Although both methods have shown a high degree of 
accuracy, DIgSILENT Powerfactory is still the number one choice due to many advantages 
that are linked with it. This includes the convenience of simulating larger networks, the 
accuracy of the software, the graphical representation of the obtained data etc. The 
disadvantage with the FMEA is the fact that it can be subjected to human error that will lead to 
incorrect results [37]. 
 
5.6.3 Historical vs. DIgSILENT PowerFactory Software  
 
Table 5.13: Historical vs. DIgSILENT PowerFactory before installation of the new innovative   




As per simulation using DIgSILENT Powerfactory, the data used to calculate the SAIDI and 
the SAIFI are substantially noticeable with the historical data as shown in Table 5.13.The 
system reliability indices comparison for both simulation and historical data at the locations for 
the new equipment are different. Historical data is unpredictable and will vary every year to 
year depending on the severity of the weather and other unplanned faults. According to 
historical data of the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder outages are relatively high, around 2 
times monthly due to radial feeder configuration and high numbers of faults in the equipment 
and feeder sections, causing a great contribution to unavailability of electricity supply to 
customers. Supply restoration takes lots of time, not only due to the standard procedure 
reasons but also distribution protection system configuration itself; such as feeder breaker with 
many load break switches in the feeder. They caused poor reliability indices, especially SAIDI 
and SAIFI. One of the ways to improve the reliability indices of the overhead line in fault 
DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF
Configuration 1 15,24 15,24 0 4,75 4,75 0 3,21 3,21 0
Configuration 2 12,99 12,99 0 4,75 4,75 0 2,74 2,74 0
Configuration 3 12,4 12,4 0 4,75 4,75 0 2,61 2,61 0
Configuration 4 7,13 7,13 0 4,75 4,75 0 1,5 1,5 0
CAIDISAIDI SAIFI
DPF Historical Data % DIFF DPF Historical Data % DIFF DPF Historical Data % DIFF
Whole System 15,24 18,34 -20,3412 4,75 8,94 -88,21 3,21 2,05 36,14
LBS4204 12,74 15,37 -20,6436 2,54 3,07 -20,87 5,02 5,01 0,20
SF451 2,29 0,77 66,37555 0,46 1,05 -128,26 5 0,73 85,40




management is to reconfigure the distribution protection system by using the feeder 
automation. They work based on sensing and coordinating of voltage, current and time in case 




Figure 5.34: Historical vs. DIgSILENT PowerFactory before installation of new innovative   

























Chapter 6: Location, Protection Coordination and Grading of  
                   Devices 
  
6.1. Introduction 
Power system protection is the process of making the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electrical energy as safe as possible from the effects of failures and events that 
place the power system at risk. The objective of power system protection is to isolate a faulty 
section of the electrical power system from rest of the live system so that the rest portion can 
function satisfactorily without any severer damage due to fault current. Power system 
protection contributes to Distribution automation and can be studied together because both 
employ similar technology. Before installation of any Distribution automation, correct protection 
coordination and grading are essential. 
 
6.1.1 Selective Coordination 
 
Selective Protection coordination is critical for the reliability of the electrical distribution system 
and must be analysed. While it is very important, it is not enough to select protective devices 
based solely on their ability to carry the system load current and interrupt the maximum fault 
current at their respective points of application. It is important to note that the type of 
overcurrent protective devices and ratings (or settings) selected to determine if a system is 
selectively coordinated.  
 
The two one-line diagrams in Figure 6.1 below illustrate the concept of selective coordination.  
 
A system without selective coordination represented by the one-line diagram is to the left. A 
fault on the load side of one overcurrent protective device unnecessarily opens other 
upstream overcurrent protective device(s). The result is unnecessary power loss to loads that 
should not be affected by the fault. This is commonly known as a "cascading effect" or lack of 
coordination. The system to the right represented by the one-line diagram is a system with 
selective coordination. Only the nearest upstream overcurrent protective device opens for the 
full range of overload or fault currents possible for this system. All the other upstream 
overcurrent protective devices do not open. Therefore, only the circuit with the fault is 
removed and the remainder of the power system is unaffected. The power supply for other 
loads in the system continue to be uninterrupted and a selectively coordinated circuit would 
only have the immediate upstream feeder overcurrent protective device open for overcurrent 













Figure 6.1: Selective Coordination: Avoid Blackouts [48] 
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Selective coordination was analysed and applied to the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
before installation of the new protective devices. These devices had to be properly graded and 
coordinated to allow only the nearest upstream overcurrent protective device to open for both 
overloads and all types of short-circuits, leaving the remainder of the system undisturbed and 
preserving the continuity of service.  Isolation of a faulted circuit from the remainder of the 
system is critical in today’s modern electrical systems. Power blackouts cannot be tolerated.  
 
6.1.2 Location of Distribution Automation Equipment  
 
There were two views in the determining the positioning of the distribution automation 
installation.  
 
• Equipment positioning from the view of cost reduction. 
• Equipment positioning in order to reduce transient interruption, reduction of energy not   
       supplied and satisfaction of customers [54].  
 
Some other factors were also considered when the devices were installed at the proposed 
locations, such as power quality and reliability indices (SAIDI and SAIFI), load (KVA) 
connection, number of customers connected, protection settings, the imposed stress to the 
network equipment especially to the power transformer, and the characteristic of the supplied 
loads through the distribution automation against the reclosing close ups [55]. 
  
The devices were installed at different points along the radial distribution feeder. It was 
necessary to adjust their operating time (time grading) so that the device nearest on the 












































Figure 6.2: Placement of the Distribution Automation Equipment 
 
An event spreadsheet (Historical data) was developed to determine the device location based 
on the most cost effective reliability improvement. The following information helped evaluate 
the distribution automation equipment location impact on customer hours lost, total load lost, 
and customer interruptions: 
 
• Fault rate 
• Average time to switch 
• Average time to complete a repair 
• Underground / overhead split    
 
6.2. Modelling and Simulation of Protection Time/Current Characteristics of 
Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder using DIgSILENT PowerFactory 
Software 
DIgSILENT PowerFactory was used to simulate the behaviour and co-ordination of the 
protective devices before the distributed automation system was connected to an 11 kV 
distribution system. From the simulation, the basic issue was to coordinate and grade the 
IntelliRupter Pulsecloser, (IR) with the upstream substation breaker’s earth-protection and the 
downstream 30 K type fuses.   
Installation of Intellirupter at LBS4204   
Installed Capacity = 6267 kVA 
Installation of FuseSaver at 
SF451 (30K fuse)  
Installed Capacity =1067 kVA 
Installation of Tripsaver at 
SF617 (30 K fuse)  
Installed Capacity =375kVA 
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Table 6.1 below represents the mathematical concept and the software used for allocation of 
protection settings i.e. Settings was allocated to overcurrent and earth fault currents for 
Waterkloof substation breaker and the Intellirupter Pulsecloser. 
The Substation Farmers 1 breaker and the Intellirupter Pulsecloser was set to the highest fault 
level. Moving downstream the impedance of the feeder causes the fault level to reduce, hence 
grading would be achieved.  
The earth fault was set at 80 A for both the substation breaker and the Intellirupter Pulsecloser 
due to the close location of these devices to the substation. The SEF was set at 5 A for the 
Intellirupter Pulsecloser and 6 A for the substation breaker which was definite time. If a fault 
was identified to be less than 80 A and more than 5 A then the SEF would pickup and trip the 
Intellirupter Pulsecloser before the substation breaker would operate. An earth fault greater 
than 80 A on the feeder would activate and trip the Intellirupter Pulsecloser before the 
substation breaker would operate. Similarly, for overcurrent faults, the Intellirupter Pulsecloser 
would pickup and trip faster than the substation breaker due to the smaller time multiplier. The 
overcurrent setting for the Intellirupter Pulsecloser was set to 300A @ 0.4s NI while the 
substation breaker was set to operate with a backup setting of 400A @ 0.5s NI. 
 


















 Overcurrent Earth Fault Sensitive earth 
Fault 
Substation settings 400A @ 0.5s NI 80A @ 0.3s NI 6A @ 7s DT 




OC = Overcurrent 
EF = Earth Fault 
NI = Inverse Definite minimum trip curve 
DT = Definite time 
SEF = Sensitive Earth Fault 
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Figure 6.3: Protection Time/Current Characteristics using DIgSILENT PowerFactory 
 
 
6.3. TCC Curves for Intellirupter Puslecloser and Tripsaver 
For downstream fuses and upstream circuit breakers or reclosers, it is not a simple matter to 
determine if a fuse and circuit breaker will be selectively coordinated. Even if the plot of the 
time current curves for a downstream fuse and an upstream circuit breaker or recloser show 
that the curves do not cross, selective coordination may not be possible beyond a certain fault 
current. The only sure way to determine whether these two devices will coordinate is to test 
the devices together.  
The basic issue faced was coordinating IntelliRupter Pulsecloser with the upstream substation 
breaker’s earth-protection and the downstream 30 K fuses. Figure 6.4 shows the substation 
breaker’s earth-protection (2-Relay) with a pick-up of 80 A and a Time Delay (TD = 0.3) 
coordinating with the 30 K fuse at low fault-currents in the neighborhood of around 60 A. Each 
fuse is represented by a band: the minimum melt characteristic and the total clear 
characteristics. Fuses have an inverse time-current characteristic, which means the greater 
the overcurrent, the faster they interrupt.  The 2-Relays left or bottom curve illustrating its 8 % 
current-response tolerance just begins to touch the right-side of the 30 K fuse’s maximum 
response curve. 
There was no room to allow for another earth-protection curve (from IntelliRupter Pulsecloser) 
which would be in between the substation breaker and the fuse. Consequently, the options 
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were either to reduce the size of the fuse or increase the pick-up of the substation breaker’s 
earth-protection.  
The TCC curves for the Intellirupter Pulsecloser, Substation breaker settings, downstream 
Tripsavers and 30 K type fuses can be seen in Figure 6.4 below. The horizontal axis of the 
graph represents the RMS symmetrical current in amps. The vertical axis represents the time, 






















Figure 6.4: Time-current characteristic curves for the Intellirupter Pulsecloser,  
                  Substation breaker settings, downstream Tripsavers and 30 K type fuses 
                   
The graph in Figure 6.5 shows that by increasing the pick-up of the substation breaker’s earth-
protection from 80 A to 92 A (2-Relay), this provided enough room between the fuse and the 
breaker’s earth-protection to insert IntelliRupter Pulsecloser’s earth-protection and have it 
coordinate with the fuse and the breaker. The 30 K fuse should operate before all other 
devices and the Intellirupter Pulsecloser will trip before the substation breaker for a sensitive 
earth fault. Any current below 100 A will cause the Intellirupter Pulsecloser and Substation 
Breaker to operates or pick up the fault current because of the sensitive earth fault. The plots 
reflect minimum/ maximum “bands” of response tolerances, including the interrupting time-
total faults cleared. By adding +/- % tolerances (current & time) to the nominal TCC plus fault-
interrupter clearing time will give a better picture of how much margin exists between TCCs. 
The substation breaker had a +/- 8 % current tolerances response and +/- 4 % time-response 
which is a standard for SEL relays and the other relays associated to the feeder. The relay 
fixed-time tolerance of +/- 1.5 cycles or 30 ms for the relay (as specified by SEL) was added 
plus 2 cycles or 40 ms for the breaker’s fault-interrupting time. The IntelliRupter Pulsecloser 
had +/- 2 % current and time-response tolerances and +/- 10 ms fixed-time tolerance. A 30 ms 
(1.5 cycles) for its fault-interrupting time was added to the IntelliRupter Pulsecloser causing 
the IntelliRupter Pulsecloser curves to be so much narrower than the breaker’s curves.  
Due to their accuracy and speed of response, often more IntelliRupters can be coordinated in 
series than conventional reclosers. An IntelliRupter measures current in both directions and 
can coordinate in either direction. Protection capabilities include simultaneous independent 
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directional phase, ground, and negative-sequence time-overcurrent elements; simultaneous 
independent directional phase, ground, and negative-sequence definite-time elements; 
directional blocking overcurrent elements, intelligent fuse saving overcurrent elements; over 
voltage/under voltage elements, and sensitive earth faults [8].  
 
IntelliRupter pulseclosing tests fault persistence by injecting a minor loop of energy after the 
initial interruption. Conventional reclosers must test by reclosing into the fault, which produces 

























Figure 6.5: Increasing the pick-up of the substation breaker’s earth-protection (The     
                  phase faults are shown in blue and earth (ground) faults in red.) 
 
6.4. Protection Functionality for FuseSavers 
6.4.1 Protection Algorithm Overview 
 
The FuseSaver protection algorithm coordinates with the partner fuse melting curve. The time 
it takes for the fuse to melt is inversely proportional to the energy absorbed by the fuse 
element as the fault current flows through it. This energy is a function of the square of the 
current and the duration of the fault (I²t). For large fault currents, the fuse element may melt 
within the first half cycle of current [19].  
 
The FuseSaver electronics sample the line current at high speed and employs an inverse time 
protection algorithm which trips the FuseSaver in time to prevent the partner fuse from 
blowing. When more than 33 % of the energy required melting the fuse has accumulated the 
FuseSaver will trip. This means that for low fault levels the FuseSaver will take longer to trip 























Figure 6.6: Example: Fuse and FuseSaver time-current curve [19] 
 
Fault currents can have a dc offset due to the X/R ratio of the circuit and the starting phase 
angle of the fault. This means that the first half cycle can have a considerably higher peak 
current, up to 2.6 times the rms value, and therefore considerably more energy. The 
FuseSaver estimates the energy absorbed by the fuse during the fault, including the effects of 
dc offset. Both the fuse and the FuseSaver interrupt at a current zero after they have 
operated. At high-fault levels, the protection algorithm opens the vacuum interrupter contacts 
of the FuseSaver fast enough to clear the fault at the first current zero after contact part, and 
so limit the current let-through to one cycle. This means that if enough energy is absorbed by 
the fuse element in the first cycle of fault current to melt the fuse, then it is impossible for the 
FuseSaver to save the fuse from melting. Therefore, this current level is the limit of 
coordination possible between the FuseSaver and the fuse [19].  
 
6.4.2 Advanced Protection Functionality 
 
The FuseSaver offers additional protection features, such as instantaneous and maximum 
fault time settings to give more control over the FuseSaver operation. At the time of 
commissioning, the FuseSaver was configured to know the type and rating of its partner fuse 
that it is protecting. As the FuseSaver has an electronic controller, additional parameters can 
be set to further modify the time-current curve as follows: 
 
Minimum Trip Current Multiplier 
  
The minimum trip current is a multiple of the fuse rating and sets the pickup level for the 
protection functionality. This is the current level above which the FuseSaver senses a fault. 
For example, if the FuseSaver is set for a 12 A fuse and a minimum trip level of X3 is selected, 





B = “Type K” 
fuse 
C = Fusesaver set to coordinate with a “Type K” fuse 
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Maximum Fault Time Setting  
Once the current has risen above the minimum trip level, the FuseSaver picks up the fault and 
will trip on an inverse-time basis to save the fuse. However, if the inverse-time protection has 
not tripped the FuseSaver before the maximum fault time is reached, then the FuseSaver will 
trip [19].  
 
Instantaneous Trip Setting  
The FuseSaver runs an inverse time curve to match the fuse that it is protecting. However, the 
FuseSaver can also be set to trip instantaneously for faults above a certain level.  The 
FuseSaver instantaneous protection works as a multiple of the fuse rating. So, for example, if 
the fuse rating is 10 A and the instantaneous multiplier is set to X11, then the FuseSaver will 
trip instantly for faults above 110 A [19].  
 
Dead Time Setting  
 
The dead time is the period after the FuseSaver has tripped on a fault and before it closes. In 
general, the longer the dead time the greater the chance that a transient fault will be cleared 




When all the FuseSavers on a line are fitted with communications modules, it is possible to 
configure them so if one detects a permanent fault, then all three phases will be tripped and 
stay tripped. 
 
The two options are:  
 Three phase LOCKOUT DISABLED, this is the default.  
 Three phase LOCKOUT ENABLED.  
 
The three-phase lockout is enabled as part of the policy file settings. 
 
The following figure below illustrates the advanced protection functionality for the FuseSaver 
















Figure 6.7: Example: Advanced FuseSaver protection curve [19] 
 
“Type K” fuse 
Fusesaver set to coordinate with 
a “Type K” fuse 
Minimum trip current  
Maximum fault time 
Instantaneous trip current 
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6.4.3 Typical Waterkloof Feeder - Lateral Application 
In the system in Figure 6.8 below there is a Waterkloof substation with a circuit breaker 
supplying a feeder. The feeder has a backbone and lateral lines. The backbone has a recloser 
at a midpoint and the lateral is protected with fuses. Coming off the lateral lines are 
transformers which also have fuses. The lateral line fuses are fitted with FuseSavers to 
prevent the fuses from blowing on transient faults. The lateral line fuse associated with a 
FuseSaver is known as its partner fuse. A protection coordination graph has been constructed 
in Figure 6.9 using settings that were applied to the Waterkloof F1 network. The recloser is set 
to 70 A pickup with x10 instantaneous multiplier and has a very-inverse curve with a dead time 
of 5 s. The fuse on the lateral line is a type K 30 A fuse with minimum pickup response of 60 A. 
The transformer fuse is a type K 15 A fuse. The FuseSaver was set to a type K 30 A with the 
following additional parameters: X3 minimum trip current multiplier, X10 instantaneous 
multiplier,  Dead time of 5 s and Maximum fault time of 2 s. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: A typical feeder - lateral application for the Waterkloof F1 Feeder 
6.4.4 Upstream Protection 
The operation of the upstream recloser (Intellirupter Pulsecloser) depends upon the recloser 
protection settings and the location of the fault relative to the recloser and the FuseSaver. 
6.4.5 Faults Upstream 
For faults upstream of the FuseSaver, the upstream recloser (IR) will trip and reclose. The 
FuseSaver will see the line current go off and then on again. For the FuseSaver, this will re-
trigger the inhibit timing (default 10 s). A fault which occurs downstream during this inhibit time 
will not trip the FuseSaver.  
6.4.6 Faults Downstream of the FuseSaver 
If the recloser (Intellirupter Pulsecloser) protection has been set as shown in Figure 6.9, then 
faults on the lateral line downstream of the FuseSaver will cause the FuseSaver to trip and 
then close after the dead time, thereby saving the fuse. The FuseSaver will trip before the 
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Figure 6.9: Protection Coordination Chart [19] 
 
If the recloser (IR) does trip along with the FuseSaver, then the recloser will close first 
(provided the FuseSaver dead time has been set longer than the recloser reclose time as 
recommended), and then the FuseSaver will close next. If the fault is permanent, the fault will 
be cleared by the fuse. To avoid this situation, the following was recommended: 
 
 If the recloser (IR) is using an instantaneous protection setting, then the FuseSaver 
should also have an instantaneous element. 
 The reclosers instantaneous protection should be set at a higher current level than the 
FuseSaver instantaneous level and, if necessary, a minimum time of 50 ms should be 
set in the recloser [19]. 
 
6.5. Protection Setup for the Tripsaver 
6.5.1 Service Centre Configurable and IntelliLink TS  Setup Software  
 
Tripsaver Service Centre Configurability feature provides flexibility to reconfigure the device, 
read event logs and perform functional tests. The IntelliLink TS Setup Software is a software 











Figure 6.10: Tripsaver Configured by the Service Centre Configuration Kit 
Transformer fuse type K 15 A  
 FuseSaver type K 30 A  
 Fuse type K 30 A  
 Recloser (IR), 70A pickup 
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6.5.2 TCC Curve Settings  
 
The configuration kit and the IntelliLink TS Setup Software were used to properly configure 
Tripsaver units before putting it in use. The Time Current Characteristic (TCC) curves for the 
initial trip operation and for up to three test operations are selected using the TCC Curve 
Settings Screen, which is the first screen when the software is launched. The four trip 
operations are named: Initial Trip, Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3, respectively. Setting fields for 
each trip operation are grouped in separate areas identifiable by trip names shown on the left 























Figure 6.11: TCC Curve Settings 
 
The Tripsaver for Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder was set using the following TCC Curve 
Settings: 
 
Initial Trip (1st curve): Fuselink: 
Speed: K; Ampere Rating: 30. 
Open Interval After Initial Trip: 3 s. 
Test 1 (2nd curve): Fuselink: 
Speed: K; Ampere Rating: 30. 
Open Interval After Test 1: 2 s. 
 
Test 2 (3rd curve): Fuselink: 
Speed: K; Ampere Rating: 30. 
Open Interval After Test 2: 2 s. 
 
Test 3 (4th curve): Fuselink: 
Speed: K; Ampere Rating: 30. 
Sequence Reset Time: 15 s. 
 
Tripsaver Operating Sequence 
 
Tripsaver supports up to three reclosing operations (four tripping operations in total) before it 
drops open. A wide variety of time-current characteristic (TCC) curves is available. The open 
interval between tripping operations is five seconds. The vacuum interrupter resets two 
seconds after Tripsaver drops open. The operator can then reclose Tripsaver into the 
mounting. In instances in which a temporary fault is cleared before Tripsaver reaches the end 
of its operating sequence, Tripsaver will return to its first TCC curve, i.e., reset after 15 
seconds have elapsed since the last reclosing operation [13]. 
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Chapter 7: Field Trial of the Innovative New Technologies 
7.1. Introduction – Installation of the Tripsaver  
 
Eskom has been focusing on a range of options for improving the outage performance of MV 
overhead networks and particularly lateral lines. One such option is to carry out a field trial of 
cut-out mounted, single-phase reclosers installed in place of the fuse elements in the cut-outs 
at the tee-off point from the main backbone feeder. 
The high proportion of rural overhead networks comprised of three-phase tee-offs and the 
high proportion of interruptions due to momentary faults made the author focus on measures 
to lower outage rates for customers fed from the lateral lines.  
 
In order to show the capability of the proposed methodologies, an area of the real MV South 
African network has been considered. The period taken into consideration for the planning 
study was 1 year. In order to give the best possible insight into what will be achieved with this 
innovative new technologies, the author has set up a fully operational scheme on the 
Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder. This feeder is one of the worst performing feeders in the 
WCOU (refer to appendices). The demonstration is based on the 11 kV radial system feeding 
the site and the locations have extreme environmental conditions allowing the equipment and 
system to prove itself in an unusual environment. The intention of this field trial is not only to 
minimise restoration time to healthy sections of the feeder but also minimise the number of 
affected customers.  
 
7.2. Background  
In July 2014, three of the Tripsavers (one per phase) were installed on the Waterkloof 
distribution feeder at tee-off SF617 protected by a fuse with suitable “30K fuse type” 
characteristic. This distribution feeder has kilometres of three phase lateral distribution lines 
passing through rural, heavily treed areas. Each of the installations locations is being 
monitored remotely using GridSense LineTrackers Fault Path Indicators and cellular 
communication technologies to document and validate the field application. See Figure 7.1 
below:  
Figure 7.1:  Tripsaver and FPI’s installation on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
Supply  
Load 
FPI Location – SF617 




7.2.1 Physical Handling of Tripsavers 
 
With a weight of 10 Kg, it quickly became apparent that the Tripsaver could not be installed by 
a link- stick from a pole climber working position; a live line crew with insulated platform 
vehicle were required to install the reclosers in position. The installation method, using by-
pass jumpers to avoid an outage, is illustrated in Figure 7.2. Installation was done under live 
conditions therefore bypass jumpers was installed across the fuse in order to prevent any 
outages being experienced by customers. It also became apparent that manual operation of 


















The particular Tripsaver in the trial operates an open-close-open dropout sequence with a 2-5 
second reclosing time interval. The 11 kV rated version has a 30 Amp rating, a fusing factor of 
4.8 and a maximum interrupting rating of 2 kA. It became apparent that they could only be 
used on tee-offs away from the feeder substation source because of the high substation short 
circuit (SC) current normally around 4 kA. It also became apparent that the available fault 
current at remote parts of 11 kV laterals would not exceed the minimum current needed to 
initiate the recloser sequence i.e. 4.8 x 30 = 144 Amps. These ratings also imposed limits on 
the laterals that could be chosen for the trials due to two factors - the SC level suitability at the 
tee-off point and the available current at the most remote laterals extremity. 
The fusing factor of the Tripsavers, at 4.8, was also very different from the value of 2.2 for the 
NEMA “K” fuses. These two factors significantly reduce the impact that Tripsavers can have 
on minimising customer hour interrupted (CHIs) on feeders. 
 
7.2.3 Selection of Lateral Lines 
 





• They had to be troublesome lateral lines. Lists of worst feeders and their history were 
available from the Eskom’s Plant Department Event Summary and from local fault response 
staff. 
FPI’s By-pass Jumpers 
Tripsavers Installed  
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• The lateral line chosen needed to be backed up by a 3-phase recloser on the feeder with  
  event recording facilities readily accessible. 
 
• The location of the Tripsavers pole had to be accessible to a live line hydraulic platform  
   vehicle. 
 
• Only approved types of modern cutouts could be tolerated at the Tripsavers fitting position. 
 
• The pole top construction at the laterals point had to be suitable for the space requirements   
  of the Tripsaver and its operation using the load break tool. 
 
Between July 2014 and March 2015, 1 lateral line meeting the above criteria was chosen and 
fitted with Tripsavers, three per lateral as shown by Figure 7.2. 
 
7.2.4 Alterations to Three Phase Recloser Settings 
 
On the day of each Tripsavers installation, reclosers at feeder source or upstream of the 
relevant tee-off were re-programmed from two shot reclosing to 1 fast and 1 time delayed trip 
to lockout, for co-ordination with the Tripsavers pre-set operating cycle. The substation relay 
settings were changed from 80 A to 92 A to accommodate the Tripsaver installation. The over 
current and earth fault settings were also changed to co-ordinate with the Tripsavers for 
currents greater than the pre-set trip current. It should be noted that the raising of these 
settings reduced the level of back up protection afforded to other lateral lines on the feeder not 
fitted with Tripsavers and hence still fitted with standard 15 Amp or 30 Amp fuse links. 
 
7.2.5 Operation Monitoring and Data Collection 
 
Although historical data was available for the outlets in which the Tripsavers were installed, it 
was decided not to rely on a before and after comparison of outages on the lateral lines as the 
main measure of its success or failure. The records of weather related events vary widely from 
year to year for individual lines and ongoing maintenance and refurbishment programmes in 
the networks in question fundamentally change their performance characteristics anyway. 
Because of these factors it was decided to place more emphasis on collecting detailed data 
and feedback on each event involving the Tripsavers protected lateral lines and to analyse 
them to see if: 
 
• They operated in the way expected. 
• They failed to operate when they should have. 
• Customer Hours were saved or lost due to the presence of the Tripsavers. 
• Anything could be learned about optimising Tripsavers with other protective devices.   
 
7.2.6 Periodic Fault Monitoring 
 
To gain maximum value from the trial installations, periodic and post-fault monitoring is 
essential to accurately assess their effectiveness and suitability. A core part of this was the 








• After any known operation of the Tripsavers. 
• After fuse blowing on any lateral of a feeder fitted with Tripsavers. 
• After any operation of the source recloser. 
• After a fault with any non-operation of any relevant protection. 
 
On each of these occasions the Tripsavers location was visited and visually inspected and the 
number on the event counter noted. The recloser event recorder was downloaded at the same 
time. The local operation staff completes this work and returns the data with the specially 
formatted performance record sheet to enable the operations/protection specialists to analyse 
events and draw a considered conclusion. Occasionally, the specialists have found it 
necessary to visit the fault location in order to establish all facts relating to the event. 
 
7.3. Practical PulseCloser Applications on the Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
The installations of the Pulsecloser at load breaker switch (LBS 4204) with SCADA indication 
and control was a midpoint location on the feeder circuits just before the substation breaker 
with heavy tree cover and many fused taps and no downstream ties to other feeders, as 
illustrated in Figure 7.3 below. The Pulsecloser with Intelligent Fuse Savings works well here 
and was installed at the head of the feeder with the intention of avoiding stress on the 




Figure 7.3: Typical positioning of Pulsecloser location at LBS4204 – Waterkloof Farmers  
                   1 11 kV Feeder 
 
7.3.2 PulseCloser Field Installation 
 
The Intellirupter PulseCloser has an integrated design make for greatly simplified construction 
work in the field. There was no control box to hang, no control cables to run down the pole, no 
control power to run or power transformer to hang. The Waterkloof Feeder unit came with 
surge arresters installed, so the only field work required was to hang it on the pole and make 
IntelliRupter Pulsecloser  







the jumper connections. The installation on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder is shown 
















Figure 7.4: Intellirupter Pulsecloser installation on the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV  
                   Feeder 
 
7.3.3 Preparation for Laboratory Testing on PulseClosing 
 
The tests that were performed included those targeted at quantifying the performance 
characteristics of the Pulsecloser. Subsequent analysis of the test results was used to help the 
author make decisions on the application of pulseclosing technology. Preparation of the 
Communication module, modem, SCADA and protection settings were pre-installed in the 










                                              (a)                                                       (b) 
 
Figure 7.5: (a) Laboratory testing on pulse closing (b) Modem Installation 
 
7.3.4 Preparation for Field Testing on PulseClosing 
 
A plan was developed for testing the unit in different application situations in the field. These 
field tests were performed by Eskom (under the author’s supervision), which procured and 
installed the pulseclosing unit and monitoring instruments, and then retrieved the data in the 
field. The vendor provided engineering support to Eskom to prepare for the testing. The 
testing involved both some staged testing and some operational runtime testing. 
 
Jumpers 




7.3.5   Assessment  Methodology Development 
 
Assessment methodology was developed to evaluate the life cycle costs and benefits when 
replacing a traditional recloser with the new technology. Key contributors may include 
equipment costs, deferred capital costs as a result of avoided aging effects in line and 
substation equipment, and increased power reliability and quality. Methodology development 
addressed the following: 
 
• Requirements to represent the pulseclosing technology in existing models and distribution 
system simulation tools. Perform initial modelling work that can be done with existing tools in 
support of the testing work. Also, identify needs for new modelling and simulation tools 
pertaining to pulse closing that may be the basis for development in a follow up project. 
 
• Analysis and assessment methods to examine the effectiveness of the technology for  
  various feeder configurations, including determination of the fault distance for which pulse  
  closing is effective. 
 
• Methods to assess and quantify the avoided stress on line equipment and substation 
transformers by not reclosing into an existing fault, and to analyse the potential economics of 
reducing aging effects by eliminating current surges when reclosing into an existing fault. 
 
• Methods to assess power quality impacts of the new technology on customers, including 
voltage sags caused by reclosing into existing faults. 
 
• Methods to identify system integration issues for using pulseclosing in conjunction with  other 
active components in a distribution system and proposed resolutions for any key system 
integration problems that may be identified. The need for follow-up project work will be 
determined. 
 
7.3.6 Easy Operation of Pulsecloser 
 
The control and communication module was easy to configure before installation and it was 
just as easy to configure after installation, from the security of the author’s vehicle parked up 









Figure 7.6: IntelliRupter control and communication module is configured and operated              
using a secure WiFi communication link [9]  
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7.4. Installation of FuseSaver Breaker  
7.4.1 Location of FuseSaver 
 
The Fusesaver is primarily targeted at providing protection and automation of low fault level 
lines such as laterals.  By installing FuseSavers, the utility gains the benefits of improved 
network availability and reduced maintenance call outs because the FuseSaver prevents 
transient faults from blowing fuses.  
 
The FuseSaver was recognised as the world’s fastest medium voltage circuit breaker for 
overhead lines [19]. The first FuseSavers in South Africa was installed at SF451 on the 
Waterkloof F1 Feeder. The FuseSavers were trialed in quite a remote and weather exposed 
area; for the benefits of the FuseSaver to really stand out. An area that was windy, heavily 
covered with trees and particularly prone to birds striking the line. The trial involves placing 
FuseSavers on rural distribution laterals that were currently protected by expulsion dropout 
fuses. In the event of a transient fault, the FuseSaver will operate faster than the dropout fuse, 
‘saving’ the fuse and stopping the transient fault becoming permanent. The type FuseSaver 
device is designed to protect the fuse in a lateral circuit from nuisance fuse operation under 
conditions of medium or low current faults. The 12-month FuseSaver trial was focused on 
assessing mounting methods, the overall effectiveness of the device, and developing 
standards and training. 
 
Figure 7.7: FuseSaver device installed at SF451 
 
The FuseSaver was mounted on the dead-end of the lateral line or feeder line and provides 
the connection from the conductor to the partner fuse. Their operation can be summarised as: 
The partner fuse protects the lateral line from permanent faults and the FuseSaver protects 
the partner fuse from being blown by transient faults [19]. 
 
Siemens FuserSaver 

















Figure 7.8: Location of FuseSaver on the Waterkloof rural network at SF451 
 
In most network configurations, as shown in Figure 7.8, both the fuse and FuseSaver must be 
in series on the lateral line. From this arrangement, a number of points are relevant [19]: 
 
1. It does not matter whether the fuse or the FuseSaver is adjacent to the feeder line, either    
configuration is acceptable.  
 
2. While it is preferable for the fuse and FuseSaver to be located as close together as is 
practical, mounting the FuseSaver at a different pole to the fuse is acceptable.  
 
3. The FuseSaver was attached on the dead end of the lateral line using a line clamp      
assembly.  
 
7.4.2 Bird Guard  
 
When the FuseSaver is hung directly from the medium-voltage line, installation of a bird guard 
was recommended. The bird guard provides additional electrical insulation to the conductor 
which was directly above the terminal. The bird guard was installed over the last shed on the 
FuseSaver and shrouds the FuseSaver connections and cable lug, as shown in Figure 7.10 
below [19].  
 
7.4.3 Communications Module 
 
The communications module plugs into a three-pin connector on the bottom of the FuseSaver 
and provides a short range wireless link between the FuseSaver and other devices. It also has 
a built-in battery. The module allows the crew to interface with the FuseSaver from ground 
level using a laptop. It can be installed from the ground using a live-line stick equipped with a 
special communications module attachment tool [19].  
 
The communications module connects directly to the electronics module in the FuseSaver and 
has a short range wireless communications capability so that the FuseSaver can be 








The communications module was needed to install and commission the FuseSavers but were 
optional thereafter. The communications module can only communicate with control devices 
such as a computer loaded with the Siemens Connect software and fitted with the USB 
antenna, or the remote control unit (RCU) equipped with Siemens Connect software for 
integration into a utility’s SCADA system. When the communications module is permanently 
connected, FuseSavers on two or three phases can be operated in a ganged mode. See 


















Figure 7.9: Communications module – carry case kit 
 
7.4.4 Installation and Commissioning 
 
FuseSaver installation can be accomplished using live-line or dead-line processes. The 
FuseSaver is an electrically floating device so requires no grounding of the device. 
 
7.4.5 Mechanical Installation 
 
A qualified supervisor together with the guidance of the author, who instructs workers during 
installation and commissioning tasks and checks for compliance with the applicable safety 
measures, was assigned to oversee the installation and commissioning work. The installation 
and commissioning work was performed by authorised qualified operators with sufficient 
qualifications and experience. 
 




The preferred method for mounting of the FuseSaver was to attach it directly from the line 
conductor using the line-clamp assembly. The line-clamp assembly connects directly to the 
dead-end of the conductor and ensures that the FuseSaver is hung at its centre of mass. The 
line clamp assembly consists of an insulating sleeve which was fitted between the clamp and 
the dead-end. As such, the line-clamp assembly is not an electrical connection but provides a 
solid mechanical mounting point. The insulating sleeve also provides a barrier to galvanic 
corrosion that might otherwise be possible if the line clamp and dead end are of incompatible 









It was also possible to connect the line clamp directly to the conductor if it is of suitable size. 
The line clamp assembly does not provide a conducting joint directly to the line. The 
connecting cable was still required to ensure a good electrical connection [19].  
Hanging the FuseSaver from an undersized conductor may result in fatigue and premature 




















Figure 7.11 shows how the FuseSavers was configured wirelessly through the Siemens 
Connect PC application at the site.  The policy file that included the protection settings defined 
by the author and identified the type and rating of the FuseSaver’s partner fuse were loaded. 









Dead end of spur 
Insulating sleeve 
Communications Module 
Bird Guard  
Line- clamp assembly 
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7.4.8 Operation  
 
When on-site the line crew and author could access the live data in the FuseSaver using the 
Siemens Connect PC application. This live data includes [19]:  
 Details of the partner fuse and protection settings in the FuseSaver 
 The FuseSaver open/closed status 
 The load current in each FuseSaver 
 The protection mode that is active 
 Whether the protection is armed 
 Details on the most recent fault 
 Details on the FuseSaver and battery life. 
 
The operators and author also had the ability to trip and close the FuseSaver using controls 




Figure 7.12: Siemens connect - operation line [19] 
 
7.4.9 Event Data 
 
FuseSaver stores a time stamped history of the major events in it’s on board memory. The 
event record contains a history of up to 3000 (first in – first out) events including protection 









The event data could be viewed using the Siemens Connect PC application as illustrated in 
Figure 7.13 below. Data can be filtered and exported as required. All events can be 




Figure 7.13: Siemens Connect PC application - Event data [19] 
 
7.4.10  Network Reliability Data  
 
The purpose of the line reliability analysis tool was to generate useful reliability performance 
data for the trial feeder. The analysis was conducted between a start date and end date that 
are selected. Figure 7.14 shows an example of the reliability statistics reported which includes 
the following items on a per phase basis:  
  
• Number of momentary outages 
• Total momentary outage time in the period (the time supply was off for downstream  
   customers). 
• Number of faults cleared by the FuseSaver 
• Number of sustained outages 
• Total sustained outage time in the period (the time supply was off for downstream  
   customers) 
 
• The statistics include interruptions and outages caused by upstream devices as well as the       
   FuseSaver and its partner fuse. 
 
• That faults cleared by FuseSaver within 5 s of each other in the event log will be counted as 
a single cleared fault in the installation total since this equates to a single site visit that has 
been saved. 
 
• The reliability data available is dependent on whether a communications module was 







Figure 7.14: Siemens Connect PC application - Reliability data [19] 
 




Switching covers an electrical and a mechanical switching. Switching is also carried out 
automatically to protect the network [19].  
 
Mechanical switching comprises:  
 
• Switching on the trip and close levers of the communications module 
 
Electrical switching comprises:  
 
• Remote switching  
• Manual switching by Siemens Connect software  
 
Mechanical switching on the communications module  
 
The communications module (3) is fitted with two external levers (1), (2) that will trip or close 






























Figure 7.15: Mechanical switching using the live - line stick 
 
These levers (1) and (2) are operated by pushing the live-line stick from the ground level [19].  
The levers (1), (2) are colour coded: Refer to Table 7.1.  
 
Table 7.1: Mechanical switching on the communications module of the FuseSaver [19] 
 
Lever  Colour  Operation 
Trip lever (1)  Green  Opens the FuseSaver 





























Chapter 8: Load Point and System Indices Calculations after   
                   installation of Equipment 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter involves the reliability evaluation of the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 
Distribution Network after installation of the equipment using Configuration 2, 3 and 4. The 
approach is to make an FMEA table with Configurations 2, 3 and 4 used on the pilot feeder 
.i.e. 
 Configuration 2: Configuration 1 + FuseSavers added at SF451 
 Configuration 3: Configuration 2 + Tripsavers and FPI’s added at SF617 
 Configuration 4: Configuration 3 + Intellirupter Pulsecloser added at LBS 4204 
 
Figure 8.1 shows the overview of Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder network after installation of the 






















The average restoration time for the components is set to 0.1 hours after installation of 
equipment. Transient faults were assumed to operate the new devices which eliminated most 
permanent faults. The results shown in Table 8.1, Table 8.2 and Table 8.3 can be used to 
obtain the system performance indices for the different configurations used on the pilot feeder. 
In order to calculate the system indices, the value of the feeders load point indices, equivalent 
lateral sections and the number of customers connected to the feeder must be known. System 
indices calculations for Configuration 2, 3 and 4 are shown below. 
 
8.2. Configuration 2 - with FuseSaver connected to Load Point G 




Where λS =∑λi     , rs =Us
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= 12.99 interruption/ (customers.year)     
              
 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼 = (9.5082∗20)+(1.9811∗1)+(1.9855∗1)+(2.3478∗2)+(3.1261∗12)+(2.6499∗3)+(4.6040∗15)+(2.4310∗5)+(2.9072∗6)+(3.2104∗11)+(3.7217∗6)+(1.9811∗3)+(1.9811∗1)
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λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0,5309 5 2,65465 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
0,0307 5 0,15326 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
0,0416 5 0,20799 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208
0,2791 5 1,39574 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957
0,0033 1 0,00328 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033
0,1675 5 0,83745 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374
0,012 5 0,06021 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602
0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848
0,0077 5 0,03831 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383
0,0493 5 0,24631 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463
0,104 5 0,51998 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52
0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808
0,127 5 0,63493 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349
0,0799 5 0,39957 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,6229 0,1 0,26229 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0,4499 5 2,2496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0,9261 5 4,6306 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,2293 5 6,1467 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,7406 5 8,7029 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
4,604 2,22 10,23 2,431 5,03 12,217 2,907 5,02 14,6 3,21 5,02 16,11 3,722 5,02 18,67 1,981 5,03 9,967 1,981 5,03 9,967




8.3. Configuration 3 - with FuseSaver and Tripsaver connected to Load point G  
                              and K respectively  
Table 8.2: Load point indices for the pilot network – Configuration 3 
   
 
 
Where λS =∑λi     , rs =Us
λs
 =
 ∑λi  ri    
∑λi






































λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0,5309 5 2,65465 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
0,0307 5 0,15326 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
0,0416 5 0,20799 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208 0,0416 5 0,208
0,2791 5 1,39574 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957 0,2791 5 1,3957
0,0033 1 0,00328 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033 0,0033 1 0,0033
0,1675 5 0,83745 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374 0,1675 5 0,8374
0,012 5 0,06021 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602 0,012 5 0,0602
0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848 0,277 5 1,3848
0,0077 5 0,03831 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383 0,0077 5 0,0383
0,0493 5 0,24631 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463 0,0493 5 0,2463
0,104 5 0,51998 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52 0,104 5 0,52
0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808 0,2562 5 1,2808
0,127 5 0,63493 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349 0,127 5 0,6349
0,0799 5 0,39957 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996 0,0799 5 0,3996
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,6229 0,1 0,26229 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0,4499 5 2,2496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0,9261 5 4,6306 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,2293 5 6,1467 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,7406 0,1 0,1741 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
4,604 2,22 10,23 2,431 5,03 12,217 2,907 5,02 14,6 3,21 5,02 16,11 3,722 2,72 10,14 1,981 5,03 9,967 1,981 5,03 9,967




8.4. Configuration 4 – with Fusesaver, Tripsaver and Intellirupter Pulsecloser  
                               connected to the feeder 





Where λS =∑λi     , rs =Us
λs
 =
 ∑λi  ri    
∑λi
, Us = ∑λiri   
 λ = 1.0947
section λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
1 0,5309 5 2,654648 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,531 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
2 0,0307 5 0,153258 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,031 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
3 0,0416 5 0,207993 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,042 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042
4 0,2791 5 1,395743 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,279 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279
5 0,0033 1 0,003284 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,003 5 0,0164 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003
6 0,1675 5 0,837446 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,167 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167
7 0,012 5 0,060209 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012
8 0,277 5 1,384796 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277
9 0,0077 5 0,038315 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,008 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008
10 0,0493 5 0,246308 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,049 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049
11 0,104 5 0,519983 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104
12 0,2562 5 1,280799 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,256 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256
13 0,127 5 0,634926 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127
14 0,0799 5 0,399566 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,08 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008
15 7,5272 0,1 0,752716 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,004 0,1 0,0004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,3667 5 1,8336 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,1451 5 5,7253 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,6689 5 3,3443
21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Transformers 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
Total 9,508 1,13 10,72 1,981 1,56397 3,098 1,985 1,569 3,1149 2,348 2,1 4,932 3,126 2,82 8,824 2,6499 2,4 6,443
Load Point A Load Point B Load Point C Load Point D Load Point E Load Point F
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs)
0,5309 5 2,65465 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546 0,5309 5 2,6546
0,0307 5 0,15326 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533 0,0307 5 0,1533
0,0416 0,1 0,00416 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042 0,0416 0,1 0,0042
0,2791 0,1 0,02791 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279 0,2791 0,1 0,0279
0,0033 0,1 0,00033 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003 0,0033 0,1 0,0003
0,1675 0,1 0,01675 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167 0,1675 0,1 0,0167
0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012 0,012 0,1 0,0012
0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277 0,277 0,1 0,0277
0,0077 0,1 0,00077 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008 0,0077 0,1 0,0008
0,0493 0,1 0,00493 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049 0,0493 0,1 0,0049
0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104 0,104 0,1 0,0104
0,2562 0,1 0,02562 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256 0,2562 0,1 0,0256
0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127 0,127 0,1 0,0127
0,0799 0,1 0,00799 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008 0,0799 0,1 0,008
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2,6229 0,1 0,26229 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0,4499 5 2,2496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0,9261 5 4,6306 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,2293 5 6,1467 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,7406 0,1 0,1741 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0
0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15 0,015 10 0,15
4,604 0,73 3,3606 2,431 2,2 5,348 2,907 2,66 7,729 3,21 2,88 9,245 3,722 0,88 3,272 1,981 1,56 3,098 1,981 1,56 3,098
Load Point L Load Point MLoad Point G Load Point H Load Point I Load Point J Load Point K
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Figure 8.2: FMEA load point indices where r (hrs) = 0.1 hrs 
 
 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 =  
(10.72∗20)+(3.0984∗1)+(3.115∗1)+(4.9320∗2)+(8.8236∗12)+(6.4427∗3)+(3.3607∗15)+(5.3480∗5)+(7.7289∗6)+(9.2451∗11)+(3.2724∗6)+(3.0984∗3)+(3.0984∗1)
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 = 1.50 hours/customers interruption 
 
Table 8.4 below summarises the system indices of the feeder for the four different 
configurations using FMEA and Reliability Network Equivalent Approach. 
 
Table 8.4: System indices of the feeder for the four different configurations  
 
 SAIDI SAIFI CAIDI 
Configuration 1 (base case) 15.24 4,75 3.21 
Configuration 2 12.99 4,75 2.74 
Configuration 3 12.40 4,75 2.61 
Configuration 4 7.13 4,75 1.50 
    
 
The figure below illustrates the improvement of the system indices after the implementation of 
the new innovative technologies using FMEA method. The SAIDI improved while the SAIFI 
remained constant. Most permanent faults were eliminated, as a result, sustained interruptions 





Figure 8.3: FMEA System Indices 
 
Figure 8.4 compares the unavailability of load points before and after the installation of 




Figure 8.4: Unavailability of load points 
 
Based on data taken for 6 months period, significant improvements on the system reliability 
indices of the tested feeder were detected. However, implementation of this new system 
equipment may not show the expected results due to environmental and seasonal factors, 
especially at faults beyond the Intellirupter PulseCloser, but at the initial stage a significant 
improvement on the system reliability indices of the tested feeder was noted. Additional data 
received over the next two years will be needed to obtain a better understanding of the 




8.5. Comparison and Discussion of System Indices Results 
The System Indices are computed using FMEA and DIgSILENT PowerFactory for the different 
network configurations. The load point indices are not presenting the full behaviour of the 
network which is the reason why system indices were computed to determine the performance 
of the modelled network. 
The comparison of the total system indices using FMEA and DPF are as shown in Tables 8.5 
and Figure 8.5 below. The results shown in Table 8.5 for both the simulation and analytical 
approaches are very much comparable, proving that any of these methods can be used to 
assess the reliability of a distribution network. Also from the table, it can be seen that the 
percentage differences are quite negligible and the addition of this new system devices has 
improved all the reliability indices of the feeder except SAIFI. As indicated in Table 8.5 below, 
there was an improvement in SAIDI after installation of the distribution automation. The feeder 
automation system used minimised restoration time (decreased the SAIDI) and reduced the 
impact on the affected customers suffering from interruption. The addition of this new system 
equipment has not reduced the failure frequency but the failure duration. Although both 
methods have shown a high degree of accuracy, DIgSILENT is still the number one choice 
due to many advantages that are linked with it. This includes the convenience of simulating 
larger networks, the accuracy of the software, the graphical representation of the obtained 
data etc. The disadvantage with the FMEA is the fact that it can be subjected to human error 
that will lead to incorrect results. Minor or no differences are observed between the results. 
The reason for this is that the failure modes analysis is based on approximate equations and 
differences are therefore expected. The differences will be negligible, however, provided that 
λr « 1 for each component; this is normally the case for power system networks. It should be 
noted that the value of system unreliability is evaluated using a summation rule [37]. 
 




Figure 8.5: Comparison of FMEA and DPF system indices 
DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF DPF FMEA % DIFF
Configuration 1 15,24 15,24 0 4,75 4,75 0 3,21 3,21 0
Configuration 2 12,99 12,99 0 4,75 4,75 0 2,74 2,74 0
Configuration 3 12,4 12,4 0 4,75 4,75 0 2,61 2,61 0
Configuration 4 7,13 7,13 0 4,75 4,75 0 1,5 1,5 0
CAIDISAIDI SAIFI
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Chapter 9: Cost Assessment of Reliability Improvement in 
 Distribution Networks 
9.1. Introduction 
A major challenge for the power utilities today is to ensure a high level of reliability of supply to 
customers. Two main factors determine the feasibility of a project that improves the reliability 
of supply i.e. 
1. The project cost (investment and operational) and
2. The benefits that result from the implementation of the project.
9.2. Reliability Cost 
The most important function of the electric power system is to provide electric power to its 
customers at the lowest possible cost with acceptable reliability levels. The two aspects of 
economics and reliability often conflict and present power system managers, planners, 
designers and operators with a wide range of challenging problems. An acceptable method of 
assessing the worth of power system reliability is to evaluate the customer losses due to 
service interruptions, i.e. the cost of unreliability [31]. 
Many new challenges in the deregulated environment have been confronted by the Electric 
power industry. The electricity utilities have been forced to utilise network assets more 
effectively and reduce outage time due to faults. The final link between the bulk transmission 
system and the customers is provided by the distribution network. Installing reliability 
improving apparatus at medium voltage level is recommended since approximately 80 % of 
customer service interruptions are experienced at this voltage level. Service reliability is 
improved by implementing various strategies such as feeder length reduction, feeder splitting 
and installing improved switchgear and protection apparatus, for example replacing oil 
breakers with gas breakers at substations [42], [43]. Currently, one of the most cost-effective 
methods now being considered for improving service reliability is distribution feeder 
automation i.e. implementation of new technologies. This involves the use of remote switches 
to isolate the faults and restore the power supplies to the other remaining healthy section of 
the feeder. The costs associated with the installation of switches are quite significant; despite 
the fact that the feeder’s switch automation can increase the system reliability. There is a 
growing concern in power utilities, regarding a quantitative justification of the increase in 
reliability due to the placement of switches rather than simply based on reduced interrupted 
duration. Reliability worth assessment is currently receiving considerable attention as it 
provides an opportunity to incorporate the costs or losses incurred by utility customers as 
results of power failure. In order to render a rational means of decision making on the 
necessity of changing service continuity levels experienced by customers, utility costs and the 
cost incurred by customers associated with interruptions of service must be incorporated in 
planning and operating practices. 
New distribution automation technologies have been applied to the distribution network in 
order to achieve significant service reliability improvement for electricity customers [32–34]. 
Other approaches are the interruption cost minimisation based on appropriate switch location 
or relocation across a distribution feeder and investigate reliability improvement [35], [36]. The 
investment decisions are based on project economic feasibility studies through which the most 
115 
beneficial investment alternative is determined. For an investment to be economically viable, 
utility’s cost to improve reliability should be less that the customer’s cost or cost of interruption. 
Figure 9.1 shows how utility costs reflected in customer rates and customer interruption costs 
are combined to give the total societal cost. The utility cost curve shows how customer rates 
increase as more money is spent for increased distribution system reliability levels [7]. The 
customer interruption cost curve shows how customer cost of interruptions decreases as the 
distribution system reliability increases [7]. It is also important to note that for low distribution 
system reliability levels, the customer interruption costs are significant. [7]. However, the utility 
cost can also increase significantly in the additional costs of restoring the system to a normal 
operating state and the loss of revenue (i. e., the utility cost curve shown in Figure 9.1 is 
based on the belief that increased costs will achieve higher levels of distribution system 
reliability) [7]. When the combined utility and customer interruption costs are at the minimum, 
then the utility customers will receive the optimal service, as indicated by the dashed line. 
Therefore, a given level of service reliability can be examined in terms of the costs and the 
worth to the customer of providing the electric service from various proposed distribution 
operating configurations using the concept of value based distribution system reliability 
planning [45].  
Figure 9.1: Consumer, utility and total cost as a function of system reliability [45] 
9.3. Feeder Load Forecast 
The load information was obtained from statistical metering installed at the substations for the 
area under study and used in the network reliability costing assessment for Waterkloof 
Farmers1 11 kV Feeder. The feeder registered a peak loading of 3.62 MVA at a power factor 
of 0.92 in the year 2013. The annual load growth is approximately 5.8 % per year. These 
elements were included in the costing assessment of reliability improvement in distribution 
networks using DIgSILENT PowerFactory software. 
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Figure 9.2: Load profile metering of Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder for 2013 [6] 
 
9.4. Reliability Cost/Worth Planning Approach 
The majority of outages seen by customers are caused by failures in the distribution systems. 
The reliability planning approach is based on Cost of Unserved Energy (COUE). This is the 
economical loss the customer experiences due to unserved energy as a result of planned or 
unplanned interruptions. The approach balances the cost of improving service reliability for 
customers and the economic benefits of such improvements. The importance of the power 
grid depends on the customer being supplied. In order to determine the distribution system 
reliability, the income that the utility gets from the customers per year must be known. This 
income will serve as a gate keeper which is the limit that the planners should not exceed when 
making a decision in terms of economic and network optimisation planning so that there will 
be no loss to the business. According to Eskom standard, the charges per Industrial / 
commercial customer is 80c /kWh and the Waterkloof Farmers1 11 kV Feeder is supplied at 
the notified maximum demand load (NMD) of 3.62 MVA. The load is only used for the 
customer interruption cost calculation based on the SAIDI impact at a business level. The 
power factor and load factor are also used for calculation of losses [52].  
Therefore, the annual income from the Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder amounts to 
R23,326,549/yr. as shown below:  
 
Income /year of the Feeder = 3618kVA x 0.92 x 8760hrs x R0.8/kWh = R23, 326,549/yr. 
 
The income/year of the feeder must be multiplied with the load factor of 0.58 due to the fact 
that customers do not draw the maximum load. Therefore, the income/year of the feeder will 
amount to R 13, 529,398/yr.  
 
Utility cost can be calculated by 
 




The utility cost includes the loss of income (due to unserved energy), the investment cost and 
maintenance cost; and the contractors and labours cost. The investment cost and 
maintenance cost of components added are listed in Table 9.1 as per Eskom data.  
 
Table 9.1: Investment cost, Maintenance cost and Operation cost (per year) 
 
 Fuses (each) Disconnects (each) 
Breakers/Reclosers 
(each) 


















R 5000  (Trip test) R2000/km 
(Inspection) 0 0 0 0 
 
The average interest rate for the contractors and labours cost is assumed to be 10 % of the 
material costs. The depreciation period for disconnects and breakers is assumed to be 20 
years. The maintenance cost of the breakers is very low due to the fact that the (SF6) breaker 
is maintenance free because it does not use oil for arc quenching, and, therefore, the amount 
shown is only for the breaker trip test and inspections [52]. 
 
The customer interruption cost (CIC) is associated with the outage cost in a specific load 
point.  
 
The CIC is calculated as follows:  
 




x = Load points 
𝑼𝒙  = Annual unavailability at load point x  (𝑼𝒙= 𝝀𝒙𝒓𝒙) 
𝑳𝒙 = Average load point at load point x 
𝒓𝒙 = Interruption duration  
𝝀𝒙 = Failure rate at load point x 
𝑪𝒙 = Average cost of unserved energy per year at load point x 
 
The average cost of unserved energy i.e. sector interruption cost for commercial customers, 
used by Eskom, is R21.48/kWh. The total cost of interruption was calculated by adding all the 
CIC of the load points. 
 
9.4.1 Different Configurations Tested - Cost benefits analysis before and 
after the installation of the equipment 
 
Table 9.2 shows four different configurations. Configuration one is the base case in which all 
fuses, disconnects, breakers, and alternative supply are installed. The other configurations are 








Table 9.2: Four different configurations 
 
Configuration 1 Standard Eskom MV Network with fuses, disconnects and reclosers 
Configuration 2 Configuration 1 + FuseSavers added at SF451 
Configuration 3 Configuration 2 + Tripsavers and FPI’s added at SF617 
Configuration 4 Configuration 3 + Intellirupter Pulsecloser added at LBS 4204 
  
The following calculation is indicative of how a utility can calculate the financial benefit of 
installing the equipment on the basis of unplanned SAIDI improvements. The benefit relates to 
the particular financial penalty for sustained and momentary customer hours, interruptions and 
operational costs, which may not be applicable to other utilities. 
 
 Configuration 1: Standard Eskom MV Network with fuses, disconnects and reclosers –  




Figure 9.3: Results of the load point indices of Configuration 1 from DIgSILENT  
                  PowerFactory  
 
Note: ACIF (1/a) =λ and AID (h) = r 
 
The CIC calculation for different load points for Configuration 1 is shown in Figure 9.4 using 
equation (9.1) 
 




Figure 9.4: CIC of load points - Configuration 1 
 
 
Annual cost of interruptions of feeder for Configuration 1 = R 2967336.00 
 
 
Act.Pow. Number of connec…. Tariff AID LPIT LPIF LPENS ACIF ACIT LPIC TCIT TMVAIF
MW IntTariffenergy,Int….. h h/a 1/a MWh/a 1/a h/a $/a Ch/a
A A Grid 4,2458 20 1,127442 10,71999 9,5082384 4,551491 9,508238 10,71999 97766,03 214,3997 5,305777
BRUYN (B) BRUYN (B) Grid 0,46 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,458494 1,981081 9,96727 9848,46 9,96727 2,758958
C C Grid 0,92 1 5,026968 9,980844 1,98546 0,918238 1,98546 9,980844 19723,74 9,980844 5,505747
D D Grid 0,115 2 5,02635 11,80089 2,3478057 0,13571 2,347806 11,80089 2915,056 23,60178 0,582003
E E Grid 0,529 12 5,019789 15,69255 3,1261374 0,830136 3,126137 15,69255 17831,32 188,3106 2,010653
F F Grid 0,138 3 5,023345 13,31158 2,6499429 0,1837 2,649943 13,31158 3945,871 39,93473 0,618774
G G Grid 0,98164 15 5,013437 23,08178 4,6039824 2,265799 4,603982 23,08178 48669,37 346,2266 2,533426
H H Grid 0,46 5 5,025448 12,21688 2,4310029 0,561976 2,431003 12,21688 12071,25 61,08439 2,24834
I I Grid 0,46 6 5,021279 14,59785 2,9071974 0,671501 2,907197 14,59785 14423,84 87,5871 1,880065
J J Grid 0,805 11 5,01927 16,11401 3,2104293 1,297178 3,210429 16,11401 27863,38 177,2541 2,979355
K K Grid 0,345 6 5,016623 18,67013 3,7216542 0,64412 3,721654 18,67013 13835,69 112,0208 1,10147
L L Grid 0,552 3 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,550193 1,981081 9,96727 11818,15 29,90181 3,31075
M M Grid 0,92 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,916989 1,981081 9,96727 19696,92 9,96727 5,517916
Name In Folder Grid     
Configuration 1
Load λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs/yr) Average Load (MW) Average Load (kW) Unserved Energy (kWh/yr) COUE(R/kWh) CIC(R/yr)
A 9,508238 1,12744179 10,71998532 4,1535 4153,5 44525,45903 21,48 956406,8599
BRUYN (B) 1,981081 5,03122719 9,9672696 0,46 460 4584,944016 21,48 98484,59746
C 1,98546 5,026967997 9,98084388 0,9 900 8982,759492 21,48 192949,6739
D 2,347806 5,02634954 11,8008921 0,1125 112,5 1327,600361 21,48 28516,85576
E 3,126137 5,019789149 15,6925506 0,529 529 8301,359267 21,48 178313,1971
F 2,649943 5,023345258 13,3115781 0,138 138 1836,997778 21,48 39458,71227
G 4,603982 5,013436976 23,0817756 0,9603 960,3 22165,42911 21,48 476113,4173
H 2,431003 5,025447769 12,2168781 0,46 460 5619,763926 21,48 120712,5291
I 2,907197 5,021279463 14,5978506 0,46 460 6715,011276 21,48 144238,4422
J 3,210429 5,019269572 16,1140101 0,805 805 12971,77813 21,48 278633,7942
K 3,721654 5,016622608 18,6701346 0,345 345 6441,196437 21,48 138356,8995
L 1,981081 5,03122719 9,9672696 0,552 552 5501,932819 21,48 118181,517
M 1,981081 5,03122719 9,9672696 0,92 920 9169,888032 21,48 196969,1949
Total Annual Cost of Interruption 2967335,691
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An example (Load point A) from Figure 9.4 using equation (9.1) is illustrated below: 
 
CIC/year =  𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑨𝑪𝑨 = (10.72hrs/yr) (4153.5 kW) (R 21.48/kWh) = R 956406.86yr.  
       
Where: U = λ x r and Unserved energy = U x Average load 
 
 
Summary of Utility cost for Configuration 1: 
 
Loss of income = R 0.8/kWh x 3618 kVA x 0.92 x 15.24 (SAIDI) = R 40581.80 
Investment cost for fuses = R 3700 x 7 = R 25900 
Investment cost for disconnectors = R 30000 x 8 = R 240000 
Investment cost for reclosers = R 80000 x 2 = R 160000 
Maintenance cost for fuses, disconnects and reclosers = 0+(8 x R 5000)+(2 x R 5000) = R 50000 
Labour cost = 10% of investment cost for fuses = R 2590                               
Labour cost = 10% of investment cost for disconnects = R 24000       
Labour cost = 10% of investment cost for reclosers = R 16000    
    
Utility Cost = Loss of income + Investment cost + Maintenance cost + Operation cost 
 
Utility cost = R 40581.80 + R 425900 + R 50000 + R 42590 = R 559071.80 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |   DIgSILENT   | Project:                     | 
|                 |                                                                | PowerFactory  |------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |    15.1.4     | Date:  6/30/2015             | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Reliability Assessment                                                                                                          | 
|   Method                                     Load flow analysis                                                                 | 
|   Network                                    Distribution (Optimal Power Restoration)                                           | 
|   Calculation time period                    2015                                                                               | 
|   Consider Maintenance                       Yes                                                                                | 
|   Fault Clearance Breakers                   Use all circuit breakers                                                           | 
|   Switching procedures                       Sequential                                                                         | 
|   Consider Sectionalizing (Stages 1-3)       No                                                                                 | 
|   Time to open remote controlled switches    0.10 min.                                                                          | 
|                                                                                                                                 | 
| Automatic Contingency Definition                                                                                                | 
|   Selection                                  Whole System                                                                       | 
|   Busbars / terminals                        Yes                Common mode                                No                   | 
|   Lines / cables                             Yes                Independent second failures                No                   | 
|   Transformers                               Yes                Double earth faults                        No                   | 
|                                                                 Protection/switching failures              No                   | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Study Case: Study Case                                                                           | Annex:                  / 1  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index          :  SAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca                                                | 
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index        :  CAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca                                                | 
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   15.243    h/Ca                                               | 
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    3.207    h                                                  | 
| Average Service Availability Index                   :  ASAI   =    0.9958929464                                                | 
| Average Service Unavailability Index                 :  ASUI   =    0.0041070536                                                | 
| Energy Not Supplied                                  :  ENS    =   17.868    MWh/a                                              | 
| Average Energy Not Supplied                          :  AENS   =    0.464    MWh/Ca                                             | 
| Average Customer Curtailment Index                   :  ACCI   =    0.944    MWh/Ca                                             | 
| Expected Interruption Cost                           :  EIC    =    0.774    M$/a                                               | 
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate                   :  IEAR   =   19.414    $/kWh                                              | 
| System energy shed                                   :  SES    =    0.000    MWh/a                                              | 
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index          :  ASIFI  =   3.769955 1/a                                                 | 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index           :  ASIDI  =   16.471011 h/a                                                | 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index       :  MAIFI  =    0.000000 1/Ca                                               | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 9.5: Results of the system indices from DIgSILENT PowerFactory to obtain  
                  SAIDI for Configuration 1  
 
Calculation of system customer interruption cost for Configurations 2, 3 and 4 are summarized 
in Table 9.3 and Figure 9.6. The details calculations are found in Appendix L.   
 
From Table 9.3 and Figure 9.6, it can be seen that with component addition, both customer 











Figure 9.6: Different configurations tested 
 
Results shown in Figure 9.6 provide basic information for system cost benefits analysis of the 
four configurations. The x-axis represents the different configurations and the y-axis 
represents the utility cost, customer interruption cost and total cost. Configurations 2 and 3 
were designed by adding the FuseSaver and Tripsaver at SF 451 and SF 617 respectively 
while the configuration 4 was designed to add the Intellirupter Pulsecloser at LBS 4204 just 
before the substation breaker preventing unnecessary upstream substation breaker trips, dips 
and damage to the substation transformers. The outage cost decreased with the adding of 
components, so did the system reliability index i.e. SAIDI. System utility cost increased with 
the adding of components. The total cost is the summation of outage cost and system utility 
cost. 
 
9.5. Reliability Cost Curve 
The utility cost curve as illustrated in Figure 9.7 below shows how utility cost increases as 
more money is spent on optimising the reliability of the distribution network from which 
customers are supplied. The cost of an interruption is highly dependent on its duration [7].The 
customer interruption cost curve illustrates how customer cost of interruption decreases as the 
reliability of the distribution system increases. It is, therefore, important to note that the 
customer interruption costs are significant for the lower level of distribution systems reliability 
levels. 
 
Configuration  1 Configuration  2 Configuration  3 Configuration  4
Power Factor (Cos θ) 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
Load Factor 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Customer type Industrial / commercial Industrial / commercial Industrial / commercial Industrial / commercial 
Customer  charges  80c /kWh  80c /kWh  80c /kWh  80c /kWh 
Cost of unserved energy             R21.48/kWh R21.48/kWh R21.48/kWh R21.48/kWh
SAIDI value using DIgSILENT 15.24 12.99 12.4 7.13
Utility cost R 559 071.80 R 705 204.86 R 943 814.18 R 1 342 960.29
Customer Interruption cost R 2 967 336.00 R 2 702 229.90 R 2 639 026.32 R 1 659 123.89





Figure 9.7: Graphical representation of reliability costs. 
 
The total cost curve, (i.e. the sum of Utility cost and customer cost) is indicated by the purple 
line. The customer cost of reliability becomes important when a utility wishes to balance its 
costs with customer costs. The issue of whether a utility should have any regard to total cost is 
a matter for the regulator. In South Africa, this is badly regulated. To a great extent, the utilities 
disregard customer interruption costs and look only at costs incurred by the utility to meet the 
regulator’s standard of reliability defined as SAIFI, SAIDI, etc. The cost for the utility is another 
issue that becomes a concern when dealing with improving power systems reliability. Cost and 
reliability in power systems go hand in hand in most cases, but there are some situations 
where lower cost is associated with higher reliability. To reduce SAIDI, the utility must spend 
increasing amounts of money on system reinforcements and maintenance [7]. This is evident 
in Figure 9.7, showing the trade-off between cost and customer interruptions. The utility 
cannot continuously keep on adding protection systems because reliability needs to be 
improved, there actually has to be a point where cost is minimal and in favour of both the 
customers and the utility. The result shown in Figure 9.7 has not yet reached this desirable 
point because the total cost curve is still decreasing, so the utility should be spending more. At 
this point an optimal cost is achieved when the combined utility and customer interruption 
costs curve is at the minimum, then the utility customers will receive the least cost service.  
Seeking minimum total cost will normally lead to lower reliability in rural areas than in urban 
areas.  In response, the Regulator usually finds it necessary to impose lower limits of 
acceptable reliability performance. However, to be effective, the actual performance must then 
be monitored properly and violations punished by the Regulator, which is not properly 
understood by NERSA as yet. 
 
The graphs also depict that there is room for improvement i.e. as more money is spent for 
increased distribution system reliability levels, the level of customer interruption would 
decrease significantly until a point of intersection [the point of intersection is not necessarily 
the minimum total cost point. The minimum cost is where the absolutes of the gradients are 
equal] at which a reasonable level of reliability in power systems is achieved at minimum total 
costs for both the customer and the utility. However, the utility cost can also increase 
significantly in the additional costs of restoring the system to a normal operating state and the 
loss of revenue (i.e. the utility cost curve shown in Figure 9.7 is based on the belief that 
increased utility costs will achieve higher levels of distribution system reliability). On the basis 
of the above it can be seen that configuration four is the best choice among the designed 
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configuration although there is still further room for increasing utility cost and decreasing 
customer interruptions to reach the minimum total cost condition [7].  
 
9.6. Comparative Cost and Life Cycle Cost Analysis 
Life-Cycle-Cost Analysis is a useful instrument to identify the main cost drivers of a power grid 
and to take up appropriate actions for cost reduction. For modern electrical devices efficient 
and reliable operation is of particular importance. They must execute their function reliably, 
preferably lifelong and must be as economical as possible over their complete lifetime. 
Concerning the assessment of single units like circuit breakers, transformers, overhead lines 
etc. the Life-Cycle-Cost (LCC) method has been used for quite a long time. As illustrated in 
Table 9.4, the concept of Life-Cycle-Cost means to take into account not only the 
manufacturing cost, but also to consider the operational costs. 
 
Table 9.4: Summary of Investment Benefit/Cost Analysis for First year 
 
Customer Interruption Cost (CIC)   
Before installation of automation devices.(Configuration 1)  R 2967336.00 
After installation of automation devices.(Configuration 4)  R 1659123.89 
CIC Difference (Configuration 1 - Configuration 4)        (1)  R 1308212.11 
   
Utility Cost (Investment Cost and Maintenance Cost)   
Investment Cost   
Fusesaver 3 x R 33800 R 101400 
Tripsaver 3 x R 30000 R 90000 
Fault Path Indicator (FPI) 3 x R 32300 R 96900 
IntelliRupter Pulsecloser 1 x R 345600 R 345600 
Maintenance Cost   
Maintenance   R 0 
Total Investment and Maintenance Cost                         (2)  R 633300 
   
Benefit in first year (1) – (2) R 674912.11 
 
Since the whole investment is amortized in the first year and the automation devices are 
maintenance free it is not necessary to calculate the life cycle cost using the following 
formulas: 
 
The total utility cost is defined as: 
 
𝑪𝑻𝒐𝒕












and the total reliability cost for the society is defined as:  
 








𝑪𝑰 (𝝉) = Investment cost for year 𝝉 
𝑪𝑴(𝝉) = Maintenance cost for year 𝝉 
𝑪𝑰𝑪 (𝝉) = Customer interruption cost for year 𝝉 
𝑻 = Calculation period 
𝒓𝒖𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚  =  Discount rate for the utility 
𝒓𝑪𝑰𝑪 = Discount rate for the customer interruption cost 
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Chapter 10: Results and Field Data Analysis  
  
10.1.  Results of the Field Trial  
 
At the time of writing, the equipment has been installed for six months. There have been a 
number of fault incidents and extensive feedback of events/data has been obtained from local 
operational staff. 
In the area fitted with the innovative new technologies, a total of seven faults during the 
monitoring period to date were captured. All were temporary short circuits and all were cleared 
by the equipment before the first 5 second delayed reclose. No outage was experienced by 
the main feeder and the 5 seconds reclose period was the only outage experienced by the 
mainline and laterals. The circuit conditions seen by the equipment were verified by examining 
the downloaded recloser event recorder. In all of these cases, an outage would have arisen in 
the laterals if NEMA K type fuses were fitted. These were all good results. No cause of the 
fault was found. There have been no reported cases of the equipment operating incorrectly or 
dropping out of its carrier without reason. 
 
Figure 10.1 indicates the permanent and momentary interruptions on the Waterkloof F1 11 kV 
Feeder in 2000 through 2014. As a point of information, a great deal of remediations work was 
performed on this feeder prior to implementing the DA pilot program, which helped reduce the 
number permanent interruptions. 
Figure 10.1 below illustrates quite clearly that the number of faults for the feeder increased 
from 2007 to 2013 then significantly decreases after installation of the equipment. The 
average number of faults for the feeder declined from 32 number (2013) of faults to 13 number 
of faults after the new technologies were installed from June 2014 onwards, 59.4% reduction 
was achieved. 
 
Figure 10.1: Fault frequency on Waterkloof Feeder fitted with the new technology.  




Installation of equipment 
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10.2.  Recloser Tripping Operations  
The field trial on Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder has been performed since June 2014. 
Starting from this, data collected for a period of 6 months afterwards. It is clearly shown in 
Table 10.1 below, that the number of breaker tripping of the feeder decreased significantly. A 
high number of recloser operation indicates that there were many temporary faults on the 
tested feeder.  
 
Table 10.1: Performance of feeder equipment  
 






























































10.3.  SAIDI Improvement 
SAIDI constitutes the amount of time the average customer is without power over a one year 
period. The assumption is that a switching operation takes 60 minutes, while an automated 
recloser operation takes approximately 1 minute. Essentially anything that is placed on the 
line, whether it is a switch, sectionaliser or recloser will improve SAIDI.  
 
Based on data taken for (thus far) 6 months period, a significant improvement on the SAIDI of 
the tested feeder was found. This innovative new technology was based on both strategies of 
switching action and reconfiguration of the distribution network. This will result in fast switching 
action to isolate a faulted section and restore the remaining healthy part of the feeder, hence 
reducing SAIDI score. However, comparison with the performance of the previous year 
indicates there was no demonstrable improvement. Instead, research should be directed at 
what occurred in May 2013 and appears to have radically improved performance as measured 
by SAIDI. 
 
As expected, the addition of the protection devices increases the overall feeder reliability. The 
impact of these new technologies is shown in Figure 10.2, which illustrates the sharp drop in 
SAIDI after implementation of the devices in 2014. (See Appendix G for Root causes of the 











Figure 10.2: SAIDI improvement on Waterkloof F1 Feeder fitted with the new technology 
The last six months shown in Figure 10.2 is with the automation devices fully activated. It 
predicts good results, but more time is required to better quantify the results. It appears that 
performance improved as these devices were deployed (the last six months shown in Figure 
10.2).But it also looks like a great deal more improvement will be achieved through the 
different seasons, constant environmental changes and weather related patterns i.e. SAIDI will 
continue to drop over longer periods.  
10.4.  SAIFI Improvement 
The only way to improve SAIFI is to decrease the number of sustained interruptions 
experienced by customers. The equipment installed on the pilot feeder eliminated the 
permanent outages by preventing faults from running through to the substation breaker and 
when the lateral fuse operates in response to a temporary fault. As a result, sustained 
interruptions were prevented while momentary interruptions were increased. (Refer to Figure 
8.5 and Table 8.5)  
10.5.  MAIFI Improvement 
Momentary interruptions (any interruption in service) are most effectively increased by using 
this equipment. The ability to interrupt faults closer to the location of the fault instead of 
interrupting the whole feeder provides one of the most dramatic improvements. If the feeder 
has sensitive loads near the substation (often the case on the typical feeder), it was 
advantageous to place these devices such as the Intellirupter Pulsecloser beyond that 
segment, vs. a switch or sectionaliser. 
10.6.  CAIDI Reduction 
Despite the fact that the extent of sustained outages were reduced by automated feeder 
switching. This is due largely to the terms of the equation that is used to calculate CAIDI. For 
example, as the number of customers experiencing sustained outages is reduced, the 
denominator of the CAIDI index also goes down relative to the value of the numerator, and 
thus the overall index increases. Reducing CAIDI requires decreasing restoration times for 
those remaining without power after automated feeder switching operations have occurred. It 
is expected that enhanced fault detection, outage detection and notification capabilities will 
contribute to reductions in the duration of sustained outages for affected customers, and thus 
reduce CAIDI. 
Installation of innovative 




10.7.  Operation of Equipment 
10.7.1  Intellirupter Pulsecloser 
 
Four momentary operations were detected for the IntelliRupter during the field trial. The 
IntelliRupter tripped upon sensing a 2700-ampere phase-to-phase fault. After a 0.3-second 
delay, the IntelliRupter then pulseclosed to verify that the line was clear of faults before 
initiating a closing operation. Fault current was indeed still detected on one phase so 
IntelliRupter did not close. 
By contrast, a conventional recloser would have closed in this instance. The substation 
transformer, conductor splices, and other equipment would have been subjected to damaging 
fault current until the recloser decided to open again and upstream customers would have 
been subjected to another irritating voltage sag in the interim. The consequences would have 
been magnified if multiple reclosing attempts were necessary. After a 15-second delay 
IntelliRupter again pulseclosed, but no fault current was detected this time, so the IntelliRupter 
closed, restoring service to downstream customers. The source side voltage shown in the 
middle three waveforms was virtually unaffected by pulseclosing. Each operation of the 
overcurrent circuit testing sequence can be configured for either single-phase trip or three-
phase trip. The last test operation specifies whether single-phase lockout is acceptable, or if a 
three-phase lockout is required. 




Figure 10.4 shows that the FuseSaver operated thrice during the trial period. i.e. it operated 























Figure 10.4: Snapshot of the FuseSaver operation sequence 
 
Last Fault Data  
 
The Last Fault Data on the Operate Line page shows the most relevant information for a line 
crew attempting to repair a faulted line. The last fault display was taken from the event record 
of the FuseSaver and shows the data for the most recent line fault which caused the 
FuseSaver protection to pick-up.  
 
The event log below shows that there were no detected sustained interruptions events. This 
means there have been no permanent faults downstream of the FuseSaver for it to act upon 
unless they were SEF faults. This means the outages are either due to inadequate line current 
or upstream breaker operations on faults that are upstream of the FuseSaver. The “power off” 
/ “power on” events indicates that the upstream protection device (Intellirupter Pulsecloser) 
was set too sensitive and operated before the FuseSaver could operate. (See Appendix M for 
further details on the Last Fault Data for the FuseSaver)  
 
Table 10.2: Event record of the FuseSaver  
 
Phase  Date and Time  Name  Duration 
A-RED  2014/12/19 02:47:03 PM  Outage  0.418992 
A-RED  2014/12/19 02:47:03 PM  Line Current On  
 A-RED  2014/12/19 02:47:03 PM  Line Current Off  
 C-BLU  2014/12/19 02:47:02 PM  Outage  0.418991 
C-BLU  2014/12/19 02:47:02 PM  Line Current On  
 C-BLU  2014/12/19 02:47:02 PM  Line Current Off  
 B-WHT  2014/12/19 02:47:02 PM  Outage  0.418991 
B-WHT  2014/12/19 02:47:02 PM  Line Current On  










10.7.3  Tripsaver 
 
No operations for the Tripsaver was detected, this was due to the sensitive protection settings 
of the upstream Intellirupter Pulsecloser.  
 
The most recent operational information of the Tripsaver is shown in the figures below. 
 





Red Phase White Phase Blue Phase 
 
Figure 10.5: Load Current screen 
 
Last Fault Magnitude: The fundamental-frequency RMS magnitude of the last fault current in 
primary amperes, measured just prior to the opening of the vacuum interrupter is shown. No 
interruptions were detected.  
   
Figure 10.6: Last Fault Magnitude screen 
 
Number of Open Operations: The number of vacuum interrupter open operations registered 
is shown. This was due to the testing of the Tripsavers and the sensitive protection settings of 
the upstream Intellirupter Pulsecloser.  
 
   
Red Phase White Phase Blue Phase 
 





Red Phase White Phase Blue Phase 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of the work presented and highlights 
the significance of the research towards the field.  
 
11.1.  Conclusions of Research 
The basic function of a power system is to supply customers with electrical energy as cost 
effectively as possible and with an acceptable degree of quality of service particularly in terms 
of reliability of electricity supplied to customers. Electricity service should be provided at 
increased levels of availability and reliability as more energy is demanded. 
 
Poor reliability planning and faulty protection systems also contribute to the increased 
frequency, duration and the severity of the interruption. There are different methods that are 
used for reliability planning and evaluation of distribution system. The methods include 
Historical data analysis and Predictive reliability analysis. Reliable electricity is essential to the 
industrial or / and commercial businesses, as well as a necessity for the productivity, safety 
and comfort of residential customers. As a result, electrical utilities are striving to maintain a 
safe and reliable power delivery to all their customers. 
 
There are two main types of benefits from installing new technology devices and systems to 
address distribution reliability challenges: reliability improvements and operational savings.  
New technologies can be installed to improve overhead network performance, reduce 
operating cost and enable smart grid capability in the near future. The challenge facing today’s 
network operators is how to improve network reliability and reduce operating costs on great 
lengths of lines that generate little income. The further challenge is how utilities will transform 
these same traditional assets into an intelligent, integrated, self-healing network, suitable for 
tomorrow. 
 
A well-coordinated distribution automation system could be introduced for switching operation 
and the outage time could be reduced. The cost of implementation of these new technologies 
could be recovered within few months by reducing the energies not served when operating to 
clear faults. 
The future of Distribution Automation systems lies in the outcome of the balance between 
benefits and cost and it is only when the outcome is positive that it can be said that the 
network performance has been enhanced. In the future, this enhancement may not purely be 
the restoration of supply but may also be the improvement of the quality of supply, which is 
becoming more critical to today’s user. In the case of the distribution automation trial at 
Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder the benefits are easily recognisable with quick and simple 
supply restoration and fault identification.  
 
11.2.  Improved Reliability  
The continuity of electricity supply to customers is one of the performance measures of a utility 
company. Unfortunately, power interruption often experienced by customers caused by faults 
that mostly occur in medium voltage distribution lines [23]. The medium voltage overhead lines 
are usually many kilometres in length which covers wide and spread areas. They are 
susceptible to faults due to lightning, pollution, animal, equipment failures, trees touching, 
traffic accident, and people activity.  
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In order to achieve a better distribution system reliability indices in fault management, there 
are some strategies, such as [24]: 
 
1. Reduce the number of faults 
2. Reduce time of interruption 
3. Reduce the number of affected customers 
 
Reduce time of interruption may be done by switching actions to isolate the faulty section, and 
restore the supply for remaining healthy parts. Reduce number of affected customers may be 
done by reconfiguring the networks. The distribution automation equipment implemented on 
the pilot feeder fulfilled the two strategies above. 
 
The operation of the DA reclosing allowed temporary faults to clear themselves. For typical 
overhead distribution systems, 60% to 80% of faults will be temporary in nature. If a DA 
recloser interrupts a temporary fault and then recloses, the problem will often be solved 
automatically. This is desirable since the utility does not have to dispatch crews, and no 
repairs are necessary. With reclosing, fewer sustained interruptions are intentionally traded-off 
for more momentary interruptions. In this case, the momentary interruption is a deliberate and 
good thing.  
 
From the operations of the DA equipment, it can also be concluded that the most common 
way for utilities to prioritise distribution reliability performance and spending decisions are 
based on SAIDI improvement. Reducing outage duration, as measured by SAIDI, is generally 
related to the implementation of distribution automation and more efficiently operating and 
restoration practices. Isolating, reclosing, or fault location, isolation, and service restoration 
actions can reduce outage duration for customers on sections of feeders that are isolated from 
damages.  
The author has found that SAIDI generally does a good job in driving investment decisions for 
a utility. The only potential problem is that SAIDI will sometimes encourage spending in areas 
that already have adequate reliability. 
 
The pilot project has been judged to be successful based on the reliability performance 
improvement measured and with costs at or below expectation. The author will continue to 
monitor the performance of the pilot systems to better quantify the benefit versus cost ratios 
over a longer operating period.  
 
11.3.  Fuse Saving Technology - Protecting Lateral Lines from Transient Faults  
The sustained outage caused by fuse operations is unnecessary as the fault is transient, a 
momentary outage should be sufficient to clear the fault. Fuse operation on permanent faults 
has its advantages, but the fuse needs to be protected from transient faults [19]. 
The FuseSaver used in the pilot project is a half-cycle interrupting circuit breaker, making 
fuse-saving strategies a reality. Its half-cycle functionality means it can open and clear a fault 
in as little time as it takes the fuse to melt, thereby avoiding a fuse operating unnecessarily. It 
then closes after a configurable dead time. Customers on the lateral line are unaffected and 
the utility avoids regulatory performance penalties and arranging a line crew. If the fault is 
permanent, the device simply allows the fuse to operate, thereby isolating the faulted line. The 
half-cycle functionality will improve network performance and reduce ongoing costs 
immediately, saving the fuses from unnecessary operation [19]. 
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11.4.  PulseClosing Technology  
Conclusions and benefits resulting from the pulse closing technologies are listed below: 
PulseClosing tests overhead distribution circuits for the presence or absence of faults:  
 eliminates voltage sags from reclosing into faults
 reduces stress on power system equipment
11.4.1 Benefits of Pulse Closing
Benefits to the Public 
The benefits of pulse closing technology to the general public are: 
• Improved power distribution system reliability, reducing consumer inconveniences and costs
associated with power outages.
• Improved power quality and reduced disturbances during outage recovery processes, due to
use of pulsing to test before reclosing rather than reclosing  directly into circuits which may
still be faulted.
• Reduced risk of igniting fires caused by arc energy released during fault events.
• Lower consumer electricity costs due to the extension of distribution equipment life that will
be possible with pulse closing.
Benefits to Electric Distribution Utilities 
The benefits of the pulse closing technology assessment to electric distribution utilities are: 
• Understanding of applications and limits of a new technology, pulse closing.
• Identification of impacts of a new distribution protection technology (pulse closing) on
distribution automation systems.
• Understanding the technical and economic impacts of reclosing into existing faults on line
and substation equipment life.
• Acceleration of the efforts of utilities to advance automation of distribution systems.
11.5.  Equipment Fault Events 
A detailed study of the events described, including the IntelliRupter Pulsecloser, Tripsaver and 
FuseSaver event recorder downloads enables a number of clear conclusions to be drawn.
 It is in the best interest of the utility to analyse feeders which have the most critical loads and
have the worst reliability.
• The equipment can be expected to operate in the field in the way intended i.e. adhering to
pre-set characteristics and no nuisance dropouts.
• The physical handling, installation and operational aspects of the equipment fit into normal
practices in the field, with minimal adjustment of work methods and procedures necessary.
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• The current ratings of the Distribution Automation devices supplied to Eskom should be lower
in order to achieve greater effectiveness and co-ordination with the back-up recloser. It is
expected that with a device more tailored to the specific Eskom’s environment, greater
benefits might have been realised.
• The field trial has been satisfactory so far and a good understanding has been reached of its
application in Eskom networks. Although considerable data has been collected and analysed
at the time of writing, a fuller assessment should be available by the end of 2015.
11.6.  Utility Costs and Customers Interruptions 
Improving of the MV network goes hand in hand with improving the reliability of the network. 
Distribution system reliability should be based on balancing the costs to a utility as well as the 
value of benefits received by the supplied customers. The value-based distribution system 
reliability planning approach used for the tested feeder was to locate the best solution at 
minimum total cost, where the total cost includes the sum of the utility cost and the customer 
interruption costs [35], [36]. 
11.7.  Operational Savings 
Utilities frequently operate switches to support load balancing, faults and to de‐energise 
feeder segments for maintenance. Before automation, many of these activities required crews 
to travel to multiple sites and perform switching operations manually before maintenance 
operations began. When the maintenance work was completed, manual switching was again 
required to put feeders back into their original service configurations. Automated feeder 
switching can produce operational savings by eliminating manual switching and improving the 
productivity of field crews. 
11.8.  Final Comments 
Distribution system reliability is a measure of total electricity interruptions. Electricity is 
essential to all customers. It is impossible to deliver uninterrupted electricity to all customers 
over a long period of time. This is because there are factors that are capable of interrupting 
the power at any time which are outside the engineers’ control. These factors include adverse 
weather, animals and human interference to mention a few. Utilities are faced with the 
challenges of evaluating and planning for reliable distribution systems in order to supply the 
best service to all customers. 
This reliability project has been initiated to improve the quality of supply customers experience 
in the area. Although not a very representative place for the new technologies were chosen, 
the new technologies implemented were added to the network to reduce the impact of faults 
on the customers. Apart from this they worked perfectly fine and greatly enhance fault finding 
techniques and thereby improving planned and unplanned restoration times. 
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Chapter 12: Recommendations for Future Research 
The challenge of how to improve network reliability and reduce operating costs is solvable 
today. The challenge of how to transform traditional assets into an intelligent, integrated, 
reliable network suitable for tomorrow is not a problem of the magnitude it was estimated to 
be. Innovative new technologies can be installed on existing infrastructure to improve 
communication and performance, reduce cost and enable smart grid capability in the near 
future.  
 
12.1. MV Overhead Feeder Loop Automation 
 
In an effort to improve the reliability of supply, utilities are rethinking the levels of sophistication 
deployed in their medium voltage (MV) overhead feeders. An auto-reclose cycle should clear a 
transient fault without interrupting supply to the customer. In most cases, no further operator 
assistance would be required to clear the fault. Some faults are however more permanent. 
Examples include distribution equipment, such as transformer failures and fallen power lines 
due to motor accidents or storms. Protection equipment is designed to minimise damage by 
interrupting the supply to a segment containing a fault. The supply will remain off until the fault 
is removed and the protection equipment is turned back on. Today’s reclosers are capable of 
sophisticated protection, communication, automation and analytical functionality. It is possible 
to operate in either a 'manual' mode where the operator has to perform the reconfiguration of 
the network or in a 'loop automation' mode where the reclosers perform the task automatically. 
 
Loop automation uses time, voltage, power flow, and these simple rules to isolate the fault and 
reconfigure the network, without any communications or operator assistance. In a loop 
automation network, the following actions will take place when a fault occurs: 
 
 The recloser immediately upstream of the fault automatically trips, recloses to a 
lockout, and remains open. 
 
 Reclosers downstream of the fault automatically change the protection settings in 
anticipation of power flowing in the opposite direction. 
 
 The normally open tie-recloser closes automatically.  
 
Due to the fault still being present, the recloser immediately downstream of the fault trips, and 
locks out without reclosing. This will automatically restore power to the healthy parts of the 
network. An operator can now despatch line crews to the faulted segment. 
 
12.2. Future Development    
12.2.1 The IntelliTeam Automatic Restoration System and IntelliNodes 
Interfact Modules 
 
A pilot scheme for a Distribution Automation project targeting specifically self-healing (FLISR) 
of Eskom’s Distribution Grid should be implemented in the near future. A system consisting of 
IntelliTeam Automatic Restoration System using IntelliNodes Interfact Modules to incorporate 
the existing reclosers into the IntelliTEAM. 
The objectives in proposing this solution were to provide an extremely cost-effective solution 
that meets the network improvement performance. The IntelliTeam Automatic Restoration 
System automatically reconfigures the distribution system after a fault and quickly restores 
service to segments of the feeder which aren’t affected by the fault. Although fully compatible 
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with SCADA, no SCADA control or central monitoring is required. Decisions are made locally, 
based on real-time loading data. The IntelliTeam supports complex systems of virtually any 
size and accommodates tie points from multiple sources. It can handle as many teams of 
switches as line loading will allow [13].  
 
Radio Survey  
 
Desktop radio survey which will include worst and best case scenarios to identify potential 
communication problems and the possible need for repeaters and to ensure at least two paths 
to each substation is achieved. The field survey consisting of the vendor (S&C) and Radius 
using radios and repeaters on site [13].  
  
Installation of the IntelliNodes to the Existing Reclosers  
 
Physical installation of the IntelliNodes in the existing reclosers’ control panels, as well as 
electrical and communication connections, should be implemented in the near future [13].  
 
12.3. Inspection and Maintenance Program for Utilities 
  
Each utility should design and maintain a program to limit the frequency and duration of 
electric service interruptions. The program should include inspection, maintenance, repair and 
replacement standards that ensure service restoration as well as preventive and emergency 
maintenance; and should give special emphasis to the improvement of the worst performing 
feeders. The program should include at a minimum:  
 
1) The age, distribution and location of equipment on each circuit.  
2) The number, density and location of customers on each circuit.  
3) The location and density of trees on the system.  
4) An annual vegetation management plan.  
5) The impacts on distribution system reliability of animals, wind, storms, ice and auto         
    accidents. 
      
The value of these standards in assessing an electric utility’s performance can help point to 
specific areas where more attention by the utility is necessary to improve reliability. Causes of 
outages can be identified on a systemic basis and improvement plans can be developed. For 
example, the extent that a company routinely inspects utility poles to determine those most 
susceptible to deterioration and collapse, a cause for interruptions, may be established from 
evaluating reliability indices. A common finding, for example, is that a lack of vegetation 
management (commonly referred to as “tree trimming”) is responsible for outages along 
specific circuits. There may be a number of reasons why plant life has grown too close to 
power lines, but the fix is often relatively simple.  
Other reasons for interruptions may be more difficult to detect, such as animals on poles or 
along wires, resulting in shorts and the subsequent interruptions. Whatever the reason for an 
interruption or series of interruptions, these calculations can assist the utility to determine 









12.4.  System Improvement 
 
System redesign is required where by the transformers should be protected and network 
stabiliser (NER) should be installed in all transformers where applicable. Installation of extra 
reclosers is required in order to achieve sufficient sectionalising points that are remotely 
controllable. Tie link should also be added to the network to enable interconnection with closer 
network and in so doing enhancing the reliability of the network. Fault path indicators can also 
serve as an advantage as this will add value in terms of fault finding. 
 
12.5. Optimal Placement of Protective Devices 
A popular reliability improvement strategy involves the addition of protective devices, 
particularly the addition of reclosers. With proper analytical tools, engineers can obtain 
reliability indices that would give them an idea of the locations at which an improvement is 
needed. However, engineers are often bounded by limited capital spending. It then becomes 
important to make sure the investment yields the most beneficial return. Placing the reclosers 
at optimal locations is considered a challenging and yet a vital decision in distribution 
planning. Methods and tools such as the CYME Power Engineering Software and Solutions 
(Optimal Recloser Placement) and Genetic Algorithm (GA) can be used for optimal placement 
of protective devices. CYME identifies optimal protective device locations to improve the 
network conditions based on selected objectives and criteria, studies the reliability indices, 
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Table 1 – Standard Fuse Ratings [6] 
Table 2 illustrates the point at which the SE/F definite time characteristic meets the total 
clearing curve of a specific fuse given the standard ratings. The currents depicted in table 2 
are the lowest current values at which the fuse will operate before the upstream SE/F 
protection, for the SE/F time setting indicated in column 1. Proper grading will only be 
achieved at currents above these values. [6] 
 



















 Appendix B: Time Current Characteristics (TCC): Minimum Melting Time and 
 Total Clearing Time 
Time Current Characteristics (TCC) for K and D type fuses - Minimum melting time [6] 
Time Current Characteristics (TCC) for K and D type fuses - Total clearing time [6] 
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Appendix C: Telecommunication Site Survey – Signal Strength and GPS 
Coordinates 
The communication path profiles (line of site) of the equipment installed on the Waterkloof F1 
11 kV Feeder. 
Estimated GPS co-ordinates: 
1. LBS4204  (18° 52' 38.9" ; -34° 6' 23.1")
2. SF451  (18° 53' 16.3" ; -34° 6' 47.6")
3. TS617 / SF617 (18° 54' 16.6"; -34° 6' 57.7")
Figure 1: Load Break Switch - LBS4204   Figure 2: Section Fuse - SF451 
  Figure 3: Section Fuse - SF617 
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Appendix E: Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV - Unplanned SAIFI (2009-2013) 



















































Appendix F: Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV - Unplanned SAIDI (2009-2013) 




















































Unplanned Values SAIDI - Actual SAIDI - Year SAIFI - Actual SAIFI - Year 
OHL Feeder Sub Month 
2.003 2.003 2.238 2.238 
WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV 
FEEDER(247454265) 
NOV2010 
DEC2010 0.538 2.541 2.274 4.512 
JAN2011 0.419 2.960 0.333 4.845 
FEB2011 1.981 4.941 0.167 5.012 
MAR2011 4.941 5.012 
APR2011 0.017 4.958 0.012 5.024 
MAY2011 6.387 11.345 2.345 7.369 
JUN2011 11.345 7.369 
JUL2011 4.925 16.270 1.167 8.536 
AUG2011 3.327 19.597 0.214 8.750 
SEP2011 1.404 21.001 1.917 10.667 
OCT2011 1.940 22.941 1.988 12.655 
NOV2011 20.938 10.417 
DEC2011 1.849 22.249 2.190 10.333 
JAN2012 1.304 23.134 1.143 11.143 
FEB2012 0.496 21.649 0.083 11.060 
MAR2012 21.649 11.060 
APR2012 21.632 11.048 
MAY2012 0.882 16.128 0.226 8.929 
JUN2012 11.931 28.059 5.405 14.333 
JUL2012 0.141 23.275 0.024 13.190 
AUG2012 7.744 27.691 8.548 21.524 
SEP2012 1.555 27.843 1.071 20.679 
OCT2012 0.162 26.065 0.083 18.774 
NOV2012 6.998 33.063 4.012 22.786 
DEC2012 0.197 31.412 0.167 20.762 
JAN2013 0.066 30.174 0.036 19.655 
FEB2013 0.041 29.718 0.012 19.583 
MAR2013 29.718 19.583 
APR2013 29.718 19.583 
MAY2013 0.125 28.961 0.071 19.429 
JUN2013 0.464 17.493 0.095 14.119 
JUL2013 3.486 20.838 2.179 16.274 
AUG2013 0.649 13.743 0.048 7.774 
SEP2013 4.148 16.337 1.976 8.679 
OCT2013 0.386 16.560 0.119 8.714 
NOV2013 0.362 9.923 0.226 4.929 
DEC2013 9.726 4.762 
JAN2014 9.660 4.726 
FEB2014 9.619 4.714 
MAR2014 9.186 18.805 3.148 7.862 
APR2014 1.281 20.086 2.552 10.414 
MAY2014 3.362 23.323 1.047 11.389 
JUN2014 1.281 24.141 1.035 12.329 
JUL2014 1.294 21.949 0.412 10.562 
AUG2014 0.263 21.563 0.060 10.574 
SEP2014 1.125 18.539 0.417 9.014 
OCT2014 0.235 18.389 0.047 8.942 
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Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder Fuse Operations 
Location : SF617 – Tripsavers : Historical data for SF617 – Installation of  Tripsavers 
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RC_LOC_PARENT WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER
MONTH_CHAR (Multiple Items)
CAUSE_NOFELCA (Multiple Items)
Row Labels Sum of OFE_CUSTOMER_INTERRUPTIONS Sum of FE_CUSTOMER_DURATIONS Average of DURATION AVG (HOURS) Count of CAUSEID
48A7798 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 2 4,975555556 2,487777778 1
48A8615 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 1 2,797222222 2,797222222 1
48A8813 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 2 7,838333333 3,919166667 1
48A8826 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 3 19,4525 6,484166667 1
48A8917 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 0 1
48A8921 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 0 1
48A8922 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer 1 2,648611111 2,648611111 1
F48A8513 11kV DOEF 1 1,890555556 1,890555556 1
F48A8606 11kV DOEF 3 3,433333333 1,144444444 1
F48A8828 11kV DOEF 0 1
F48A8914 11kV DOEF 1 3,212222222 3,212222222 1
LBS4203 11kV Ganged Switch 392 669,2433333 2,593966408 3
REC4199 11kV Recloser 872 373,4911111 3,156503268 4
REC7306 11kV Recloser 0 2
SF320 11kV Fused Load Break 2 2,605555556 1,302777778 1
SF451 11kV Fused Load Break 15 66,61666667 4,441111111 1
SL2449 11kV Solid Cutout 32 70,34722222 3,70248538 1
SL4503 11kV Solid Cutout 2 20,95166667 20,95166667 1
WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER 765 212,4425 0,277702614 1
Grand Total 2094 1461,946389 3,026712901 25
Location: SF451 – Fusesavers Historical data for SF451 – Installation of Fusesavers 
Location: LBS4204 – Intellirupter Pulsecloser - Installation of Intellirupter Pulsecloser 
Fault frequency on Waterkloof Feeder 
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RC_LOC_PARENT WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER
MONTH_CHAR (Multiple Items)
CAUSE_NOFELCA FAULT
Row Labels Count of OFE_CUSTOMER_INTERRUPTIONS Sum of FE_CUSTOMER_DURATIONS Average of DURATION AVG (HOURS) Count of CAUSEID
LBS4204 11kV Ganged Switch 4 1322,169167 3,307170489 4




RC_LOC_PARENT WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER
MONTH_CHAR (Multiple Items)
CAUSE_NOFELCA FAULT
Row Labels Count of OFE_CUSTOMER_INTERRUPTIONS Sum of FE_CUSTOMER_DURATIONS Average of DURATION AVG (HOURS) Count of CAUSEID
SF451 11kV Fused Load Break 6 392,5102778 4,402374339 6




RC_LOC_PARENT WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER
MONTH_CHAR (Multiple Items)
CAUSE_NOFELCA FAULT
Row Labels Sum of OFE_CUSTOMER_INTERRUPTIONS Sum of FE_CUSTOMER_DURATIONS Average of DURATION AVG (HOURS) Count of CAUSEID
SF617 11kV Fused Load Break 84 305,9186111 3,641888228 14




WMA FSA TSA LOCATION DESCRIPTION OWNER KV CUST_CNT LPU_CUST_CNT SPU_CUST_CNT PPU_CUST_CNT TOTAL_FDR_LENGTH_M CABLE_LENGTH_MLINE_LENGTH_M
Western WMA Bellville FSA Somerset West TSA247454265 WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER ESKOM Distribution 11 86 11 73 2 24091.751 4593.653 19498.098
System indices calculations using FMEA  
From Event Summary _5 Years - 31 December 2013
λ2013 = (Number of Fault per year)/ (year*length of feeder) 
  = 133/ (5*24.3) 
   = 1.0947 
Line Current Calculations  
I = (KVA *1000)/ (11kV*(3/√3)) 
ILBS4204   = (7267*1000)/ (11kV*(3/√3)) 
  = 381.42A 
ISF451 = (1067*1000)/ (11kV*(3/√3)) 
 = 56.00A 
ISF617 = (375*1000)/ (11kV*(3/√3)) 
 = 19.68A 
Historical Data Results:  2009 - 2014 
FEEDER FAULTS TOTAL_FDR_LENGTH_M TOTAL_FDR_LENGTH_Km Faults/100km




WATERKLOOF / FARMERS 1 11kV FEEDER
(All)
86















Grand Total 18 401
48A7694 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer
48A8922 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer
819,1258333
F48A8828 11kV DOEF
48A8804 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer
SF320 11kV Fused Load Break
SL4503 11kV Solid Cutout
F48A8821 11kV DOEF
48A8917 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer
REC4199 11kV Recloser
SF617 11kV Fused Load Break
48A8908 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer
SL4202 11kV Solid Cutout
48A7798 11kV/400V Two Winding Transformer





Total number of Feeder Customers
Row Labels
Event Summary _5 Years - 31 December 2013 – Historical Data and Failure Rate 
Calculations 
Table 1: Root causes of the SAIDI variation 
Root causes of the SAIDI differences related to Table 1 are listed in the Table 2. 
Table 2: Root fault causes of the SAIDI 
DATE FAULT CAUSES 
October 2013 Birds, Vandalism 
November 2013 Overhead Power Line Problem 
December 2013 - 
January 2014 - 
February 2014  - 
March 2014 Cable Faulted, Foreign Objects / Interference, 
Overhead Power Line Problem, Vandalism 
April 2014 Birds, Jumper Damaged 
May 2014 Fuse Failure, Animals, Conductor & 
Associated Hardware Failure, Fault On LV 
Network, Power Transformer failure 
June 2014 Fuse Failure, Conductor & Associated 
Hardware Failure 
July 2014 Jumper Failure, Conductor & Associated 
Hardware Failure 
August 2014 Conductor & Associated Hardware Failure, 
Cable Damaged 
September 2014 Conductor & Associated Hardware Failure, 
Overhead Power Line Problem, Trees, Winds 
October 2014 Oil Leak, Vandalism 
November 2014 - 
December 2014 - 
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Appendix H: Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder – Reference Group Feeder – 
  SAIDI and SAIFI 
158 
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LPU's on Waterkloof / Farmers 1
Customer Name Property_Description Feeder Transformer NMD
Maximum 
Load used POD
ANGLO AMERICAN FARMS LTD,-  WINERY VERGELEGEN EST,,,1/843/8,I Waterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8625 300 192 5458487403
FALSE BAY VINEYARDS (PTY) LTD  SIR LOWRY'S PASS RD,WATERKLOOF FARM,, 1/2986,IWaterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8708 750 326 4225234124
CITY OF CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALPINETOWN 1/144/2.I;HELDERBERG ADMINISTRATIONWaterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8927 1000 893 2529156781
CITY OF CAPE TOWN METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALWATER SCHEME PUMP STATION,,ERF NO 820/1,1/222/7,IWaterkloof / Farmers 1 BRUYN 150 251 7037673395
LOURENSFORD ESTATES FARMING ENTERPRISESLOURENSFORD EST,,,1/104,I Waterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8515 2000 1678 6986396220
PRECIOUS PROSPECT TRADING (PTY) LTD   MOUNT RHODES (MOUNT),FARM 918,SIR LOWRY'S PASS,1/4182,IWaterkloof / Farmers 1 MOUNT 200 122 5676692779
ANGLO AMERICAN FARMS LTD,-  LOURENSFORD RD,VERGELEGEN FARM,LUBBE OFFICE,1/843/5,IWaterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8615 200 73 7533187669
ANGLO AMERICAN FARMS LTD,-  VERGELEGEN FARM,ROOILAND POMPHUIS,,1/843/6,IWaterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8628 500 210 7703529841
MORGENSTER (1711) (PTY) LTD  MORGENSTER WINE EST,,,1/2256,I Waterkloof / Farmers 1 48A8606 200 155 8372930122
VERGELEGEN WINES (PTY) LTD  VERGELEGEN WINE FARM,,,1/2718,I Waterkloof / Farmers 1 VERG 250 243 7915079590
5550 4143 75%
Appendix I: Network Description 





Sir Lowry's Pass_FARMERS 1 11kV BKR
Sir Lowry's Pass_FARMERS 2 11kV REC5087
Sir Lowry's Pass_FARMERS 3 11kV BKR
Waterkloof_FARMERS 1 11kV BKR









Conductors on feeder [6] 
Load distribution- DIgSILENT PowerFactory 
161 
Appendix J: Digsilent - General Load Data
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2013/12/15 20:30 1256 561 1376 0.91
2013/12/15 21:00 1265 546 1378 0.92
2013/12/15 21:30 1229 598 1367 0.90
2013/12/15 22:00 1170 563 1298 0.90
2013/12/15 22:30 1116 563 1250 0.89
2013/12/15 23:00 1088 536 1213 0.90
2013/12/15 23:30 1051 560 1191 0.88
2013/12/16 00:00 1003 573 1155 0.87
2013/12/16 00:30 981 581 1140 0.86
2013/12/16 01:00 969 525 1102 0.88
2013/12/16 01:30 922 502 1050 0.88
2013/12/16 02:00 936 521 1071 0.87
2013/12/16 02:30 907 512 1042 0.87
2013/12/16 03:00 897 530 1042 0.86
2013/12/16 03:30 928 529 1068 0.87
2013/12/16 04:00 953 518 1085 0.88
2013/12/16 04:30 944 513 1074 0.88
2013/12/16 05:00 954 500 1077 0.89
2013/12/16 05:30 930 474 1044 0.89
2013/12/16 06:00 982 500 1102 0.89
2013/12/16 06:30 945 489 1064 0.89
2013/12/16 07:00 814 405 909 0.90
2013/12/16 07:30 1098 563 1234 0.89
2013/12/16 08:00 1319 599 1449 0.91
2013/12/16 08:30 1559 650 1689 0.92
2013/12/16 09:00 1770 716 1909 0.93
2013/12/16 09:30 1841 710 1973 0.93
2013/12/16 10:00 1816 698 1946 0.93
2013/12/16 10:30 1626 651 1751 0.93
2013/12/16 11:00 1578 643 1704 0.93
2013/12/16 11:30 1707 680 1837 0.93
2013/12/16 12:00 1701 664 1826 0.93
2013/12/16 12:30 1681 661 1806 0.93
2013/12/16 13:00 1686 635 1802 0.94
2013/12/16 13:30 1713 679 1843 0.93
2013/12/16 14:00 1583 695 1729 0.92
2013/12/16 14:30 1572 705 1723 0.91
2013/12/16 15:00 1574 703 1724 0.91
2013/12/16 15:30 1498 647 1632 0.92
2013/12/16 16:00 1458 630 1588 0.92
2013/12/16 16:30 1442 634 1575 0.92
2013/12/16 17:00 1453 670 1600 0.91
2013/12/16 17:30 1464 676 1613 0.91
2013/12/16 18:00 1444 660 1588 0.91
2013/12/16 18:30 1447 690 1603 0.90
2013/12/16 19:00 1399 683 1557 0.90
2013/12/16 19:30 1359 654 1508 0.90
2013/12/16 20:00 1363 552 1471 0.93
2013/12/16 20:30 1321 602 1452 0.91




11kV Fdr 2 - Farm1
kVA kWh LF
DATE & TIME kW kVAr kVA pf 2846 1218231 0.58
2013/01/01 00:00 1197 635 1355 0.88 3946 1208770 0.46
2013/01/01 00:30 1158 576 1293 0.90 3101 1304477 0.57
2013/01/01 01:00 1025 506 1143 0.90 2729 1190761 0.61
2013/01/01 01:30 997 536 1132 0.88 2509 1195167 0.64
2013/01/01 02:00 993 544 1132 0.88 2504 1156431 0.64
2013/01/01 02:30 966 518 1096 0.88 2390 1120736 0.63
2013/01/01 03:00 957 528 1093 0.88 2553 1215800 0.64
2013/01/01 03:30 970 556 1118 0.87 2554 1136957 0.62
2013/01/01 04:00 964 538 1104 0.87 2711 1075512 0.53
2013/01/01 04:30 986 547 1128 0.87 2264 964769 0.59
2013/01/01 05:00 1089 588 1238 0.88 2433 512676 0.28
2013/01/01 05:30 1075 591 1227 0.88 0.58
2013/01/01 06:00 1024 595 1184 0.86
2013/01/01 06:30 946 540 1089 0.87
2013/01/01 07:00 1016 604 1182 0.86
2013/01/01 07:30 1029 586 1184 0.87
2013/01/01 08:00 1126 634 1292 0.87
2013/01/01 08:30 1220 624 1370 0.89
2013/01/01 09:00 1259 612 1400 0.90
2013/01/01 09:30 1296 682 1464 0.88
2013/01/01 10:00 1370 692 1535 0.89
2013/01/01 10:30 1428 715 1597 0.89
2013/01/01 11:00 1388 710 1559 0.89
2013/01/01 11:30 1381 695 1546 0.89
2013/01/01 12:00 1357 708 1531 0.89
2013/01/01 12:30 1389 737 1572 0.88
2013/01/01 13:00 1423 744 1606 0.89
2013/01/01 13:30 1314 716 1496 0.88
2013/01/01 14:00 1309 722 1495 0.88
2013/01/01 14:30 1339 755 1537 0.87
2013/01/01 15:00 1388 769 1587 0.87
2013/01/01 15:30 1388 778 1591 0.87
2013/01/01 16:00 1294 731 1486 0.87
2013/01/01 16:30 1170 658 1342 0.87
2013/01/01 17:00 1175 659 1347 0.87
11kV Fdr 2 - Farm1
CTS-0000000331
Appendix K: Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder- Average Load Factor and 
Power Factor  
01/01/2013 - 31/12/2013 
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Appendix L: Results of the Load Point Indices and System Reliability 
  Indicesof Different Configurations from DIgSILENT 
Cost Evaluation of the Different Configurations Tested   
Configuration 2: Configuration 1 + FuseSavers added at SF451 
Figure 1: Results of the load point indices for Configuration 2 from DIgSILENT 
CIC/year =∑ 𝑼𝒙𝑳𝒙𝑴𝒙=𝑨 𝑪𝒙           (9.1) 
The CIC calculation for different load points for Configuration 2 are shown in Figure 2 using 
equation (9.1) 
Figure 2: Calculations of the CIC for each load point - Annual cost of interruptions 
- Configuration 2
Annual cost of interruptions of feeder for Configuration 2 = R 2702229.90 
Where: U = λ x r and Unserved energy = U x Average load 
Utility cost for Configuration 2 includes Configuration 1: 
Loss of income = R 0.8/kWh x 3618 kVA x 0.92 x 12.991 (SAIDI) = R 34593.06 
Investment cost for Fusesaver = R 33800 x 3 = R 101400 
Maintenance cost for Fusesaver = 0 
Labour cost = 10 % of investment cost for Fusesaver = R 10140  
Utility Cost = Loss of income + Investment cost + Maintenance cost + Operation cost 
Utility cost = R 34593.06+ R 101400 + R 10140 + R 559071.80 = R 705204.86 
Act.Pow. Number of connec…. Tariff AID LPIT LPIF LPENS ACIF ACIT LPIC TCIT TMVAIF
MW IntTariffenergy,Int….. h h/a 1/a MWh/a 1/a h/a $/a Ch/a
A A Grid 4,2458 20 1,127442 10,71999 9,5082384 4,551491 9,508238 10,71999 97766,03 214,3997 5,305777
BRUYN (B) BRUYN (B) Grid 0,46 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,458494 1,981081 9,96727 9848,46 9,96727 2,758958
C C Grid 0,92 1 5,026968 9,980844 1,98546 0,918238 1,98546 9,980844 19723,74 9,980844 5,505747
D D Grid 0,115 2 5,02635 11,80089 2,3478057 0,13571 2,347806 11,80089 2915,056 23,60178 0,582003
E E Grid 0,529 12 5,019789 15,69255 3,1261374 0,830136 3,126137 15,69255 17831,32 188,3106 2,010653
F F Grid 0,138 3 5,023345 13,31158 2,6499429 0,1837 2,649943 13,31158 3945,871 39,93473 0,618774
G G Grid 0,98164 15 2,221894 10,22956 4,6039824 1,004175 4,603982 10,22956 21569,67 153,4434 2,533426
H H Grid 0,46 5 5,025448 12,21688 2,4310029 0,561976 2,431003 12,21688 12071,25 61,08439 2,24834
I I Grid 0,46 6 5,021279 14,59785 2,9071974 0,671501 2,907197 14,59785 14423,84 87,5871 1,880065
J J Grid 0,805 11 5,01927 16,11401 3,2104293 1,297178 3,210429 16,11401 27863,38 177,2541 2,979355
K K Grid 0,345 6 5,016623 18,67013 3,7216542 0,64412 3,721654 18,67013 13835,69 112,0208 1,10147
L L Grid 0,552 3 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,550193 1,981081 9,96727 11818,15 29,90181 3,31075
M M Grid 0,92 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,916989 1,981081 9,96727 19696,92 9,96727 5,517916
Name In Folder Grid
  
Configuration 2
Load λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs/yr) Average Load (MW) Average Load (kW) Unserved Energy (kWh/yr) COUE(R/kWh) CIC(R/yr)
A 9,508238 1,12744179 10,71998532 4,1535 4153,5 44525,45903 21,48 956406,8599
BRUYN (B) 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,46 460 4584,944016 21,48 98484,59746
C 1,98546 5,026968 9,98084388 0,9 900 8982,759492 21,48 192949,6739
D 2,347806 5,0263495 11,8008921 0,1125 112,5 1327,600361 21,48 28516,85576
E 3,126137 5,0197891 15,6925506 0,529 529 8301,359267 21,48 178313,1971
F 2,649943 5,0233453 13,3115781 0,138 138 1836,997778 21,48 39458,71227
G 4,603982 2,2218938 10,22955972 0,9603 960,3 9823,446199 21,48 211007,6244
H 2,431003 5,0254478 12,2168781 0,46 460 5619,763926 21,48 120712,5291
I 2,907197 5,0212795 14,5978506 0,46 460 6715,011276 21,48 144238,4422
J 3,210429 5,0192696 16,1140101 0,805 805 12971,77813 21,48 278633,7942
K 3,721654 5,0166226 18,6701346 0,345 345 6441,196437 21,48 138356,8995
L 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,552 552 5501,932819 21,48 118181,517
M 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,92 920 9169,888032 21,48 196969,1949
Total Annual Cost of Interruption 2702229,898
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |   DIgSILENT   | Project: | 
| | | PowerFactory  |------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |    15.1.4 | Date:  6/30/2015             | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Reliability Assessment | 
|   Method Load flow analysis | 
|   Network Distribution (Optimal Power Restoration) | 
|   Calculation time period 2015 | 
|   Consider Maintenance Yes | 
|   Fault Clearance Breakers Use all circuit breakers | 
|   Switching procedures Sequential | 
|   Consider Sectionalizing (Stages 1-3) No | 
|   Time to open remote controlled switches 0.10 min. | 
| | 
| Automatic Contingency Definition | 
|   Selection Whole System | 
|   Busbars / terminals Yes Common mode No | 
|   Lines / cables Yes Independent second failures No | 
|   Transformers Yes Double earth faults No | 
| Protection/switching failures No | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Study Case: Study Case                                                                           | Annex:                  / 1  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index :  SAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index :  CAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca | 
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   12.991    h/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2.733    h | 
| Average Service Availability Index :  ASAI   = 0.9958929464 | 
| Average Service Unavailability Index :  ASUI   = 0.0041070536 | 
| Energy Not Supplied :  ENS =   16.521 MWh/a | 
| Average Energy Not Supplied :  AENS   =    0.342 MWh/Ca | 
| Average Customer Curtailment Index :  ACCI   = 0.944 MWh/Ca | 
| Expected Interruption Cost :  EIC = 0.774 M$/a | 
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate :  IEAR   =   18.316 $/kWh | 
| System energy shed    :  SES = 0.000 MWh/a | 
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index :  ASIFI  =   3.769955 1/a | 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index :  ASIDI  =   13.481247 h/a | 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index :  MAIFI  = 0.000000 1/Ca | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3: Results of the system indices from DIgSILENT PowerFactory to obtain 
 SAIDI for Configuration 2 
Configuration 3: Configuration 2 + Tripsavers and FPI’s added at SF617 
Figure 4: Results of the load point indices for Configuration 3 from DIgSILENT 
The CIC calculation for different load points for Configuration 3 are shown in Figure 5 using 
equation (9.1) 
Figure 5: Calculations of the CIC for each load point - Annual cost of interruptions 
- Configuration 3
Act.Pow. Number of connec…. Tariff AID LPIT LPIF LPENS ACIF ACIT LPIC TCIT TMVAIF
MW IntTariffenergy,Int….. h h/a 1/a MWh/a 1/a h/a $/a Ch/a
A A Grid 4,2458 20 1,127442 10,71999 9,5082384 4,551491 9,508238 10,71999 97766,03 214,3997 5,305777
BRUYN (B) BRUYN (B) Grid 0,46 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,458494 1,981081 9,96727 9848,46 9,96727 2,758958
C C Grid 0,92 1 5,026968 9,980844 1,98546 0,918238 1,98546 9,980844 19723,74 9,980844 5,505747
D D Grid 0,115 2 5,02635 11,80089 2,3478057 0,13571 2,347806 11,80089 2915,056 23,60178 0,582003
E E Grid 0,529 12 5,019789 15,69255 3,1261374 0,830136 3,126137 15,69255 17831,32 188,3106 2,010653
F F Grid 0,138 3 5,023345 13,31158 2,6499429 0,1837 2,649943 13,31158 3945,871 39,93473 0,618774
G G Grid 0,98164 15 2,221894 10,22956 4,6039824 1,004175 4,603982 10,22956 21569,67 153,4434 2,533426
H H Grid 0,46 5 5,025448 12,21688 2,4310029 0,561976 2,431003 12,21688 12071,25 61,08439 2,24834
I I Grid 0,46 6 5,021279 14,59785 2,9071974 0,671501 2,907197 14,59785 14423,84 87,5871 1,880065
J J Grid 0,805 11 5,01927 16,11401 3,2104293 1,297178 3,210429 16,11401 27863,38 177,2541 2,979355
K K Grid 0,345 6 2,724951 10,14133 3,7216542 0,349876 3,721654 10,14133 7515,332 60,84796 1,10147
L L Grid 0,552 3 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,550193 1,981081 9,96727 11818,15 29,90181 3,31075
M M Grid 0,92 1 5,031227 9,96727 1,9810812 0,916989 1,981081 9,96727 19696,92 9,96727 5,517916




Load λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs/yr) Average Load (MW) Average Load (kW) Unserved Energy (kWh/yr) COUE(R/kWh) CIC(R/yr)
A 9,508238 1,12744179 10,71998532 4,1535 4153,5 44525,45903 21,48 956406,8599
BRUYN (B) 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,46 460 4584,944016 21,48 98484,59746
C 1,98546 5,026968 9,98084388 0,9 900 8982,759492 21,48 192949,6739
D 2,347806 5,0263495 11,8008921 0,1125 112,5 1327,600361 21,48 28516,85576
E 3,126137 5,0197891 15,6925506 0,529 529 8301,359267 21,48 178313,1971
F 2,649943 5,0233453 13,3115781 0,138 138 1836,997778 21,48 39458,71227
G 4,603982 2,2218938 10,22955972 0,9603 960,3 9823,446199 21,48 211007,6244
H 2,431003 5,0254478 12,2168781 0,46 460 5619,763926 21,48 120712,5291
I 2,907197 5,0212795 14,5978506 0,46 460 6715,011276 21,48 144238,4422
J 3,210429 5,0192696 16,1140101 0,805 805 12971,77813 21,48 278633,7942
K 3,721654 2,724951421 10,1413269 0,345 345 3498,757781 21,48 75153,31713
L 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,552 552 5501,932819 21,48 118181,517
M 1,981081 5,0312272 9,9672696 0,92 920 9169,888032 21,48 196969,1949
Total Annual Cost of Interruption 2639026,315
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Annual cost of interruptions of feeder for Configuration 3 = R 2639026.32 
Where: U = λ x r and Unserved energy = U x Average load 
Utility cost for Configuration 3 includes Configuration 2: 
Loss of income = R 0.8/kWh x 3618kVA x 0.92 x 12.4 (SAIDI) = R 33019.32 
Investment cost for Tripsaver and FPI = (R 30000+R 32300) x 3 = R 186900 
Maintenance cost for Tripsaver and FPI = 0 
Labour cost = 10 % of investment cost for Trisaver and FPI = R 18690 
Utility Cost = Loss of income + Investment cost + Maintenance cost + Operation cost 
Utility cost = R 33019.32 + R 186900 + 0 + R 18690 + R 705204.86 = R 943814.18 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |   DIgSILENT   | Project: | 
| | | PowerFactory  |------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |    15.1.4 | Date:  6/30/2015             | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Reliability Assessment | 
|   Method Load flow analysis | 
|   Network Distribution (Optimal Power Restoration)  | 
|   Calculation time period 2015 | 
|   Consider Maintenance Yes | 
|   Fault Clearance Breakers Use all circuit breakers | 
|   Switching procedures Sequential | 
|   Consider Sectionalizing (Stages 1-3) No | 
|   Time to open remote controlled switches 0.10 min. | 
| | 
| Automatic Contingency Definition | 
|   Selection Whole System | 
|   Busbars / terminals Yes Common mode No | 
|   Lines / cables Yes Independent second failures No | 
|   Transformers Yes Double earth faults No | 
| Protection/switching failures No | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Study Case: Study Case                                                                           | Annex:                  / 1  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index :  SAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index :  CAIFI  =   4.752724 1/Ca | 
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =   12.426    h/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    2.6145    h | 
| Average Service Availability Index :  ASAI   = 0.9958929464 | 
| Average Service Unavailability Index :  ASUI   = 0.0041070536 | 
| Energy Not Supplied :  ENS =   16.218 MWh/a | 
| Average Energy Not Supplied :  AENS   = 0.287 MWh/Ca | 
| Average Customer Curtailment Index :  ACCI   = 0.944 MWh/Ca | 
| Expected Interruption Cost :  EIC = 0.774 M$/a | 
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate :  IEAR   =   17.627 $/kWh | 
| System energy shed :  SES = 0.000 MWh/a | 
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index :  ASIFI  =   3.769955 1/a | 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index :  ASIDI  =   13.134153 h/a | 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index :  MAIFI  = 0.000000 1/Ca | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 6: Results of the system indices to obtain SAIDI for Configuration 3 
Configuration 4: Configuration 3 + Intellirupter Pulsecloser added at LBS 4204 
Figure 7: Results of the load point indices for Configuration 4 from DIgSILENT 
Act.Pow. Number of connec…. Tariff AID LPIT LPIF LPENS ACIF ACIT LPIC TCIT TMVAIF
MW IntTariffenergy,Int….. h h/a 1/a MWh/a 1/a h/a $/a Ch/a
A A Grid 4,2458 20 1,127442 10,71999 9,5082384 4,551491 9,508238 10,71999 97766,03 214,3997 5,305777
BRUYN (B) BRUYN (B) Grid 0,46 1 1,563972 3,098356 1,9810812 0,142524 1,981081 3,098356 3061,423 3,098356 2,758958
C C Grid 0,92 1 1,568848 3,114885 1,98546 0,286569 1,98546 3,114885 6155,512 3,114885 5,505747
D D Grid 0,115 2 2,100676 4,931978 2,3478057 0,056718 2,347806 4,931978 1218,297 9,863956 0,582003
E E Grid 0,529 12 2,822536 8,823637 3,1261374 0,46677 3,126137 8,823637 10026,23 105,8836 2,010653
F F Grid 0,138 3 2,431246 6,442664 2,6499429 0,088909 2,649943 6,442664 1909,76 19,32799 0,618774
G G Grid 0,98164 15 0,729943 3,360646 4,6039824 0,329894 4,603982 3,360646 7086,132 50,40968 2,533426
H H Grid 0,46 5 2,1999 5,347964 2,4310029 0,246006 2,431003 5,347964 5284,216 26,73982 2,24834
I I Grid 0,46 6 2,658552 7,728937 2,9071974 0,355531 2,907197 7,728937 7636,808 46,37362 1,880065
J J Grid 0,805 11 2,879707 9,245096 3,2104293 0,74423 3,210429 9,245096 15986,07 101,6961 2,979355
K K Grid 0,345 6 0,87929 3,272413 3,7216542 0,112898 3,721654 3,272413 2425,054 19,63448 1,10147
L L Grid 0,552 3 1,563972 3,098356 1,9810812 0,171029 1,981081 3,098356 3673,708 9,295067 3,31075
M M Grid 0,92 1 1,563972 3,098356 1,9810812 0,285049 1,981081 3,098356 6122,846 3,098356 5,517916
Name In Folder Grid
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The CIC calculation for different load points for Configuration 4 are shown in Figure 8 using 
equation (9.1) 
Figure 8: Calculations of the CIC for each load point - Annual cost of interruptions 
- Configuration 4
Annual cost of interruptions of feeder for Configuration 4 = R 1659123.89 
Where: U = λ x r and Unserved energy = U x Average load 
Utility cost for Configuration 4 includes Configuration 3: 
Loss of income = R 0.8/kWh x 3618kVA x 0.92 x 7.13 (SAIDI) = R 18986.11 
Investment cost for Intellirupter Pulsecloser = R 345600 
Maintenance cost for Intellirupter Pulsecloser = 0 
Labour cost = 10 % of investment cost for Intellirupter Pulsecloser = R 34560 
Utility Cost = Loss of income + Investment cost + Maintenance cost + Operation cost 
Utility cost = R 18986.11+ R 345600 + R 34560 + R 943814.18 = R 1342960.29 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |   DIgSILENT   | Project: | 
| | | PowerFactory  |------------------------------- 
|                 |                                                                |    15.1.4 | Date:  6/30/2015             | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Reliability Assessment | 
|   Method Load flow analysis | 
|   Network Distribution (Optimal Power Restoration) | 
|   Calculation time period 2015 | 
|   Consider Maintenance Yes | 
|   Fault Clearance Breakers Use all circuit breakers | 
|   Switching procedures Sequential | 
|   Consider Sectionalizing (Stages 1-3) No | 
|   Time to open remote controlled switches 0.10 min. | 
| | 
| Automatic Contingency Definition | 
|   Selection Whole System | 
|   Busbars / terminals Yes Common mode No | 
|   Lines / cables Yes Independent second failures No | 
|   Transformers Yes  Double earth faults No | 
| Protection/switching failures No | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| Study Case: Study Case                                                                           | Annex:                  / 1  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Summary                                                                                                                  | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
| System Average Interruption Frequency Index :  SAIFI  =   4.752724  1/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Frequency Index :  CAIFI  =   4.752724  1/Ca | 
| System Average Interruption Duration Index           :  SAIDI  =    7.134    h/Ca | 
| Customer Average Interruption Duration Index         :  CAIDI  =    1.501    h | 
| Average Service Availability Index :  ASAI   = 0.9991314654  | 
| Average Service Unavailability Index :  ASUI   = 0.0008685346 | 
| Energy Not Supplied :  ENS = 8.081 MWh/a | 
| Average Energy Not Supplied :  AENS   = 0.094 MWh/Ca | 
| Average Customer Curtailment Index :  ACCI   = 0.192 MWh/Ca | 
| Expected Interruption Cost :  EIC = 0.123 M$/a | 
| Interrupted Energy Assessment Rate :  IEAR   =   15.217 $/kWh | 
| System energy shed :  SES = 0.000 MWh/a | 
| Average System Interruption Frequency Index :  ASIFI  = 3.769955 1/a | 
| Average System Interruption Duration Index :  ASIDI  = 7.392628 h/a | 
| Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index :  MAIFI  = 0.000000 1/Ca | 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 9: Results of the system indices to obtain SAIDI for Configuration 4 
Configuration 4
Load λ(f/yr) r(hrs) U(hrs/yr) Average Load (MW) Average Load (kW) Unserved Energy (kWh/yr) COUE(R/kWh) CIC(R/yr)
A 9.508238 1.12744179 10.71998532 4.1535 4153.5 44525.45903 21.48 956406.8599
BRUYN (B) 1.981081 1.563971992 3.09835551 0.46 460 1425.243535 21.48 30614.23112
C 1.98546 1.568848267 3.11488548 0.9 900 2803.396932 21.48 60216.9661
D 2.347806 2.100675541 4.93197801 0.1125 112.5 554.8475261 21.48 11918.12486
E 3.126137 2.82253637 8.82363651 0.529 529 4667.703714 21.48 100262.2758
F 2.649943 2.431246353 6.44266401 0.138 138 889.0876334 21.48 19097.60237
G 4.603982 0.729943197 3.36064563 0.9603 960.3 3227.227998 21.48 69320.85741
H 2.431003 2.1999003 5.34796401 0.46 460 2460.063445 21.48 52842.16279
I 2.907197 2.65855236 7.72893651 0.46 460 3555.310795 21.48 76368.07587
J 3.210429 2.879707088 9.24509601 0.805 805 7442.302288 21.48 159860.6531
K 3.721654 0.879289863 3.27241281 0.345 345 1128.982419 21.48 24250.54237
L 1.981081 1.563971992 3.09835551 0.552 552 1710.292242 21.48 36737.07735
M 1.981081 1.563971992 3.09835551 0.92 920 2850.487069 21.48 61228.46225
Total Annual Cost of Interruption 1659123.891
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Phase DateTime Name Duration
A-RED 2014-12-19 14:47 Outage 0.418992
A-RED 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-19 14:47 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-19 14:47 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-19 14:47 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-12-08 10:00 Outage 0.419998
A-RED 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-08 10:00 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-08 10:00 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-08 10:00 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-07 10:01 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-12-07 10:01 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-07 10:01 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-07 10:01 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-06 16:12 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-12-06 16:12 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-06 16:12 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-06 16:12 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-06 10:07 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-06 10:07 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-12-06 10:07 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-06 10:07 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-12-05 13:31 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-12-05 13:31 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-12-05 13:31 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-12-05 13:31 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-11-29 10:04 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-11-29 10:04 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-11-29 10:04 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-11-29 10:04 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-11-26 17:36 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-11-26 17:36 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-11-26 17:36 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-11-26 17:36 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-11-22 10:00 Outage 0.418991
C-BLU 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-11-22 10:00 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-11-22 10:00 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-11-22 10:00 Line Current Off
A-RED 2014-11-02 10:02 Outage 0.418991
A-RED 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current On
A-RED 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current Off
B-WHT 2014-11-02 10:02 Outage 0.418991
B-WHT 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current On
B-WHT 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current Off
C-BLU 2014-11-02 10:02 Outage 0.418992
C-BLU 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current On
C-BLU 2014-11-02 10:02 Line Current Off
Appendix M: Last Fault Data – FuseSaver 
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Appendix N: Network Reliability Equivalent for Distribution Test System 
 Feeder (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 and Waterkloof Farmers 1  
 11 kV  
Distribution Test system (RBTS Bus 6) Feeder 4 
Customer Data, Feeder Types and Lengths 
Customer Data [60] 
Feeder Types and Lengths [60] 
Number of 
Load Points 




3 1 3 9 residential 0.3171 0.1775 138 
4 2 4 11 19 residential 0.3229 0.1808 126 
2 5 6 residential 0.3864 0.2163 118 
5 7 8 10 18 23 residential 0.2964 0.1659 147 
3 12 13 22 residential 0.3698 0.2070 132 
4 25 28 31 36 residential 0.2776 0.1554 79 
4 27 29 33 39 residential 0.2831 0.1585 76 
2 14 17 commercial 0.8500 0.4697 10 
1 15 small 1.9670 1.6391 1 
1 16 small 1.0830 0.9025 1 
2 32 37 farm 0.5025 0.1929 1 
3 20 30 34 farm 0.6517 0.2501 1 
2 21 35 farm 0.6860 0.2633 1 
2 24 40 farm 0.7965 0.3057 1 
2 26 38 farm 0.7375 0.2831 1 





Feeder Section Numbers 
Bus 6 
1 0.6 2 3 8 9 12 13 17 19 20 24 25 28 31 34 41 47 
2 0.75 1 5 6 7 10 14 15 22 23 26 27 30 33 43 61 
3 0.8 4 11 16 18 21 29 32 35 55 
4 0.9 38 44 
5 1.6 37 39 42 49 54 62 
6 2.5 36 40 52 57 60 
7 2.8 35 46 50 56 59 64 
8 3.2 45 51 53 58 63 
9 3.5 48 
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Main section data, Line: ʎ = 0.065 (f/km.yr) 
Main Section Length (km) λ(f/yr) r(hrs) s(hrs) Line: λ = 0,065 (f/km.yr) 
35 0.8 0.052 5 1 
36 2.5 0.1625 5 1 
37 1.6 0.104 5 1 
38 0.9 0.0585 5 1 
39 1.6 0.104 5 1 
40 2.5 0.1625 5 1 
42 1.6 0.104 5 1 
44 0.9 0.0585 5 1 
45 3.2 0.208 5 1 
46 2.8 0.182 5 1 
48 3.5 0.2275 5 1 
49 1.6 0.104 5 1 
59 2.8 0.182 5 1 
59 2.8 0.182 5 1 
Lateral Section, Sub-Feeders and Transformer Data 
Component Sections Length 
(km) 
λ(f/yr) r(hrs) s(hrs) Line: λ = 0,065 
(f/km.yr) 
41 0.6 0.039 5 1 
43 0.75 0.04875 5 1 
47 0.6 0.039 5 1 
F5 13.3 0.8645 5 1 
F6 8.5 0.5525 5 1 
F7 12.9 0.8385 5 1 
Transformers 0.015 10 1 
Number of customers 











Reliability-network equivalent - Feeder 5 158 
Reliability-network equivalent - Feeder 6 156 
Reliability-network equivalent - Feeder 7 158 
Total 1183 
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Data for the lateral sections, Bus 6 
Data for the load points, Bus 6 
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Where, 
R = Residential customers 
A = Agricultural customers 
C = Commercial customers 
I = Industrial customers 
Comparison of load point indices for Bus 6 
172 
Comparison of system indices for Bus 6 
Waterkloof Farmers 1 11 kV Feeder 




Load Points B, C, D and E 
Load Point G 
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Load Points F, H, I and J 
Load Points K, L and M 
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Magpie 33 58 6.35 24.71 3/4/2.118 1.40 18.57 
6Al/1St 
Squirrel 106 149 6.33 24.48 6/1/2.11 0.84 8.02 
Fox 148 210 8.37 42.80 6/1/2.79    1.46 13.10 
Rabbit 186 - 10.05 61.70 6/1/3.35    2.10 18.5 
Mink 209 297 10.98 73.65 6/1/3.66 2.52 21.90 
Raccoon 238 - 12.27 91.97 6/1/4.09 3.14 27.20 
Hare 292 408 14.16 122.48 6/1/4.72 4.19 36.00 
18Al/1St 
Chickadee 433 625 18.87 212.09 18/1/3.77 6.31 44.90 
Kingbird 590 855 23.88 340.96 18/1/4.78 10.08 69.80 
30Al/7St 
Wolf 378 548 18.13 194.94 30/7/2.59 7.16 69.20 
Bear 529 770 23.45 326.12 30/7/3.35 11.97 112.00 
Goat 607 884 25.97 399.98 30/7/3.71 14.72 136.00 
45Al/7St 































Acacia 114 160 6.24 23.79 7/2.08 0.65 6.69 
35 163 229 8.31 42.18 7/2.77 1.13 11.86 
Pine 227 320 10.83 71.65 7/3.61 1.92 20.20 
Oak 312 443 13.95 118.90 7/4.65 3.19 33.33 
37Al 
Sycamore 583 829 22.61 303.20 37/3.23 8.19 85.00 
Upas 557 740 24.71 362.10 37/3.53 9.78 101.67 
AAC 
19Al 
Hornet - - 16.25 157.62 19/3.25 4.27 26.00 
c.f. above Centipede - - 26.46 415.22 37/3.78 11.28 67.20 
61Al 




























0.15 Cu 352.2 12.63 97.44 7/4.21 8.59 38.0 Chickadee 
0.1 Cu 279.9 10.36 65.60 7/3.45 5.77 26.1 Oak 
0.06 Cu 197 7.92 38.36 7/2.64 3.37 15.7 Pine 
0.075 Cu 8.84 47.73 7/2.95 4.20 19.4 Oak 
3Cu 
0.05 Cu 188 8.04 32.85 3/3.73 2.89 12.9 Pine 
0.025 Cu 124.1 5.67 16.44 3/2.64 1.45 6.8 35 
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Appendix P: Planning and Designing of Intellirupter Pulsecloser Structure, 
  FuseSaver and Tripsaver 
Structure of Drawings 
A special structure was designed and planned for the Intellirupter Pulsecloser. Visual 400 A 
isolating links was designed on either side of the Intellirupter for the incoming and outgoing 
solid cut-outs isolation purposes. A load break switch was included in the design as a by-
pass in the event of mal-functioning of the devise.  
The structure was made up of 
 Strain A- Frame or Delta Wood X- Arm
 Bypass (Load Break Switch)
 Intellirupter Pulsecloser
 Jumpers to be Covered
 Pole 9m Min. 160mm Top Diameter
 Pole 12m Min. 180mm Top Diameter for conductors up to Mink
 Pole 12m 200mm Top Diameter for bigger conductors.
 Make use of 400 A links for the incoming and outgoing solid cut-outs
 Support centre Intellirupter Pulsecloser jumpers with post insulator.
 Use top groove ties attach jumpers to insulator
 Special anti-climbing device is required in high risk areas.
Figure 1 explains the structure of the Intellirupter Pulsecloser. 
Figure 1: Intellirupter Pulsecloser Structure [6] 
Designing and Planning of the ENS drawing for the Pilot feeder 
The Intelliruptor Pulsecloser, Tripsaver, FuseSaver and Fault Path Indicators were added to 
the locations indicated on the drawings below: 
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Intellirupter Pulsecloser at Existing LBS4204 
The physical operation of the Pulsecloser is basically similar to that of a recloser, therefore 
the Intellirupter and two sets of links were added at the existing LBS4204 and the normal 
recloser symbols were used for Intelliruptor.  A short note “Intelliruptor Pulsecloser” Pilot was 
included on the drawing. 
Figure 2: Intelliruptor Pulsecloser symbol on ENS 
Tripsaver at SF617 
The Tripsaver also drops out the same way a fuse does, and for operating purposes it can 
be opened in the same way as a fuse. The SF617 was replaced with a symbol for rackable 
breaker and the note “Tripsaver Pilot” was added to the drawing. 
Figure 3: The Tripsaver symbol on ENS 
FuseSaver at SF451 
The FuseSaver is basically a breaker and hence it can also be indicated as a recloser 
symbol with a note. The Recloser symbol was included directly after SF451 (use same 
coordinates as SF451) and the note: “FuseSaver Pilot” was included on the drawing. 
Figure 4: The FuseSaver symbol on ENS 
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Appendix Q: Installation – Tripsavers and FPI’s 
Figure 1: Overhead crew members from Eskom Western Cape Operating Unit 
distribution, install a Tripsaver Dropout Recloser as part of the pilot project 
– Waterkloof F1 11 kV Feeder
Figure 2: Workmen ready to close a Tripsaver into an operational circuit 
